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Go WAF Plugin (#400)

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rinfx
2023-06-28 19:25:36 +08:00
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parent fc05a3b256
commit c32e1ab69b
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3
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/Dockerfile Normal file
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FROM scratch
COPY local/main.wasm /plugin.wasm

52
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/README.md Normal file
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# 功能说明
waf插件实现了基于ModSecurity的规则防护引擎，可以根据用户配置的规则屏蔽可疑请求，并支持OWASP CRS，为站点提供基础的防护功能。
# 配置字段
| 名称 | 数据类型 | 填写要求 | 默认值 | 描述 |
| -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- | -------- |
| useCRS | bool | 选填 | false | 是否开启OWASP CRS，详情可参考[coreruleset](https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/tree/v3.3.2) |
| secRules | array of string | 选填 | - | 用户自定义的waf防护规则，语法规则可参考[ModSecurity中文手册](http://www.modsecurity.cn/chm/) |
# 配置示例
```yaml
useCRS: true
secRules:
- "SecDebugLogLevel 3"
- "SecRuleEngine On"
- "SecAction \"id:100,phase:1,pass\""
- "SecRule REQUEST_URI \"@streq /admin\" \"id:101,phase:1,t:lowercase,deny\""
- "SecRule REQUEST_BODY \"@rx maliciouspayload\" \"id:102,phase:2,t:lowercase,deny\""
```
根据该配置，以下请求将被禁止访问：
```bash
curl http://example.com/admin
curl http://example.com -d "maliciouspayload"
```
# 对特定路由或域名开启
```yaml
useCRS: true
secRules:
- "SecDebugLogLevel 3"
- "SecRuleEngine On"
- "SecAction \"id:100,phase:1,pass\""
- "SecRule REQUEST_URI \"@streq /admin\" \"id:101,phase:1,t:lowercase,deny\""
- "SecRule REQUEST_BODY \"@rx maliciouspayload\" \"id:102,phase:2,t:lowercase,deny\""
_rules_:
- _match_route_:
- "route-1"
secRules:
- "SecDebugLogLevel 3"
- "SecRuleEngine On"
- "SecAction \"id:102,phase:1,deny\""
- _match_domain_:
- "*.example.com"
- test.com
secRules:
- "SecDebugLogLevel 3"
- "SecRuleEngine On"
- "SecAction \"id:102,phase:1,pass\""
```
此例 `_match_route_` 中指定的 `route-1` 即在创建网关路由时填写的路由名称，当匹配到这两个路由时，将使用此段配置； 此例 `_match_domain_` 中指定的 `*.example.com` 和 `test.com` 用于匹配请求的域名，当发现域名匹配时，将使用此段配置； 配置的匹配生效顺序，将按照 `_rules_` 下规则的排列顺序，匹配第一个规则后生效对应配置，后续规则将被忽略。

37
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/go.mod Normal file
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module github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm
go 1.19
require (
github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230504075705-7e358eb1db7c
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-wasilibs v0.0.0-20230408002644-e2e3af21f503
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.0.0-rc.1.0.20230407165813-a18681b1ec28
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0
github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk v0.22.0
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.14.4
github.com/wasilibs/nottinygc v0.2.0
)
require (
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.1.2 // indirect
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0 // indirect
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0 // indirect
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0 // indirect
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20211021192214-5ab2d9280aa9 // indirect
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/tetratelabs/wazero v1.0.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 // indirect
github.com/wasilibs/go-aho-corasick v0.3.0 // indirect
github.com/wasilibs/go-libinjection v0.2.1 // indirect
github.com/wasilibs/go-re2 v1.0.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.9.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20180628173108-788fd7840127 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 // indirect
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 // indirect
)
replace (
github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230504075705-7e358eb1db7c => github.com/rinfx/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230508112120-f2d89b0606ee
)

65
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/go.sum Normal file
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github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230504075705-7e358eb1db7c h1:RKZJGYAkczZVqvJ/CuNJSY6YI5oyJjzm12MVzf3Z7/U=
github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230504075705-7e358eb1db7c/go.mod h1:AzSnkuon5c26nIePTiJQIAFsKdhkNdncLcTuahpGtQs=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-wasilibs v0.0.0-20230408002644-e2e3af21f503 h1:hGXspDwUBHQUne1NT2D6PmkR9wFCXsibjaJpz7xhf+g=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza-wasilibs v0.0.0-20230408002644-e2e3af21f503/go.mod h1:bTc+NV7T2wQevFQHDDWhD/+IAA5bvKbbK4CxzfvJx/o=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.0.0-rc.1.0.20230407165813-a18681b1ec28 h1:Jrlvhe4YCR/PMCazDEBeun/XTYhlzczBN0WN4/ejORo=
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 v3.0.0-rc.1.0.20230407165813-a18681b1ec28/go.mod h1:TKREBLh55w3SiBbLsQpH9EFzjBAmEUH4KRaZ/kFYz20=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.1.2 h1:oeiV9pc5rvJ+2oqOqXEAMJousPpGiup6f7Y3nZj5GoM=
github.com/corazawaf/libinjection-go v0.1.2/go.mod h1:OP4TM7xdJ2skyXqNX1AN1wN5nNZEmJNuWbNPOItn7aw=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
github.com/foxcpp/go-mockdns v1.0.0 h1:7jBqxd3WDWwi/6WhDvacvH1XsN3rOLXyHM1uhvIx6FI=
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0 h1:t6JiXgmwXMjEs8VusXIJk2BXHsn+wx8BZdTaoZ5fu7I=
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0 h1:L/CwN0zerZDmRFUapSPitk6f+Q3+0za1rQkzVuMiMFI=
github.com/kr/pretty v0.1.0/go.mod h1:dAy3ld7l9f0ibDNOQOHHMYYIIbhfbHSm3C4ZsoJORNo=
github.com/kr/pty v1.1.1/go.mod h1:pFQYn66WHrOpPYNljwOMqo10TkYh1fy3cYio2l3bCsQ=
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0 h1:45sCR5RtlFHMR4UwH9sdQ5TC8v0qDQCHnXt+kaKSTVE=
github.com/kr/text v0.1.0/go.mod h1:4Jbv+DJW3UT/LiOwJeYQe1efqtUx/iVham/4vfdArNI=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0 h1:6QDX3g6z1YvJ4olPhT1wksUcSa/V0a1B+pJb73fBjyo=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0/go.mod h1:z5UZb/iS3GoOSn0JgWuiw7dxlurVYTu+/jHXqQg881A=
github.com/miekg/dns v1.1.50 h1:DQUfb9uc6smULcREF09Uc+/Gd46YWqJd5DbpPE9xkcA=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20211021192214-5ab2d9280aa9 h1:lL+y4Xv20pVlCGyLzNHRC0I0rIHhIL1lTvHizoS/dU8=
github.com/petar-dambovaliev/aho-corasick v0.0.0-20211021192214-5ab2d9280aa9/go.mod h1:EHPiTAKtiFmrMldLUNswFwfZ2eJIYBHktdaUTZxYWRw=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
github.com/rinfx/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230508112120-f2d89b0606ee h1:5qHbEcei04hDcUTzvoFNtYtZiewnTgVv6wR9co8Ih6c=
github.com/rinfx/higress/plugins/wasm-go v0.0.0-20230508112120-f2d89b0606ee/go.mod h1:AzSnkuon5c26nIePTiJQIAFsKdhkNdncLcTuahpGtQs=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.1.0/go.mod h1:HFkY916IF+rwdDfMAkV7OtwuqBVzrE8GR6GFx+wExME=
github.com/stretchr/objx v0.4.0/go.mod h1:YvHI0jy2hoMjB+UWwv71VJQ9isScKT/TqJzVSSt89Yw=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.7.1/go.mod h1:6Fq8oRcR53rry900zMqJjRRixrwX3KX962/h/Wwjteg=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0 h1:pSgiaMZlXftHpm5L7V1+rVB+AZJydKsMxsQBIJw4PKk=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0/go.mod h1:yNjHg4UonilssWZ8iaSj1OCr/vHnekPRkoO+kdMU+MU=
github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk v0.22.0 h1:kS7BvMKN+FiptV4pfwiNX8e3q14evxAWkhYbxt8EI1M=
github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk v0.22.0/go.mod h1:qkW5MBz2jch2u8bS59wws65WC+Gtx3x0aPUX5JL7CXI=
github.com/tetratelabs/wazero v1.0.1 h1:xyWBoGyMjYekG3mEQ/W7xm9E05S89kJ/at696d/9yuc=
github.com/tetratelabs/wazero v1.0.1/go.mod h1:wYx2gNRg8/WihJfSDxA1TIL8H+GkfLYm+bIfbblu9VQ=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.14.4 h1:uo0p8EbA09J7RQaflQ1aBRffTR7xedD2bcIVSYxLnkM=
github.com/tidwall/gjson v1.14.4/go.mod h1:/wbyibRr2FHMks5tjHJ5F8dMZh3AcwJEMf5vlfC0lxk=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 h1:+Ho715JplO36QYgwN9PGYNhgZvoUSc9X2c80KVTi+GA=
github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1/go.mod h1:eRSPERbgtNPcGhD8UCthc6PmLEQXEWd3PRB5JTxsfmM=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1 h1:qjsOFOWWQl+N3RsoF5/ssm1pHmJJwhjlSbZ51I6wMl4=
github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.1/go.mod h1:ITEVvHYasfjBbM0u2Pg8T2nJnzm8xPwvNhhsoaGGjNU=
github.com/wasilibs/go-aho-corasick v0.3.0 h1:ScfPQhAwop/ELIkwY0dfMTFb/bwOdYI/MB3mkX2WOZI=
github.com/wasilibs/go-aho-corasick v0.3.0/go.mod h1:LKW6EW9NWuWYE8PII+sFpRbbY3UcrMUgfUTkGaoWyMY=
github.com/wasilibs/go-libinjection v0.2.1 h1:1aSwyE4oNpPGpFw3i3hoM15sF3qn1s4P0jC2jgFM2Qk=
github.com/wasilibs/go-libinjection v0.2.1/go.mod h1:ZUoVe+HLQYq+QPBNTSgg3fxGvZsvXiDbi0UomBlsGzo=
github.com/wasilibs/go-re2 v1.0.0 h1:pvrqtMzZgTMHVPfXJrk4YZwiqIXOKdfo5aed6CzUAW4=
github.com/wasilibs/go-re2 v1.0.0/go.mod h1:8g69JapfgjSCx49dKOQij1dqA3sOvoH5NteaUy1X0SA=
github.com/wasilibs/nottinygc v0.2.0 h1:cXz2Ac9bVMLkpuOlUlPQMWowjw0K2cOErXZOFdAj7yE=
github.com/wasilibs/nottinygc v0.2.0/go.mod h1:oDcIotskuYNMpqMF23l7Z8uzD4TC0WXHK8jetlB3HIo=
golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0 h1:LUYupSeNrTNCGzR/hVBk2NHZO4hXcVaW1k4Qx7rjPx8=
golang.org/x/net v0.9.0 h1:aWJ/m6xSmxWBx+V0XRHTlrYrPG56jKsLdTFmsSsCzOM=
golang.org/x/net v0.9.0/go.mod h1:d48xBJpPfHeWQsugry2m+kC02ZBRGRgulfHnEXEuWns=
golang.org/x/sys v0.7.0 h1:3jlCCIQZPdOYu1h8BkNvLz8Kgwtae2cagcG/VamtZRU=
golang.org/x/tools v0.6.0 h1:BOw41kyTf3PuCW1pVQf8+Cyg8pMlkYB1oo9iJ6D/lKM=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v0.0.0-20161208181325-20d25e280405/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20180628173108-788fd7840127 h1:qIbj1fsPNlZgppZ+VLlY7N33q108Sa+fhmuc+sWQYwY=
gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20180628173108-788fd7840127/go.mod h1:Co6ibVJAznAaIkqp8huTwlJQCZ016jof/cbN4VW5Yz0=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.0-20200313102051-9f266ea9e77c/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1/go.mod h1:K4uyk7z7BCEPqu6E+C64Yfv1cQ7kz7rIZviUmN+EgEM=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0 h1:HfqmD5MEmC0zvwBuF187nq9mdnXjXsSivRiXN7SmRkE=
rsc.io/binaryregexp v0.2.0/go.mod h1:qTv7/COck+e2FymRvadv62gMdZztPaShugOCi3I+8D8=

