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higress/plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
rinfx c32e1ab69b Go WAF Plugin (#400)
2023-06-28 19:25:36 +08:00

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Some protocol violations are common in application layer attacks.
# Validating HTTP requests eliminates a large number of application layer attacks.
#
# The purpose of this rules file is to enforce HTTP RFC requirements that state how
# the client is supposed to interact with the server.
# https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec3.html
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:920011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:920012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# Validate request line against the format specified in the HTTP RFC
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
#
# Uses rule negation against the regex for positive security. The regex specifies the proper
# construction of URI request lines such as:
#
# "http:" "//" host [ ":" port ] [ abs_path [ "?" query ]]
#
# It also outlines proper construction for CONNECT, OPTIONS and GET requests.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/920100.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 920100
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec3.html#sec3.2.1
# http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/272.html
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "!@rx (?i)^(?:get /[^#\?]*(?:\?[^\s\v#]*)?(?:#[^\s\v]*)?|(?:connect (?:(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\.?(?::[0-9]+)?|[\--9A-Z_a-z]+:[0-9]+)|options \*|[a-z]{3,10}[\s\v]+(?:[0-9A-Z_a-z]{3,7}?://[\--9A-Z_a-z]*(?::[0-9]+)?)?/[^#\?]*(?:\?[^\s\v#]*)?(?:#[^\s\v]*)?)[\s\v]+[\.-9A-Z_a-z]+)$" \
"id:920100,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Invalid HTTP Request Line',\
logdata:'%{request_line}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Identify multipart/form-data name evasion attempts
#
# There are possible impedance mismatches between how
# ModSecurity interprets multipart file names and how
# a destination app server such as PHP might parse the
# Content-Disposition data:
#
# filename-parm := "filename" "=" value
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# These rules check for the existence of the ' " ; = meta-characters in
# either the "name" (FILES) and "filename" (FILES_NAMES) variables.
# HTML entities may lead to false positives, which is why
# frequently used ones, such as "ä", are allowed at PL1.
#
# -=[ Targets, characters and html entities ]=-
#
# 920120 + 920122: PL1 : FILES_NAMES, FILES
# Disallow ['\";=], except for frequently used HTML entities (see 920120.data).
#
# 920121: PL2 : FILES_NAMES, FILES
# Disallow ['\";=]
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ModSecurity_CRS_RuleID-96000
# http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2183.txt
#
# This rule used to use negative look-behind.
# See https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/wiki/Technical-Decisions-and-Best-Practices#avoiding-negative-look-behind-in-regular-expressions
# for an explanation of why it now uses `!@rx` instead to avoid look-around.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/920120.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 920120
#
SecRule FILES|FILES_NAMES "!@rx (?i)^(?:&(?:(?:[acegiln-or-suz]acut|[aeiou]grav|[ain-o]tild)e|[c-elnr-tz]caron|(?:[cgk-lnr-t]cedi|[aeiouy]um)l|[aceg-josuwy]circ|[au]ring|a(?:mp|pos)|nbsp|oslash);|[^\"';=])*$" \
"id:920120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Attempted multipart/form-data bypass',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Accept only digits in content length
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule uses ModSecurity's rule negation against the regex meaning if the Content-Length header
# is NOT all digits, then it will match.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec14.html#sec14.13
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!@rx ^\d+$" \
"id:920160,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Content-Length HTTP header is not numeric',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Do not accept GET or HEAD requests with bodies
# HTTP standard allows GET requests to have a body but this
# feature is not used in real life. Attackers could try to force
# a request body on an unsuspecting web applications.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This is a chained rule that first checks the Request Method. If it is a
# GET or HEAD method, then it checks for the existence of a Content-Length
# header. If the header exists and its payload is either not a 0 digit or not
# empty, then it will match.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec4.html#sec4.3
#
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@rx ^(?:GET|HEAD)$" \
"id:920170,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'GET or HEAD Request with Body Content',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!@rx ^0?$" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This is a sibling of rule 920170
#
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@rx ^(?:GET|HEAD)$" \
"id:920171,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'GET or HEAD Request with Transfer-Encoding',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Transfer-Encoding "!@eq 0" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Require Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding to be provided with