14
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/init_tinygo.go Normal file
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//go:build tinygo
package main
import _ "github.com/wasilibs/nottinygc"
// Compiled by nottinygc for delayed free but Envoy doesn't stub it yet,
// luckily nottinygc doesn't actually call the function, so it's fine to
// stub it out.
//export sched_yield
func sched_yield() int32 {
return 0
}

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/Dockerfile Normal file
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FROM liuxr25/flask-helloworld:latest
COPY app.py /work/app.py

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/app.py Normal file
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from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/flask/test1", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def test1():
return "body normal", 200, [("test-header", "hahaha")]
@app.route("/flask/test2", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def test2():
return "body attack", 200, []
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run("0.0.0.0", 5000)

96
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/docker-compose.yaml Normal file
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services:
httpbin:
image: kennethreitz/httpbin
environment:
- MAX_BODY_SIZE=15728640 # 15 MiB
ports:
- 8083:8080
command:
- "gunicorn"
- "-b"
- "0.0.0.0:8080"
- "httpbin:app"
- "-k"
- "gevent"
- --log-file
- /home/envoy/logs/httpbin.log
volumes:
- logs:/home/envoy/logs:rw
flask:
# image: liuxr25/flask-helloworld:latest
build: .
environment:
- MAX_BODY_SIZE=15728640 # 15 MiB
ports:
- 8084:5000
chown:
image: alpine:3.16
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- chown -R 101:101 /home/envoy/logs
volumes:
- logs:/home/envoy/logs:rw
envoy:
depends_on:
- chown
- httpbin
- flask
image: higress-registry.cn-hangzhou.cr.aliyuncs.com/higress/envoy:1.20
command:
- -c
- /conf/envoy-config.yaml
- --log-level
- info
- --component-log-level
- wasm:debug
- --log-format [%Y-%m-%d %T.%f][%t][%l][%n] [%g:%#] %v
- --log-path
- /home/envoy/logs/envoy.log
volumes:
- .:/build
- .:/conf
- logs:/home/envoy/logs:rw
ports:
- 8080:8080
- 8082:8082
# envoy-logs:
# depends_on:
# - envoy
# - wasm-logs
# image: debian:11-slim
# entrypoint: bash
# command:
# - -c
# - tail -c +0 -f /home/envoy/logs/envoy.log
# volumes:
# - logs:/home/envoy/logs:ro
wasm-logs:
depends_on:
- envoy
image: debian:11-slim
entrypoint: bash
command:
- -c
- tail -c +0 -f /home/envoy/logs/envoy.log | grep --line-buffered "[critical][wasm]"
volumes:
- logs:/home/envoy/logs:ro
# debug-logs:
# depends_on:
# - envoy
# image: debian:11-slim
# entrypoint: bash
# command:
# - -c
# - tail -c +0 -f /home/envoy/logs/envoy.log | grep --line-buffered "unreachable"
# volumes:
# - logs:/home/envoy/logs:ro
volumes:
logs:

143
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/local/envoy-config.yaml Normal file
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stats_config:
stats_tags:
# Envoy extracts the first matching group as a value.
# See https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/config/metrics/v3/stats.proto#config-metrics-v3-statsconfig.
- tag_name: phase
regex: "(_phase=([a-z_]+))"
- tag_name: rule_id
regex: "(_ruleid=([0-9]+))"
static_resources:
listeners:
- address:
socket_address:
address: 0.0.0.0
port_value: 8080
filter_chains:
- filters:
- name: envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager
typed_config:
"@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.network.http_connection_manager.v3.HttpConnectionManager
stat_prefix: ingress_http
codec_type: auto
route_config:
virtual_hosts:
- name: local_route
domains:
- "*"
routes:
- name: "route_1"
match:
path: "/headers"
route:
cluster: httpbin_server
- name: "route_2"
match:
path: "/user-agent"
route:
cluster: httpbin_server
- name: "route_flask"
match:
prefix: "/flask"
route:
cluster: flask_server
- name: "route_httpbin"
match:
prefix: "/"
route:
cluster: httpbin_server
# - name: "route_mock"
# match:
# prefix: "/"
# direct_response:
# status: 200
# body:
# inline_string: "mock response\n"
http_filters:
- name: envoy.filters.http.wasm
typed_config:
"@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.wasm.v3.Wasm
config:
name: "coraza-filter"
root_id: ""
configuration:
"@type": "type.googleapis.com/google.protobuf.StringValue"
value: |
{
"useCRS": true,
"secRules": [
"SecDebugLogLevel 3",
"SecRuleEngine On",
"SecRule REQUEST_URI \"@streq /admin\" \"id:101,phase:1,t:lowercase,deny\"",
"SecRule REQUEST_BODY \"@rx maliciouspayload\" \"id:102,phase:2,t:lowercase,deny\"",
"SecRule RESPONSE_HEADERS::status \"@rx 406\" \"id:103,phase:3,t:lowercase,deny\"",
"SecRule RESPONSE_HEADERS:test-header \"@streq hahaha\" \"id:104,phase:3,t:lowercase,deny\"",
"SecRule RESPONSE_BODY \"@rx attack\" \"id:105,phase:4,t:lowercase,deny\""
],
"_rules_": [
{
"_match_route_": [
"route_1"
],
"secRules": [
"SecDebugLogLevel 3",
"SecRuleEngine On",
"SecAction \"id:102,phase:1,deny\""
]
},
{
"_match_route_": [
"route_2"
],
"secRules": [
"SecDebugLogLevel 3",
"SecRuleEngine On",
"SecAction \"id:102,phase:1,pass\""
]
}
]
}
vm_config:
runtime: "envoy.wasm.runtime.v8"
vm_id: "10086"
code:
local:
filename: "build/main.wasm"
- name: envoy.filters.http.router
typed_config:
"@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.router.v3.Router
clusters:
- name: httpbin_server
connect_timeout: 6000s
type: STRICT_DNS
lb_policy: ROUND_ROBIN
load_assignment:
cluster_name: httpbin_server
endpoints:
- lb_endpoints:
- endpoint:
address:
socket_address:
address: httpbin
port_value: 8080
- name: flask_server
connect_timeout: 6000s
type: STRICT_DNS
lb_policy: ROUND_ROBIN
load_assignment:
cluster_name: flask_server
endpoints:
- lb_endpoints:
- endpoint:
address:
socket_address:
address: flask
port_value: 5000
admin:
access_log_path: "/dev/null"
address:
socket_address:
address: 0.0.0.0
port_value: 8082

16
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/mage.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
//go:build ignore
// +build ignore
// Entrypoint to mage for running without needing to install the command.
// https://magefile.org/zeroinstall/
package main
import (
"os"
"github.com/magefile/mage/mage"
)
func main() {
os.Exit(mage.Main())
}

16
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/magefiles/go.mod Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
module github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm/magefiles
go 1.19
require (
fortio.org/fortio v1.38.4
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0
github.com/tetratelabs/wabin v0.0.0-20220927005300-3b0fbf39a46a
)
require (
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221111204811-129d8d6c17ab // indirect
golang.org/x/net v0.2.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.4.0 // indirect
)

21
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/magefiles/go.sum Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
fortio.org/assert v1.1.2 h1:t6WGDqPD5VFrUvx30U0+3mgXXcoPonrdKqt0vfJHn8E=
fortio.org/fortio v1.38.4 h1:HkVsu9E4emMU+i2D2HjPll1Dbu5IqCRTeKeoiYWxFWA=
fortio.org/fortio v1.38.4/go.mod h1:xZTReCI6wlPJQN+JssVO6jsqXJV2vC32dcZJrUaqmcU=
github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c=
github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0 h1:n+5WquG0fcWoWp6xPWfHdbskMCQaFnG6PfBrh1Ky4HY=
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0 h1:t6JiXgmwXMjEs8VusXIJk2BXHsn+wx8BZdTaoZ5fu7I=
github.com/google/uuid v1.3.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0 h1:6QDX3g6z1YvJ4olPhT1wksUcSa/V0a1B+pJb73fBjyo=
github.com/magefile/mage v1.14.0/go.mod h1:z5UZb/iS3GoOSn0JgWuiw7dxlurVYTu+/jHXqQg881A=
github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.8.0 h1:pSgiaMZlXftHpm5L7V1+rVB+AZJydKsMxsQBIJw4PKk=
github.com/tetratelabs/wabin v0.0.0-20220927005300-3b0fbf39a46a h1:P0R3+CTAT7daT8ig5gh9GEd/eDQ5md1xl4pkYMcwOqg=
github.com/tetratelabs/wabin v0.0.0-20220927005300-3b0fbf39a46a/go.mod h1:m9ymHTgNSEjuxvw8E7WWe4Pl4hZQHXONY8wE6dMLaRk=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221111204811-129d8d6c17ab h1:1S7USr8/C0Sgk4egxq4zZ07zYt2Xh1IiFp8hUMXH/us=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20221111204811-129d8d6c17ab/go.mod h1:CxIveKay+FTh1D0yPZemJVgC/95VzuuOLq5Qi4xnoYc=
golang.org/x/net v0.2.0 h1:sZfSu1wtKLGlWI4ZZayP0ck9Y73K1ynO6gqzTdBVdPU=
golang.org/x/net v0.2.0/go.mod h1:KqCZLdyyvdV855qA2rE3GC2aiw5xGR5TEjj8smXukLY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.2.0 h1:ljd4t30dBnAvMZaQCevtY0xLLD0A+bRZXbgLMLU1F/A=
golang.org/x/text v0.4.0 h1:BrVqGRd7+k1DiOgtnFvAkoQEWQvBc25ouMJM6429SFg=
golang.org/x/text v0.4.0/go.mod h1:mrYo+phRRbMaCq/xk9113O4dZlRixOauAjOtrjsXDZ8=
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1 h1:fxVm/GzAzEWqLHuvctI91KS9hhNmmWOoWu0XTYJS7CA=

81
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/magefiles/loadtest.go Normal file
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package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"fortio.org/fortio/fhttp"
"fortio.org/fortio/fnet"
"fortio.org/fortio/periodic"
"github.com/magefile/mage/sh"
)
// LoadTest runs load tests against the ftw deployment.
func LoadTest() error {
for _, threads := range []int{1, 2, 4} {
for _, payloadSize := range []int{0, 100, 1000, 10000} {
for _, conf := range []string{"envoy-config.yaml", "envoy-config-nowasm.yaml"} {
if err := doLoadTest(conf, payloadSize, threads); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
}
return nil
}
func doLoadTest(conf string, payloadSize int, threads int) error {
if err := sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "build", "--pull"); err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
_ = sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "kill")
_ = sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "down", "-v")
}()
if err := sh.RunWithV(map[string]string{"ENVOY_CONFIG": fmt.Sprintf("/conf/%s", conf)}, "docker-compose",
"--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "run", "--service-ports", "--rm", "-d", "envoy"); err != nil {
return err
}
// Wait for Envoy to start.
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
if resp, err := http.Get("http://localhost:8080/anything"); err != nil {
continue
} else {
if resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
break
}
}
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
opts := &fhttp.HTTPRunnerOptions{
RunnerOptions: periodic.RunnerOptions{
QPS: 100,
NumThreads: threads,
Duration: 10 * time.Second,
},
HTTPOptions: fhttp.HTTPOptions{
URL: "http://localhost:8080/anything",
Payload: fnet.GenerateRandomPayload(payloadSize),
},
}
fmt.Printf("Running load test with config=%s, payloadSize=%d, threads=%d\n", conf, payloadSize, threads)
res, err := fhttp.RunHTTPTest(opts)
if err != nil {
return err
}
rr := res.Result()
fmt.Printf("All done %d calls (plus %d warmup) %.3f ms avg, %.1f qps\n",
rr.DurationHistogram.Count,
0,
1000.*rr.DurationHistogram.Avg,
rr.ActualQPS)
return nil
}