# every POST request if the protocol version is not HTTP/2.
#
# In case of HTTP/2, see the RFC7540 8.1 p52:
# HTTP/2 does not use the Transfer-Encoding: chunked anymore, because
# the underlying transport protocol is already using data frames with
# known length.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This chained rule checks if the protocol is not HTTP/2, then checks
# request method is POST, if so, it checks that a Content-Length or
# Transfer-Encoding headers are also present.
#
SecRule REQUEST_PROTOCOL "!@within HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0" \
"id:920180,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'POST without Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding headers',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@streq POST" \
"chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "@eq 0" \
"chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Transfer-Encoding "@eq 0" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# As per RFC7230 3.3.2: A sender MUST NOT send a Content-Length
# header field in any message that contains a Transfer-Encoding header
# field.
#
# Related to 920170, 920171 and 920180.
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Transfer-Encoding "!@eq 0" \
"id:920181,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers present',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!@eq 0" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Range Header Check
#
# RFC7233 2.1 p6:
# "A byte-range-spec is invalid if the last-byte-pos value is present
# and less than the first-byte-pos."
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule compares the first and second byte ranges and flags
# when the first value is greater than the second.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7233
# https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Range|REQUEST_HEADERS:Request-Range "@rx (\d+)-(\d+)" \
"id:920190,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Range: Invalid Last Byte Value',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule TX:2 "@lt %{tx.1}" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Broken/Malicious clients often have duplicate or conflicting headers
# Automated programs and bots often do not obey the HTTP RFC
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule inspects the Connection header and looks for duplicates of the
# keep-alive and close options.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://www.bad-behavior.ioerror.us/about/
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7233
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Connection "@rx \b(?:keep-alive|close),\s?(?:keep-alive|close)\b" \
"id:920210,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Multiple/Conflicting Connection Header Data Found',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Check URL encodings
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# There are two different chained rules. We need to separate them as we are inspecting two
# different variables - REQUEST_URI and REQUEST_BODY. For REQUEST_BODY, we only want to
# run the @validateUrlEncoding operator if the content-type is application/x-www-form-urlencoding.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1738.txt
#
# -=[ Example payload ]=-
# http://localhost/?s=a%20b%20c%'/
# reason: %'/ is not a valid url encoding
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx \x25" \
"id:920220,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267/72',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@validateUrlEncoding" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^(?i)application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
"id:920240,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267/72',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@rx \x25" \
"chain"
SecRule REQUEST_BODY "@validateUrlEncoding" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Check UTF encoding
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the site, otherwise
# it will result in false positives.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This chained rule first checks to see if the admin has set the TX:CRS_VALIDATE_UTF8_ENCODING
# variable in the crs-setup.conf file.
#
SecRule TX:CRS_VALIDATE_UTF8_ENCODING "@eq 1" \
"id:920250,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'UTF8 Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@validateUtf8Encoding" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Disallow use of full-width unicode as decoding evasions may be possible.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule looks for full-width encoding by looking for %u followed by 2 'f'
# characters and then 2 hex characters. It is a vulnerability that affected
# IIS circa 2007.
# The rule will trigger on %uXXXX formatted chars that are full or half
# width, as explained above. This %uXXXX format is passed as a raw parameter
# and is (seemingly only) accepted by IIS (5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0). Other
# webservers will only process unicode chars presented as hex UTF-8 bytes.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/739224
# https://www.checkpoint.com/defense/advisories/public/2007/cpai-2007-201.html
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/719
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY "@rx \%u[fF]{2}[0-9a-fA-F]{2}" \
"id:920260,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Unicode Full/Half Width Abuse Attack Attempt',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-iis',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267/72',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict type of characters sent
#
# This is a rule with multiple stricter siblings that grows more
# restrictive in higher paranoia levels.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule uses the @validateByteRange operator to restrict the request