271
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/magefiles/magefile.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
package main
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/magefile/mage/mg"
"github.com/magefile/mage/sh"
"github.com/tetratelabs/wabin/binary"
"github.com/tetratelabs/wabin/wasm"
)
var minGoVersion = "1.19"
var tinygoMinorVersion = "0.27"
var addLicenseVersion = "04bfe4ee9ca5764577b029acc6a1957fd1997153" // https://github.com/google/addlicense
var golangCILintVer = "v1.48.0" // https://github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/releases
var gosImportsVer = "v0.3.1" // https://github.com/rinchsan/gosimports/releases/tag/v0.3.1
var errCommitFormatting = errors.New("files not formatted, please commit formatting changes")
var errNoGitDir = errors.New("no .git directory found")
func init() {
for _, check := range []func() error{
checkTinygoVersion,
checkGoVersion,
} {
if err := check(); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Error: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
}
// checkGoVersion checks the minimum version of Go is supported.
func checkGoVersion() error {
v, err := sh.Output("go", "version")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected go error: %v", err)
}
// Version can/cannot include patch version e.g.
// - go version go1.19 darwin/arm64
// - go version go1.19.2 darwin/amd64
versionRegex := regexp.MustCompile("go([0-9]+).([0-9]+).?([0-9]+)?")
compare := versionRegex.FindStringSubmatch(v)
if len(compare) != 4 {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected go semver: %q", v)
}
compare = compare[1:]
if compare[2] == "" {
compare[2] = "0"
}
base := strings.SplitN(minGoVersion, ".", 3)
if len(base) == 2 {
base = append(base, "0")
}
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
baseN, _ := strconv.Atoi(base[i])
compareN, _ := strconv.Atoi(compare[i])
if baseN > compareN {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected go version, minimum want %q, have %q", minGoVersion, strings.Join(compare, "."))
}
}
return nil
}
// checkTinygoVersion checks that exactly the right tinygo version is supported because
// tinygo isn't stable yet.
func checkTinygoVersion() error {
v, err := sh.Output("tinygo", "version")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected tinygo error: %v", err)
}
// Assume a dev build is valid.
if strings.Contains(v, "-dev") {
return nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(v, fmt.Sprintf("tinygo version %s", tinygoMinorVersion)) {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected tinygo version, wanted %s", tinygoMinorVersion)
}
return nil
}
// Format formats code in this repository.
func Format() error {
if err := sh.RunV("go", "mod", "tidy"); err != nil {
return err
}
// addlicense strangely logs skipped files to stderr despite not being erroneous, so use the long sh.Exec form to
// discard stderr too.
if _, err := sh.Exec(map[string]string{}, io.Discard, io.Discard, "go", "run", fmt.Sprintf("github.com/google/addlicense@%s", addLicenseVersion),
"-c", "The OWASP Coraza contributors",
"-s=only",
"-y=",
"-ignore", "**/*.yml",
"-ignore", "**/*.yaml",
"-ignore", "examples/**", "."); err != nil {
return err
}
return sh.RunV("go", "run", fmt.Sprintf("github.com/rinchsan/gosimports/cmd/gosimports@%s", gosImportsVer),
"-w",
"-local",
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm",
".")
}
// Lint verifies code quality.
func Lint() error {
if err := sh.RunV("go", "run", fmt.Sprintf("github.com/golangci/golangci-lint/cmd/golangci-lint@%s", golangCILintVer), "run"); err != nil {
return err
}
mg.SerialDeps(Format)
if sh.Run("git", "diff", "--exit-code") != nil {
return errCommitFormatting
}
return nil
}
// Test runs all unit tests.
func Test() error {
return sh.RunV("go", "test", "./...")
}
// Coverage runs tests with coverage and race detector enabled.
func Coverage() error {
if err := os.MkdirAll("build", 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := sh.RunV("go", "test", "-race", "-coverprofile=build/coverage.txt", "-covermode=atomic", "-coverpkg=./...", "./..."); err != nil {
return err
}
return sh.RunV("go", "tool", "cover", "-html=build/coverage.txt", "-o", "build/coverage.html")
}
// Doc runs godoc, access at http://localhost:6060
func Doc() error {
return sh.RunV("go", "run", "golang.org/x/tools/cmd/godoc@latest", "-http=:6060")
}
// Check runs lint and tests.
func Check() {
mg.SerialDeps(Lint, Test)
}
// Build builds the Coraza wasm plugin.
func Build() error {
if err := os.MkdirAll("local", 0755); err != nil {
return err
}
buildTags := []string{"custommalloc", "no_fs_access"}
if os.Getenv("TIMING") == "true" {
buildTags = append(buildTags, "timing", "proxywasm_timing")
}
if os.Getenv("MEMSTATS") == "true" {
buildTags = append(buildTags, "memstats")
}
buildTagArg := fmt.Sprintf("-tags='%s'", strings.Join(buildTags, " "))
// ~100MB initial heap
initialPages := 2100
if ipEnv := os.Getenv("INITIAL_PAGES"); ipEnv != "" {
if ip, err := strconv.Atoi(ipEnv); err != nil {
return err
} else {
initialPages = ip
}
}
if err := sh.RunV("tinygo", "build", "-gc=custom", "-opt=2", "-o", filepath.Join("local", "mainraw.wasm"), "-scheduler=none", "-target=wasi", buildTagArg); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := patchWasm(filepath.Join("local", "mainraw.wasm"), filepath.Join("local", "main.wasm"), initialPages); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := sh.RunV("rm", filepath.Join("local", "mainraw.wasm")); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
// E2e runs e2e tests with a built plugin against the example deployment. Requires docker-compose.
func E2e() error {
if err := sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "e2e/docker-compose.yml", "build", "--pull"); err != nil {
return err
}
return sh.RunV("docker-compose", "-f", "e2e/docker-compose.yml", "up", "--abort-on-container-exit", "tests")
}
// Ftw runs ftw tests with a built plugin and Envoy. Requires docker-compose.
func Ftw() error {
if err := sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "build", "--pull"); err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
_ = sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "down", "-v")
}()
env := map[string]string{
"FTW_CLOUDMODE": os.Getenv("FTW_CLOUDMODE"),
"FTW_INCLUDE": os.Getenv("FTW_INCLUDE"),
"ENVOY_IMAGE": os.Getenv("ENVOY_IMAGE"),
}
if os.Getenv("ENVOY_NOWASM") == "true" {
env["ENVOY_CONFIG"] = "/conf/envoy-config-nowasm.yaml"
}
task := "ftw"
if os.Getenv("MEMSTATS") == "true" {
task = "ftw-memstats"
}
return sh.RunWithV(env, "docker-compose", "--file", "ftw/docker-compose.yml", "run", "--rm", task)
}
// RunExample spins up the test environment, access at http://localhost:8080. Requires docker-compose.
func RunExample() error {
return sh.RunWithV(map[string]string{"ENVOY_IMAGE": os.Getenv("ENVOY_IMAGE")}, "docker-compose", "--file", "example/docker-compose.yml", "up", "-d", "envoy-logs")
}
// TeardownExample tears down the test environment. Requires docker-compose.
func TeardownExample() error {
return sh.RunV("docker-compose", "--file", "example/docker-compose.yml", "down")
}
var Default = Build
func patchWasm(inPath, outPath string, initialPages int) error {
raw, err := os.ReadFile(inPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
mod, err := binary.DecodeModule(raw, wasm.CoreFeaturesV2)
if err != nil {
return err
}
mod.MemorySection.Min = uint32(initialPages)
for _, imp := range mod.ImportSection {
switch {
case imp.Name == "fd_filestat_get":
imp.Name = "fd_fdstat_get"
case imp.Name == "path_filestat_get":
imp.Module = "env"
imp.Name = "proxy_get_header_map_value"
}
}
out := binary.EncodeModule(mod)
if err = os.WriteFile(outPath, out, 0644); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}

14
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/main.go Normal file
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package main
import (
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm/wasmplugin"
wasilibs "github.com/corazawaf/coraza-wasilibs"
)
func main() {
wasilibs.RegisterRX()
wasilibs.RegisterPM()
wasilibs.RegisterSQLi()
wasilibs.RegisterXSS()
wasmplugin.PluginStart()
}

79
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/fs.go Normal file
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package wasmplugin
import (
"embed"
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"strings"
)
var (
//go:embed rules
crs embed.FS
root fs.FS
)
func init() {
rules, _ := fs.Sub(crs, "rules")
root = &rulesFS{
rules,
map[string]string{
"@recommended-conf": "coraza.conf-recommended.conf",
"@demo-conf": "coraza-demo.conf",
"@crs-setup-demo-conf": "crs-setup-demo.conf",
"@ftw-conf": "ftw-config.conf",
"@crs-setup-conf": "crs-setup.conf.example",
},
map[string]string{
"@owasp_crs": "crs",
},
}
}
type rulesFS struct {
fs fs.FS
filesMapping map[string]string
dirsMapping map[string]string
}
func (r rulesFS) Open(name string) (fs.File, error) {
return r.fs.Open(r.mapPath(name))
}
func (r rulesFS) ReadDir(name string) ([]fs.DirEntry, error) {
for a, dst := range r.dirsMapping {
if a == name {
return fs.ReadDir(r.fs, dst)
}
prefix := a + "/"
if strings.HasPrefix(name, prefix) {
return fs.ReadDir(r.fs, fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", dst, name[len(prefix):]))
}
}
return fs.ReadDir(r.fs, name)
}
func (r rulesFS) ReadFile(name string) ([]byte, error) {
return fs.ReadFile(r.fs, r.mapPath(name))
}
func (r rulesFS) mapPath(p string) string {
if strings.IndexByte(p, '/') != -1 {
// is not in root, hence we can do dir mapping
for a, dst := range r.dirsMapping {
prefix := a + "/"
if strings.HasPrefix(p, prefix) {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", dst, p[len(prefix):])
}
}
}
for a, dst := range r.filesMapping {
if a == p {
return dst
}
}
return p
}

339
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/plugin.go Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
package wasmplugin
import (
"errors"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go/pkg/wrapper"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3"
ctypes "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
"github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk/proxywasm"
"github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk/proxywasm/types"
"github.com/tidwall/gjson"
)
func PluginStart() {
wrapper.SetCtx(
"waf-plugin-go",
wrapper.ParseConfigBy(parseConfig),
wrapper.ProcessRequestHeadersBy(onHttpRequestHeaders),
wrapper.ProcessRequestBodyBy(onHttpRequestBody),
wrapper.ProcessResponseBodyBy(onHttpResponseBody),
wrapper.ProcessResponseHeadersBy(onHttpResponseHeaders),
wrapper.ProcessStreamDoneBy(onHttpStreamDone),
)
}
type WafConfig struct {
waf coraza.WAF
//tx ctypes.Transaction
}
func parseConfig(json gjson.Result, config *WafConfig, log wrapper.Log) error {
var secRules []string
var value gjson.Result
value = json.Get("useCRS")
if value.Exists() {
if value.Bool() {
secRules = append(secRules, "Include @demo-conf")
secRules = append(secRules, "Include @crs-setup-demo-conf")
secRules = append(secRules, "Include @owasp_crs/*.conf")
secRules = append(secRules, "SecRuleEngine On")
}
}
value = json.Get("secRules")
if value.Exists() {
for _, item := range json.Get("secRules").Array() {
rule := item.String()
secRules = append(secRules, rule)
}
}
// log.Debugf("[rinfx log] %s", strings.Join(secRules, "\n"))
conf := coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithRootFS(root)
// error: Failed to load Wasm module due to a missing import: wasi_snapshot_preview1.fd_filestat_get
// because without fs.go
waf, err := coraza.NewWAF(conf.WithDirectives(strings.Join(secRules, "\n")))
config.waf = waf
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("Failed to create waf conf: %v", err)
return errors.New("failed to create waf conf")
}
return nil
}
func onHttpRequestHeaders(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, config WafConfig, log wrapper.Log) types.Action {
ctx.SetContext("interruptionHandled", false)
ctx.SetContext("processedRequestBody", false)
ctx.SetContext("processedResponseBody", false)
ctx.SetContext("tx", config.waf.NewTransaction())
tx := ctx.GetContext("tx").(ctypes.Transaction)
// Note the pseudo-header :path includes the query.
// See https://httpwg.org/specs/rfc9113.html#rfc.section.8.3.1
uri, err := proxywasm.GetHttpRequestHeader(":path")
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to get :path")
return types.ActionContinue
}
// This currently relies on Envoy's behavior of mapping all requests to HTTP/2 semantics
// and its request properties, but they may not be true of other proxies implementing
// proxy-wasm.
if tx.IsRuleEngineOff() {
// log.Infof("[rinfx log] OnHttpRequestHeaders, RuleEngine Off, url = %s", uri)
return types.ActionContinue
}
// OnHttpRequestHeaders does not terminate if IP/Port retrieve goes wrong
srcIP, srcPort := retrieveAddressInfo(log, "source")
dstIP, dstPort := retrieveAddressInfo(log, "destination")
tx.ProcessConnection(srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
// proxywasm.LogInfof("[rinfx log] OnHttpRequestHeaders, RuleEngine On, url = %s", uri)
method, err := proxywasm.GetHttpRequestHeader(":method")
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to get :method")
return types.ActionContinue
}
protocol, err := proxywasm.GetProperty([]string{"request", "protocol"})
if err != nil {
// TODO(anuraaga): HTTP protocol is commonly required in WAF rules, we should probably
// fail fast here, but proxytest does not support properties yet.
protocol = []byte("HTTP/2.0")
}
ctx.SetContext("httpProtocol", string(protocol))
tx.ProcessURI(uri, method, string(protocol))
hs, err := proxywasm.GetHttpRequestHeaders()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to get request headers")
return types.ActionContinue
}
for _, h := range hs {
tx.AddRequestHeader(h[0], h[1])
}
// CRS rules tend to expect Host even with HTTP/2
authority, err := proxywasm.GetHttpRequestHeader(":authority")
if err == nil {
tx.AddRequestHeader("Host", authority)
tx.SetServerName(parseServerName(log, authority))
}
interruption := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders()
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_request_headers", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
func onHttpRequestBody(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, config WafConfig, body []byte, log wrapper.Log) types.Action {
// log.Info("[rinfx log] OnHttpRequestBody")
if ctx.GetContext("interruptionHandled").(bool) {
log.Error("OnHttpRequestBody, interruption already handled")
return types.ActionContinue
}
tx := ctx.GetContext("tx").(ctypes.Transaction)
if tx.IsRuleEngineOff() {
return types.ActionContinue
}
// Do not perform any action related to request body data if SecRequestBodyAccess is set to false
if !tx.IsRequestBodyAccessible() {
log.Info("Skipping request body inspection, SecRequestBodyAccess is off.")
// ProcessRequestBody is still performed for phase 2 rules, checking already populated variables
ctx.SetContext("processedRequestBody", true)
interruption, err := tx.ProcessRequestBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process request body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_request_body", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
interruption, _, err := tx.WriteRequestBody(body)
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to write request body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_request_body", interruption, log)
}
ctx.SetContext("processedRequestBody", true)
interruption, err = tx.ProcessRequestBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process request body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_request_body", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
func onHttpResponseHeaders(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, config WafConfig, log wrapper.Log) types.Action {
// log.Info("[rinfx log] OnHttpResponseHeaders")
if ctx.GetContext("interruptionHandled").(bool) {
log.Error("OnHttpResponseHeaders, interruption already handled")
return types.ActionContinue
}
tx := ctx.GetContext("tx").(ctypes.Transaction)
if tx.IsRuleEngineOff() {
return types.ActionContinue
}
// Requests without body won't call OnHttpRequestBody, but there are rules in the request body
// phase that still need to be executed. If they haven't been executed yet, now is the time.
if !ctx.GetContext("processedRequestBody").(bool) {
ctx.SetContext("processedRequestBody", true)
interruption, err := tx.ProcessRequestBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process request body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_response_headers", interruption, log)
}
}
status, err := proxywasm.GetHttpResponseHeader(":status")
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to get :status")
return types.ActionContinue
}
code, err := strconv.Atoi(status)
if err != nil {
code = 0
}
hs, err := proxywasm.GetHttpResponseHeaders()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to get response headers")
return types.ActionContinue
}
for _, h := range hs {
tx.AddResponseHeader(h[0], h[1])
// log.Infof("[rinfx debug] ResponseHeaders %s: %s", h[0], h[1])
}
interruption := tx.ProcessResponseHeaders(code, ctx.GetContext("httpProtocol").(string))
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_response_headers", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
func onHttpResponseBody(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, config WafConfig, body []byte, log wrapper.Log) types.Action {
// log.Info("[rinfx log] OnHttpResponseBody")
if ctx.GetContext("interruptionHandled").(bool) {
// At response body phase, proxy-wasm currently relies on emptying the response body as a way of
// interruption the response. See https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm/issues/26.
// If OnHttpResponseBody is called again and an interruption has already been raised, it means that
// we have to keep going with the sanitization of the response, emptying it.
// Sending the crafted HttpResponse with empty body, we don't expect to trigger OnHttpResponseBody
log.Warn("Response body interruption already handled, keeping replacing the body")
// Interruption happened, we don't want to send response body data
return replaceResponseBodyWhenInterrupted(log, replaceResponseBody)
}
tx := ctx.GetContext("tx").(ctypes.Transaction)
if tx.IsRuleEngineOff() {
return types.ActionContinue
}
// Do not perform any action related to response body data if SecResponseBodyAccess is set to false
if !tx.IsResponseBodyAccessible() {
log.Debug("Skipping response body inspection, SecResponseBodyAccess is off.")
// ProcessResponseBody is performed for phase 4 rules, checking already populated variables
ctx.SetContext("processedResponseBody", true)
interruption, err := tx.ProcessResponseBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process response body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
// Proxy-wasm can not anymore deny the response. The best interruption is emptying the body
// Coraza Multiphase evaluation will help here avoiding late interruptions
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_response_body", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
interruption, _, err := tx.WriteResponseBody(body)
// log.Infof("[rinfx debug] ResponseBody %s", string(body))
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to write response body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_response_body", interruption, log)
}
// We have already sent response headers, an unauthorized response can not be sent anymore,
// but we can still drop the response to prevent leaking sensitive content.
// The error will also be logged by Coraza.
ctx.SetContext("processedResponseBody", true)
interruption, err = tx.ProcessResponseBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process response body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
if interruption != nil {
return handleInterruption(ctx, "http_response_body", interruption, log)
}
return types.ActionContinue
}
func onHttpStreamDone(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, config WafConfig, log wrapper.Log) {
// log.Info("[rinfx log] OnHttpStreamDone")
tx := ctx.GetContext("tx").(ctypes.Transaction)
if !tx.IsRuleEngineOff() {
// Responses without body won't call OnHttpResponseBody, but there are rules in the response body
// phase that still need to be executed. If they haven't been executed yet, now is the time.
if !ctx.GetContext("processedResponseBody").(bool) {
ctx.SetContext("processedResponseBody", true)
_, err := tx.ProcessResponseBody()
if err != nil {
log.Error("Failed to process response body")
}
}
}
tx.ProcessLogging()
_ = tx.Close()
log.Info("Finished")
}