# payloads.
#
# -=[ Targets and ASCII Ranges ]=-
#
# 920270: PL1 : REQUEST_URI, REQUEST_HEADERS, ARGS and ARGS_NAMES
# ASCII 1-255 : Full ASCII range without null character
#
# 920271: PL2 : REQUEST_URI, REQUEST_HEADERS, ARGS and ARGS_NAMES
# ASCII 9,10,13,32-126,128-255 : Full visible ASCII range, tab, newline
#
# 920272: PL3 : REQUEST_URI, REQUEST_HEADERS, ARGS, ARGS_NAMES and REQUEST_BODY
# ASCII 32-36,38-126 : Visible lower ASCII range without percent symbol
#
# 920273: PL4 : ARGS, ARGS_NAMES and REQUEST_BODY
# ASCII 38,44-46,48-58,61,65-90,95,97-122
# A-Z a-z 0-9 = - _ . , : &
#
# 920274: PL4 : REQUEST_HEADERS without User-Agent, Referer, Cookie
# and Structured Header booleans
# ASCII 32,34,38,42-59,61,65-90,95,97-122
# A-Z a-z 0-9 = - _ . , : & " * + / SPACE
#
# REQUEST_URI and REQUEST_HEADERS User-Agent, Referer and Cookie are very hard
# to restrict beyond the limits in 920272. Structured Header booleans are
# validated separately in 920275.
#
# 920274 generally has few positives. However, it would detect rare attacks
# on Accept request headers and friends.
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@validateByteRange 1-255" \
"id:920270,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request (null character)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Do not accept requests without common headers.
# All normal web browsers include Host, User-Agent and Accept headers.
# Implies either an attacker or a legitimate automation client.
#
#
# Missing/Empty Host Header
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# These rules will first check to see if a Host header is present.
# The second check is to see if a Host header exists but is empty.
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@eq 0" \
"id:920280,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Missing a Host Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}',\
skipAfter:END-HOST-CHECK"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@rx ^$" \
"id:920290,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Empty Host Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
SecMarker "END-HOST-CHECK"
#
# Empty Accept Header
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule checks if an Accept header exists, but has an empty value.
# This is only allowed in combination with the OPTIONS method.
# Additionally, there are some clients sending empty Accept headers.
# They are covered in another chained rule checking the User-Agent.
# This technique demands a separate rule to detect an empty
# Accept header if there is no user agent. This is checked via
# the separate rule 920311.
#
# Exclude some common broken clients sending empty Accept header:
# "Business/6.6.1.2 CFNetwork/758.5.3 Darwin/15.6.0" (CRS issue #515)
# "Entreprise/6.5.0.177 CFNetwork/758.4.3 Darwin/15.5.0" (CRS issue #366)
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/366
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@rx ^$" \
"id:920310,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Has an Empty Accept Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!@rx ^OPTIONS$" \
"chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "!@pm AppleWebKit Android Business Enterprise Entreprise" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This rule is a sibling of rule 920310.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@rx ^$" \
"id:920311,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Has an Empty Accept Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!@rx ^OPTIONS$" \
"chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@eq 0" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Empty User-Agent Header
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rules will check to see if the User-Agent header is empty.
#
# Note that there is a second rule, 920320, which will check for
# the existence of the User-Agent header.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx ^$" \
"id:920330,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Empty User Agent Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Missing Content-Type Header with Request Body
#
# -=[ Rule Logic]=-
# This rule will first check to see if the value of the Content-Length header is
# non-equal to 0. The chained rule is then checking the existence of the
# Content-Type header. The RFCs do not state there must be a
# Content-Type header. However, a request missing a Content-Header is a
# strong indication of a non-compliant browser.
#
# Also, omitting the CT header allows to bypass the Request Body Processor
# unless you set the optional tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded variable.
#
# Note: in default settings, this behavior only provides a NOTICE and will
# not cause a request to be blocked. However, in paranoia level 2 or
# higher, we run sibling 920341, which DOES block these requests.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#header.content-type
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!@rx ^0$" \
"id:920340,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Containing Content, but Missing Content-Type header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@eq 0" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
# Check that the host header is not an IP address
# This is not an HTTP RFC violation but it is indicative of automated client access.
# Many web-based worms propagate by scanning IP address blocks.
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule triggers if the Host header contains an IPv4 or IPv6 address, optionally
# extended with a port number. In the case of IPv6 we covering the address with square
# brackets and the address without square brackets.
#
# The regex consists of three main parts and said optional group:
#
# * IPv4 address
# * IPv6 address with square brackets
# * IPv6 address without square brackets
# * optional colon and port number
#
# Please note that the regex does not test the validity of the IP addresses.
# It just tries to detect a potential IP address.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2005.01.hackerbasher.aspx
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Host "@rx (?:^([\d.]+|\[[\da-f:]+\]|[\da-f:]+)(:[\d]+)?$)" \
"id:920350,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Host header is a numeric IP address',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
# In most cases, you should expect a certain volume of each a request on your
# website. For example, a request with 400 arguments, can be suspicious.
# This file creates limitations on the request.
#
# TODO Look at the rules in this file, and define the sizes you'd like to enforce.
# Note that most of the rules are commented out by default.
# Uncomment the rules you need
#
#
# Maximum number of arguments in request limited
#
SecRule &TX:MAX_NUM_ARGS "@eq 1" \
"id:920380,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Too many arguments in request',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule &ARGS "@gt %{tx.max_num_args}" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
## -- Arguments limits --
#
# Limit argument name length
#
SecRule &TX:ARG_NAME_LENGTH "@eq 1" \
"id:920360,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Argument name too long',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@gt %{tx.arg_name_length}" \
"t:none,t:length,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Limit argument value length
#
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts Remote Code Execution exploit:
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
#
SecRule &TX:ARG_LENGTH "@eq 1" \
"id:920370,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Argument value too long',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule ARGS "@gt %{tx.arg_length}" \
"t:none,t:length,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Limit arguments total length
#
SecRule &TX:TOTAL_ARG_LENGTH "@eq 1" \
"id:920390,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Total arguments size exceeded',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule ARGS_COMBINED_SIZE "@gt %{tx.total_arg_length}" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -- File upload limits --
#
# Individual file size is limited
SecRule &TX:MAX_FILE_SIZE "@eq 1" \
"id:920400,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Uploaded file size too large',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^(?i)multipart/form-data" \
"chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "@gt %{tx.max_file_size}" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Combined file size is limited
#
SecRule &TX:COMBINED_FILE_SIZES "@eq 1" \
"id:920410,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Total uploaded files size too large',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule FILES_COMBINED_SIZE "@gt %{tx.combined_file_sizes}" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict which content-types we accept.
#
# Restrict Content-Type header to established patterns.
#
# This provides generic allow list protection against vulnerabilities like
# Apache Struts Content-Type arbitrary command execution (CVE-2017-5638).
#
# Examples of allowed patterns:
# - text/plain
# - text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
# - multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary12345
# - application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8; action="urn:localhost-hwh#getQuestions"
# - application/*+json
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "!@rx ^[\w/.+*-]+(?:\s?;\s?(?:action|boundary|charset|component|start(?:-info)?|type|version)\s?=\s?['\"\w.()+,/:=?<>@#*-]+)*$" \
"id:920470,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Illegal Content-Type header',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# In case Content-Type header can be parsed, check the mime-type against
# the policy defined in the 'allowed_request_content_type' variable.
# To change your policy, edit crs-setup.conf and activate rule 900220.
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^[^;\s]+" \
"id:920420,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request content type is not allowed by policy',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.content_type=|%{tx.0}|',\
chain"
SecRule TX:content_type "!@within %{tx.allowed_request_content_type}" \
"t:lowercase,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict charset parameter within the content-type header
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx charset\s*=\s*[\"']?([^;\"'\s]+)" \
"id:920480,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request content type charset is not allowed by policy',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.content_type_charset=|%{tx.1}|',\
chain"
SecRule TX:content_type_charset "!@within %{tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset}" \
"t:lowercase,\
ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable=On,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict charset parameter inside content type header to occur max once.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx charset.*?charset" \
"id:920530,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Multiple charsets detected in content type header',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict protocol versions.