253
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/coraza-demo.conf Normal file
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# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------
# Enable Coraza, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
# disruption.
#
SecRuleEngine On
# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------
# Allow Coraza to access request bodies. If you don't, Coraza
# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
# hole for attackers to exploit.
#
SecRequestBodyAccess On
# Enable XML request body parser.
# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^(?:application(?:/soap\+|/)|text/)xml" \
"id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
# Enable JSON request body parser.
# Initiate JSON Processor in case of JSON content-type; change accordingly
# if your application does not use 'application/json'
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/json" \
"id:'200001',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
# Sample rule to enable JSON request body parser for more subtypes.
# Uncomment or adapt this rule if you want to engage the JSON
# Processor for "+json" subtypes
#
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/[a-z0-9.-]+[+]json" \
# "id:'200006',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
# low as practical.
#
SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
# What to do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
# disruptions when initially deploying Coraza.
#
SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject
# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
#
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200002', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"
# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
# _not_ to remove it altogether.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400, \
msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
#
# Here is a short description about the Coraza Multipart parser: the
# parser returns with value 0, if all "boundary-like" line matches with
# the boundary string which given in MIME header. In any other cases it returns
# with different value, eg. 1 or 2.
#
# The RFC 1341 descript the multipart content-type and its syntax must contains
# only three mandatory lines (above the content):
# * Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING--
#
# First line indicates, that this is a multipart content, second shows that
# here starts a part of the multipart content, third shows the end of content.
#
# If there are any other lines, which starts with "--", then it should be
# another boundary id - or not.
#
# After 3.0.3, there are two kinds of types of boundary errors: strict and permissive.
#
# If multipart content contains the three necessary lines with correct order, but
# there are one or more lines with "--", then parser returns with value 2 (non-zero).
#
# If some of the necessary lines (usually the start or end) misses, or the order
# is wrong, then parser returns with value 1 (also a non-zero).
#
# You can choose, which one is what you need. The example below contains the
# 'strict' mode, which means if there are any lines with start of "--", then
# Coraza blocked the content. But the next, commented example contains
# the 'permissive' mode, then you check only if the necessary lines exists in
# correct order. Whit this, you can enable to upload PEM files (eg "----BEGIN.."),
# or other text files, which contains eg. HTTP headers.
#
# The difference is only the operator - in strict mode (first) the content blocked
# in case of any non-zero value. In permissive mode (second, commented) the
# content blocked only if the value is explicit 1. If it 0 or 2, the content will
# allowed.
#
#
# See #1747 and #1924 for further information on the possible values for
# MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "@eq 1" \
"id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_". The following flags currently exist:
#
# COR_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
#
SecRule TX:/^COR_/ "!@streq 0" \
"id:'200005',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'Coraza internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------
# Allow Coraza to access response bodies.
# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
# and data leakage issues.
#
# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
# memory consumption and response latency.
#
SecResponseBodyAccess On
# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
# (e.g., images and archives).
#
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml application/json
# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
#
SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------
# The location where Coraza stores temporary files (for example, when
# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
#
# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however,
# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
#
SecTmpDir /tmp/
# The location where Coraza will keep its persistent data. This default setting
# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
#
SecDataDir /tmp/
# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------
# The location where Coraza stores intercepted uploaded files. This
# location must be private to Coraza. You don't want other users on
# the server to access the files, do you?
#
#SecUploadDir /opt/coraza/var/upload/
# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
#
#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly
# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
# interface Coraza to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
#
#SecUploadFileMode 0600
# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# Default debug log path
# Debug levels:
# 0: No logging (least verbose)
# 1: Error
# 2: Warn
# 3: Info
# 4-8: Debug
# 9: Trace (most verbose)
# Most logging has not been implemented because it will be replaced with
# advanced rule profiling options
#SecDebugLog /opt/coraza/var/log/debug.log
SecDebugLogLevel 3
# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,
# level response status codes).
#
SecAuditEngine On
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:(5|4)(0|1)[0-9])$"
# Log everything we know about a transaction.
SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
# assumes that you will use the audit log only occasionally.
#
SecAuditLogType Serial
# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------
# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
# something else so don't expect to change this value.
#
SecArgumentSeparator &
# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
#
SecCookieFormat 0