#
SecRule REQUEST_PROTOCOL "!@within %{tx.allowed_http_versions}" \
"id:920430,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'HTTP protocol version is not allowed by policy',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict file extension
#
SecRule REQUEST_BASENAME "@rx \.([^.]+)$" \
"id:920440,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'URL file extension is restricted by policy',\
logdata:'%{TX.0}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.extension=.%{tx.1}/',\
chain"
SecRule TX:EXTENSION "@within %{tx.restricted_extensions}" \
"t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:lowercase,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Backup or "working" file extension
# example: index.php~, /index.php~/foo/
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx \.[^.~]+~(?:/.*|)$" \
"id:920500,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Attempt to access a backup or working file',\
logdata:'%{TX.0}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restricted HTTP headers
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# The use of certain headers is restricted. They are listed in the variable
# TX.restricted_headers.
#
# The headers are transformed into lowercase before the match. In order to
# make sure that only complete header names are matching, the names in
# TX.restricted_headers are wrapped in slashes. This guarantees that the
# header Range (-> /range/) is not matching the restricted header
# /content-range/ for example.
#
# This is a chained rule, where the first rule fills a set of variables of the
# form TX.header_name_<HEADER_NAME>. The second rule is then executed for all
# variables of the form TX.header_name_<HEADER_NAME>.
#
# As a consequence of the construction of the rule, the alert message and the
# alert data will not display the original header name Content-Range, but
# /content-range/ instead.
#
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/httpoxy (Header Proxy)
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES "@rx ^.*$" \
"id:920450,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'HTTP header is restricted by policy (%{MATCHED_VAR})',\
logdata:'Restricted header detected: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.header_name_%{tx.0}=/%{tx.0}/',\
chain"
SecRule TX:/^header_name_/ "@within %{tx.restricted_headers}" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Rule against CVE-2022-21907
# This rule blocks Accept-Encoding headers longer than 50 characters.
# The length of 50 is a heuristic based on the length of values from
# the RFC (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics/)
# and the respective values assigned by IANA
# (https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-parameters/http-parameters.xml#content-coding).
#
# This rule has a stricter sibling: 920521
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept-Encoding "@gt 50" \
"id:920520,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,t:length,\
msg:'Accept-Encoding header exceeded sensible length',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Restrict response charsets that we allow.
# The following rules make sure that the response will be in an ASCII-compatible charset that
# phase 4 rules can properly understand and block.
#
#
# Some servers rely on the request Accept header to determine what charset to respond with.
# This rule restricts these to familiar charsets.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/920600.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 920600
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "!@rx ^(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*(?:[\s\v]*,[\s\v]*(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*)*$" \
"id:920600,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Illegal Accept header: charset parameter',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Unicode character bypass check for non JSON requests
# See reported bypass in issue:
# https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/issues/2512
#
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@streq JSON" \
"id:920540,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Unicode character bypass detected',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267/72',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@rx (?i)\x5cu[0-9a-f]{4}" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Disallow any raw URL fragments. The '#' character should be omitted or URL-encoded.
# CRS rules generally do not check REQUEST_URI_RAW, but some servers accept the fragment as part of the URL path/query.
# This creates false negative evasions.
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI_RAW "@contains #" \
"id:920610,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Raw (unencoded) fragment in request URI',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:920013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:920014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
#
# Check the number of range fields in the Range request header.
#
# An excessive number of Range request headers can be used to DoS a server.
# The original CVE proposed an arbitrary upper limit of 5 range fields.
#
# Several clients are known to request PDF fields with up to 62 range
# fields. Therefore the standard rule does not cover PDF files. This is
# performed in two separate (stricter) siblings of this rule.
#
# 920200: PL2: Limit of 5 range header fields for all filenames outside of PDFs
# 920201: PL2: Limit of 62 range header fields for PDFs
# 920202: PL4: Limit of 5 range header fields for PDFs
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://httpd.apache.org/security/CVE-2011-3192.txt
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Range|REQUEST_HEADERS:Request-Range "@rx ^bytes=(?:(?:\d+)?-(?:\d+)?\s*,?\s*){6}" \
"id:920200,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Range: Too many fields (6 or more)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_BASENAME "!@endsWith .pdf" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This is a sibling of rule 920200
#
SecRule REQUEST_BASENAME "@endsWith .pdf" \
"id:920201,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Range: Too many fields for pdf request (63 or more)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Range|REQUEST_HEADERS:Request-Range "@rx ^bytes=(?:(?:\d+)?-(?:\d+)?\s*,?\s*){63}" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS "@rx %[0-9a-fA-F]{2}" \
"id:920230,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Multiple URL Encoding Detected',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/267/120',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# PL2: This is a stricter sibling of 920270.
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@validateByteRange 9,10,13,32-126,128-255" \
"id:920271,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request (non printable characters)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Missing User-Agent Header
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rules will check to see if there is a User-Agent header or not.
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@eq 0" \
"id:920320,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Missing User Agent Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
#
# PL2: This is a stricter sibling of 920120.
#
SecRule FILES_NAMES|FILES "@rx ['\";=]" \
"id:920121,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Attempted multipart/form-data bypass',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# PL2: Block on Missing Content-Type Header with Request Body
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 920340.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://httpwg.org/specs/rfc7231.html#header.content-type
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Length "!@rx ^0$" \
"id:920341,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Containing Content Requires Content-Type header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@eq 0" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:920015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:920016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
#
# PL 3: This is a stricter sibling of 920270. Ascii range: Printable characters in the low range
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@validateByteRange 32-36,38-126" \
"id:920272,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request (outside of printable chars below ascii 127)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Missing Accept Header
#
# This rule has been moved to PL3
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule generates a notice if the Accept header is missing.
# RFC 7231 does not enforce the use of the Accept header.
# It is just typical browser behavior to send and it can indicate a malicious client.
#
# Notice: The rule tries to avoid known false positives by ignoring
# OPTIONS requests, CONNECT requests, and requests coming from known
# offending User-Agents via two chained rules.
# As ModSecurity only reports the match of the last matching rule,
# the alert is misleading.
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept "@eq 0" \
"id:920300,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request Missing an Accept Header',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'NOTICE',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!@rx ^(?:OPTIONS|CONNECT)$" \
"chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "!@pm AppleWebKit Android" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.notice_anomaly_score}'"
#
# PL3: The little known x-up-devcap-post-charset request header can be used to submit
# a request with a different encoding as an alternative to the charset parameter in
# the Content-Type header. This can be used to circumvent charset restrictions on
# the Content-Type header in ASP.NET.
# Note that this only works in combination with a User-Agent prefix.
#
# This rule is based on a blog post by Soroush Dalili at
# https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/05/x-up-devcap-post-charset-header-in-aspnet-to-bypass-wafs-again/
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:x-up-devcap-post-charset "@ge 1" \
"id:920490,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Request header x-up-devcap-post-charset detected in combination with prefix \'UP\' to User-Agent',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'language-aspnet',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx ^(?i)up" \
"t:none,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Cache-Control Request Header allow list
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# This rule aims to strictly allow list the Cache-Control request header