253
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/coraza.conf-recommended.conf Normal file
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# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------
# Enable Coraza, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
# disruption.
#
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------
# Allow Coraza to access request bodies. If you don't, Coraza
# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
# hole for attackers to exploit.
#
SecRequestBodyAccess On
# Enable XML request body parser.
# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^(?:application(?:/soap\+|/)|text/)xml" \
"id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"
# Enable JSON request body parser.
# Initiate JSON Processor in case of JSON content-type; change accordingly
# if your application does not use 'application/json'
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/json" \
"id:'200001',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
# Sample rule to enable JSON request body parser for more subtypes.
# Uncomment or adapt this rule if you want to engage the JSON
# Processor for "+json" subtypes
#
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/[a-z0-9.-]+[+]json" \
# "id:'200006',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"
# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
# low as practical.
#
SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
SecRequestBodyInMemoryLimit 131072
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072
# What to do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
# disruptions when initially deploying Coraza.
#
SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject
# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
#
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200002', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"
# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
# _not_ to remove it altogether.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400, \
msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"
# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
#
# Here is a short description about the Coraza Multipart parser: the
# parser returns with value 0, if all "boundary-like" line matches with
# the boundary string which given in MIME header. In any other cases it returns
# with different value, eg. 1 or 2.
#
# The RFC 1341 descript the multipart content-type and its syntax must contains
# only three mandatory lines (above the content):
# * Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING--
#
# First line indicates, that this is a multipart content, second shows that
# here starts a part of the multipart content, third shows the end of content.
#
# If there are any other lines, which starts with "--", then it should be
# another boundary id - or not.
#
# After 3.0.3, there are two kinds of types of boundary errors: strict and permissive.
#
# If multipart content contains the three necessary lines with correct order, but
# there are one or more lines with "--", then parser returns with value 2 (non-zero).
#
# If some of the necessary lines (usually the start or end) misses, or the order
# is wrong, then parser returns with value 1 (also a non-zero).
#
# You can choose, which one is what you need. The example below contains the
# 'strict' mode, which means if there are any lines with start of "--", then
# Coraza blocked the content. But the next, commented example contains
# the 'permissive' mode, then you check only if the necessary lines exists in
# correct order. Whit this, you can enable to upload PEM files (eg "----BEGIN.."),
# or other text files, which contains eg. HTTP headers.
#
# The difference is only the operator - in strict mode (first) the content blocked
# in case of any non-zero value. In permissive mode (second, commented) the
# content blocked only if the value is explicit 1. If it 0 or 2, the content will
# allowed.
#
#
# See #1747 and #1924 for further information on the possible values for
# MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "@eq 1" \
"id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"
# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_". The following flags currently exist:
#
# COR_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
#
SecRule TX:/^COR_/ "!@streq 0" \
"id:'200005',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'Coraza internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"
# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------
# Allow Coraza to access response bodies.
# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
# and data leakage issues.
#
# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
# memory consumption and response latency.
#
SecResponseBodyAccess On
# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
# (e.g., images and archives).
#
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml
# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288
# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
#
SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial
# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------
# The location where Coraza stores temporary files (for example, when
# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
#
# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however,
# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
#
SecTmpDir /tmp/
# The location where Coraza will keep its persistent data. This default setting
# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
#
SecDataDir /tmp/
# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------
# The location where Coraza stores intercepted uploaded files. This
# location must be private to Coraza. You don't want other users on
# the server to access the files, do you?
#
#SecUploadDir /opt/coraza/var/upload/
# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
#
#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly
# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
# interface Coraza to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
#
#SecUploadFileMode 0600
# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# Default debug log path
# Debug levels:
# 0: No logging (least verbose)
# 1: Error
# 2: Warn
# 3: Info
# 4-8: Debug
# 9: Trace (most verbose)
# Most logging has not been implemented because it will be replaced with
# advanced rule profiling options
#SecDebugLog /opt/coraza/var/log/debug.log
#SecDebugLogLevel 3
# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------
# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,
# level response status codes).
#
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:(5|4)(0|1)[0-9])$"
# Log everything we know about a transaction.
SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ
# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
# assumes that you will use the audit log only occasionally.
#
SecAuditLogType Serial
# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------
# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
# something else so don't expect to change this value.
#
SecArgumentSeparator &
# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
#
SecCookieFormat 0