# values and to blocks all violations. This should be useful to intercept
# "bad bot" and tools that impersonate a real browser but with wrong request
# header setup.
#
# The regular expression used on this rule tries to match multiple directives
# in a single value, for example: "max-stale=1, max-age=2". This leads us to
# use a regular expression that accepts a trailing comma to keep compatibility
# with all regex engines and not PCRE only. For example: "max-stale=1, max-age=2, "
#
# Moreover, this regular expression allows duplicate directives sequence like:
# "max-stale, max-stale=1, no-cache, no-cache".
#
# Standard Cache-Control directives that can be used by the client:
# - max-age=<seconds>
# - max-stale[=<seconds>]
# - min-fresh=<seconds>
# - no-cache
# - no-store
# - no-transform
# - only-if-cached
#
# References:
# - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Cache-Control
# - https://regex101.com/r/CZ0Hxu/22
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Cache-Control "@gt 0" \
"id:920510,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Invalid Cache-Control request header',\
logdata:'Invalid Cache-Control value in request found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'header-allowlist',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Cache-Control "!@rx ^(?:(?:max-age=[0-9]+|min-fresh=[0-9]+|no-cache|no-store|no-transform|only-if-cached|max-stale(?:=[0-9]+)?)(?:\s*\,\s*|$)){1,7}$" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This rule checks for valid Accept-Encoding headers
#
# This rule has a less strict sibling: 920520
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/920521.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 920521
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Accept-Encoding "!@rx br|compress|deflate|(?:pack200-)?gzip|identity|\*|^$|aes128gcm|exi|zstd|x-(?:compress|gzip)" \
"id:920521,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Illegal Accept-Encoding header',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:920017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:920018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 920200
#
SecRule REQUEST_BASENAME "@endsWith .pdf" \
"id:920202,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Range: Too many fields for pdf request (6 or more)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'WARNING',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Range|REQUEST_HEADERS:Request-Range "@rx ^bytes=(?:(?:\d+)?-(?:\d+)?\s*,?\s*){6}" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.warning_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This is a stricter sibling of 920270.
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY "@validateByteRange 38,44-46,48-58,61,65-90,95,97-122" \
"id:920273,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request (outside of very strict set)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This is a stricter sibling of 920270.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Cookie|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Sec-Fetch-User|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Sec-CH-UA|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Sec-CH-UA-Mobile "@validateByteRange 32,34,38,42-59,61,65-90,95,97-122" \
"id:920274,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request headers (outside of very strict set)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# This is a stricter sibling of 920270.
# The headers of this rule are Structured Header booleans, for which only `?0`,
# and `?1` are inconspicuous.
# Structured Header boolean: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-19#section-3.3.6
# Sec-Fetch-User: https://www.w3.org/TR/fetch-metadata/#http-headerdef-sec-fetch-user
# Sec-CH-UA-Mobile: https://wicg.github.io/ua-client-hints/#sec-ch-ua-mobile
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Sec-Fetch-User|REQUEST_HEADERS:Sec-CH-UA-Mobile "!@rx ^(?:\?[01])?$" \
"id:920275,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Invalid character in request headers (outside of very strict set)',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# -=[ Abnormal Character Escapes ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# Consider the following payload: arg=cat+/e\tc/pa\ssw\d
# Here, \s and \d were only used to obfuscate the string passwd and a lot of
# parsers will silently ignore the non-necessary escapes. The case with \t is
# a bit different though, as \t is a natural escape for the TAB character,
# so we will avoid this (and \n, \r, etc.).
#
# This rule aims to detect non-necessary, abnormal escapes. You could say it is
# a nice way to forbid the backslash character where it is not needed.
#
# This is a new rule at paranoia level 4. We expect quite a few false positives
# for this rule and we will later evaluate if the rule makes any sense at all.
# The rule is redundant with 920273 and 920274 in PL4. But if the rule proofs
# to be useful and false positives remain at a reasonable level, then it might
# be shifted to PL3 in a future release, where it would be the only rule
# covering the backslash escape.
#
# We forbid backslashes followed by a list of basic ascii characters - unless
# the backslash is preceded by another backslash.
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES "@rx (?:^|[^\x5c])\x5c[cdeghijklmpqwxyz123456789]" \
"id:920460,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Abnormal character escapes in request',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/153/267',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT"
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