727
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs-setup-demo.conf Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,727 @@
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
#
# See also:
# https://coreruleset.org/
# https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset
# https://owasp.org/www-project-modsecurity-core-rule-set/
#
#
# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
#
# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
#
# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
#
# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
#
# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
# 1. modsecurity.conf
# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
#
# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
#
#
# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
#
# The CRS can run in two modes:
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
#
# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
# IDSs function.
#
# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
#
# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
#
# Examples for the various modes follow.
# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
#
# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
# rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
# log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
# if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
# the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
# to another custom URL.
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
#
# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
#
# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
#
# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
# are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
# covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
# with standard security requirements.
# At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
# open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
# complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
# many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
# extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
# for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
# and for installations with elevated security requirements.
# PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
# limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
# at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
# requirement.
# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
# The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
# installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
# likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
# treated before the site can go productive.
#
# All rules will log their PL to the audit log;
# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
#
# It is important to also look into the variable
# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
SecAction \
"id:900000,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.blocking_paranoia_level=1"
# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
# threshold.
# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
# setting the tx.detection_paranoia_level.
# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.detection_paranoia_level
# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.blocking_paranoia_level affect the
# anomaly scores.
# By default, tx.detection_paranoia_level is set to tx.blocking_paranoia_level.
# tx.detection_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.blocking_paranoia_level.
#
# Please notice that setting tx.detection_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
# tx.blocking_paranoia_level to said level.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900001,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.detection_paranoia_level=1"
#
# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
#
# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
# the payload. The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900010,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode Severity Levels ]] --------------------------------
#
# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
#
# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
# Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
# Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
# Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
# Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
#
# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
#
# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
#
SecAction \
"id:900100,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ----------------------
#
# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
# or outbound response, gets blocked.
#
# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
#
# [ At default value ]
# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
# the request to be blocked and logged.
#
# [ Using higher values ]
# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
#
# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
# CRS installation.
#
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
#
# High Anomaly Limit | High Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Fresh Site | -> Experimental Site
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Low Anomaly Limit | Low Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Standard Site | -> High Security Site
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900110,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
# setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
#
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] --------------------------------
#
# CRS 3.x contained exclusion packages to tweak the CRS for use with common
# web applications, lowering the number of false positives.
#
# In CRS 4, these are no longer part of the CRS itself, but they are available
# as "CRS plugins". Some plugins improve support for web applications, and others
# may bring new functionality. Plugins are not installed by default, but can be
# downloaded from the plugin registry:
# https://github.com/coreruleset/plugin-registry
#
# For detailed information about using and installing plugins, please see:
# https://coreruleset.org/docs/concepts/plugins/
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Score Reporting Level ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# When a request is blocked due to the anomaly score meeting or exceeding the
# anomaly threshold then the blocking rule will also report the anomaly score.
# This applies to the separate inbound and outbound anomaly scores.
#
# In phase 5, there are additional rules that can perform additional reporting
# of anomaly scores with a verbosity that depends on the reporting level defined
# below.
#
# By setting the reporting level you control whether you want additional
# reporting beyond the blocking rule or not and, if yes, which requests should
# be covered. The higher the reporting level, the more verbose the reporting is.
#
# There are 6 reporting levels:
#
# 0 - Reporting disabled
# 1 - Reporting for requests with a blocking anomaly score >= a threshold
# 2 - Reporting for requests with a detection anomaly score >= a threshold
# 3 - Reporting for requests with a blocking anomaly score greater than 0
# 4 - Reporting for requests with a detection anomaly score greater than 0
# 5 - Reporting for all requests
#
# Note: Reporting levels 1 and 2 make it possible to differentiate between
# requests that are blocked and requests that are *not* blocked but would have
# been blocked if the blocking PL was equal to detection PL. This may be useful
# for certain FP tuning methodologies, for example moving to a higher PL.
#
# A value of 5 can be useful on platforms where you are interested in logging
# non-scoring requests, yet it is not possible to report this information in
# the request/access log. This applies to Nginx, for example.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900115,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.reporting_level=4"
#
# -- [[ Early Anomaly Scoring Mode Blocking ]] ------------------------------
#
# The anomaly scores for the request and the responses are generally summed up
# and evaluated at the end of phase:2 and at the end of phase:4 respectively.
# However, it is possible to enable an early evaluation of these anomaly scores
# at the end of phase:1 and at the end of phase:3.
#
# If a request (or a response) hits the anomaly threshold in this early
# evaluation, then blocking happens immediately (if blocking is enabled) and
# the phase 2 (and phase 4 respectively) will no longer be executed.
#
# Enable the rule 900120 that sets the variable tx.early_blocking to 1 in order
# to enable early blocking. The variable tx.early_blocking is set to 0 by
# default. Early blocking is thus disabled by default.
#
# Please note that early blocking will hide potential alerts from you. This
# means that a payload that would appear in an alert in phase 2 (or phase 4)
# does not get evaluated if the request is being blocked early. So when you
# disabled early blocking again at some point in the future, then new alerts
# from phase 2 might pop up.
SecAction \
"id:900120,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.early_blocking=1"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
#
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
# MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900200,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# Default: |application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related|
# |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json|
# |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|
#
# Please note, that the rule where CRS uses this variable (920420) evaluates it with operator
# `@within`, which is case sensitive, but uses t:lowercase. You must add your whole custom
# Content-Type with lowercase.
#
# Bypass Warning: some applications may not rely on the content-type request header in order
# to parse the request body. This could make an attacker able to send malicious URLENCODED/JSON/XML
# payloads without being detected by the WAF. Allowing request content-type that doesn't activate any
# body processor (for example: "text/plain", "application/x-amf", "application/octet-stream", etc..)
# could lead to a WAF bypass. For example, a malicious JSON payload submitted with a "text/plain"
# content type may still be interpreted as JSON by a backend application but would not trigger the
# JSON body parser at the WAF, leading to a bypass.
#
# To prevent blocking request with not allowed content-type by default, you can create an exclusion
# rule that removes rule 920420. For example:
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^text/plain" \
# "id:1234,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=920420,\
# chain"
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/foo/bar" "t:none"
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900220,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json| |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|'"
# Allowed HTTP versions.
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
# we include both version strings by default.
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900230,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
# Forbidden file extensions.
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
# Note that .axd was removed due to false positives (see PR 1925).
#
# To additionally guard against configuration/install archive files from being
# accidentally exposed, common archive file extensions can be added to the
# restricted extensions list. An example list of common archive file extensions
# is presented below:
# .7z/ .br/ .bz/ .bz2/ .cab/ .cpio/ .gz/ .img/ .iso/ .jar/ .rar/ .tar/ .tbz2/ .tgz/ .txz/ .xz/ .zip/ .zst/
# (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_archive_formats)
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900240,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
# Forbidden request headers.
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Default: /accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/
#
# Note: Accept-Charset is a deprecated header that should not be used by clients and
# ignored by servers. It can be used for a response WAF bypass, by asking for a charset
# that the WAF cannot decode.
# Reference: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Accept-Charset
#
# Note: Content-Encoding is used to list any encodings that have been applied to the
# original payload. It is only used for compression, which isn't supported by CRS by
# default since it blocks newlines and null bytes inside the request body. Most
# compression algorithms require at least null bytes per RFC. Blocking it shouldn't
# break anything and increases security since ModSecurity is incapable of properly
# scanning compressed request bodies.
#
# Note: Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
#
# Note: Blocking the x-http-method-override,x-http-method and x-method-override headers
# prevents attacks as described here: https://www.sidechannel.blog/en/http-method-override-what-it-is-and-how-a-pentester-can-use-it
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900250,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/ /x-http-method-override/ /x-http-method/ /x-method-override/'"
# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# The content-types are enclosed by |pipes| as delimiters to guarantee exact matches.
# Default: |utf-8| |iso-8859-1| |iso-8859-15| |windows-1252|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900280,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=|utf-8| |iso-8859-1| |iso-8859-15| |windows-1252|'"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
#
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
#
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
#
# Block request if number of arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 255
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900300,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 100
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900310,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 400
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900320,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 64000
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900330,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900340,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900350,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
#
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
#
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
#
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
# being sent into the ruleset.
#
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
# request gets checked by the CRS. The selection of requests, which are going
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
#
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
# written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf).
#
#SecRuleUpdateActionById 901450 "nolog"
#
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
#
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900400,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
#
# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900950,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
#
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
#
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
#
# This value should be greater than or equal to any block durations or timeouts
# set by plugins that make use of ModSecurity's persistent collections (e.g. the
# DoS protection and IP reputation plugins).
#
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual-(v2.x)#SecCollectionTimeout
# Please keep this directive uncommented.
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
SecCollectionTimeout 600
#
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
# the CRS rules/* files.
#
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
#
SecAction \
"id:900990,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=400"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
#
# See also:
# https://coreruleset.org/
# https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset
# https://owasp.org/www-project-modsecurity-core-rule-set/
#
#
# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
#
# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
#
# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
#
# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
#
# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
# 1. modsecurity.conf
# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
#
# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
#
#
# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
#
# The CRS can run in two modes:
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
#
# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
# IDSs function.
#
# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
#
# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
#
# Examples for the various modes follow.
# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
#
# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example
# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
# rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
#
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
# log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
# if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
# the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
# to another custom URL.
# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
#
# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
#
# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
#
# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
# are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
# covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
# with standard security requirements.
# At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
# open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
# complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
# many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
# extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
# for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
# and for installations with elevated security requirements.
# PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
# limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
# at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
# requirement.
# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
# The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
# installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
# likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
# treated before the site can go productive.
#
# All rules will log their PL to the audit log;
# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
#
# It is important to also look into the variable
# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900000,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.blocking_paranoia_level=1"
# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
# threshold.
# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
# setting the tx.detection_paranoia_level.
# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.detection_paranoia_level
# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.blocking_paranoia_level affect the
# anomaly scores.
# By default, tx.detection_paranoia_level is set to tx.blocking_paranoia_level.
# tx.detection_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.blocking_paranoia_level.
#
# Please notice that setting tx.detection_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
# tx.blocking_paranoia_level to said level.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900001,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.detection_paranoia_level=1"
#
# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
#
# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
# the payload. The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900010,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode Severity Levels ]] --------------------------------
#
# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
#
# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
# Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
# Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
# Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
# Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
#
# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
#
# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900100,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
# setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
# setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
# setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ----------------------
#
# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
# or outbound response, gets blocked.
#
# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
#
# [ At default value ]
# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
# the request to be blocked and logged.
#
# [ Using higher values ]
# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
#
# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
# CRS installation.
#
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
#
# High Anomaly Limit | High Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Fresh Site | -> Experimental Site
# ------------------------------------------------------
# Low Anomaly Limit | Low Anomaly Limit
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
# -> Standard Site | -> High Security Site
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900110,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
# setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
#
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] --------------------------------
#
# CRS 3.x contained exclusion packages to tweak the CRS for use with common
# web applications, lowering the number of false positives.
#
# In CRS 4, these are no longer part of the CRS itself, but they are available
# as "CRS plugins". Some plugins improve support for web applications, and others
# may bring new functionality. Plugins are not installed by default, but can be
# downloaded from the plugin registry:
# https://github.com/coreruleset/plugin-registry
#
# For detailed information about using and installing plugins, please see:
# https://coreruleset.org/docs/concepts/plugins/
#
# -- [[ Anomaly Score Reporting Level ]] ---------------------------------------
#
# When a request is blocked due to the anomaly score meeting or exceeding the
# anomaly threshold then the blocking rule will also report the anomaly score.
# This applies to the separate inbound and outbound anomaly scores.
#
# In phase 5, there are additional rules that can perform additional reporting
# of anomaly scores with a verbosity that depends on the reporting level defined
# below.
#
# By setting the reporting level you control whether you want additional
# reporting beyond the blocking rule or not and, if yes, which requests should
# be covered. The higher the reporting level, the more verbose the reporting is.
#
# There are 6 reporting levels:
#
# 0 - Reporting disabled
# 1 - Reporting for requests with a blocking anomaly score >= a threshold
# 2 - Reporting for requests with a detection anomaly score >= a threshold
# 3 - Reporting for requests with a blocking anomaly score greater than 0
# 4 - Reporting for requests with a detection anomaly score greater than 0
# 5 - Reporting for all requests
#
# Note: Reporting levels 1 and 2 make it possible to differentiate between
# requests that are blocked and requests that are *not* blocked but would have
# been blocked if the blocking PL was equal to detection PL. This may be useful
# for certain FP tuning methodologies, for example moving to a higher PL.
#
# A value of 5 can be useful on platforms where you are interested in logging
# non-scoring requests, yet it is not possible to report this information in
# the request/access log. This applies to Nginx, for example.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900115,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.reporting_level=4"
#
# -- [[ Early Anomaly Scoring Mode Blocking ]] ------------------------------
#
# The anomaly scores for the request and the responses are generally summed up
# and evaluated at the end of phase:2 and at the end of phase:4 respectively.
# However, it is possible to enable an early evaluation of these anomaly scores
# at the end of phase:1 and at the end of phase:3.
#
# If a request (or a response) hits the anomaly threshold in this early
# evaluation, then blocking happens immediately (if blocking is enabled) and
# the phase 2 (and phase 4 respectively) will no longer be executed.
#
# Enable the rule 900120 that sets the variable tx.early_blocking to 1 in order
# to enable early blocking. The variable tx.early_blocking is set to 0 by
# default. Early blocking is thus disabled by default.
#
# Please note that early blocking will hide potential alerts from you. This
# means that a payload that would appear in an alert in phase 2 (or phase 4)
# does not get evaluated if the request is being blocked early. So when you
# disabled early blocking again at some point in the future, then new alerts
# from phase 2 might pop up.
SecAction \
"id:900120,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.early_blocking=1"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
#
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
# MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900200,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# Default: |application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related|
# |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json|
# |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|
#
# Please note, that the rule where CRS uses this variable (920420) evaluates it with operator
# `@within`, which is case sensitive, but uses t:lowercase. You must add your whole custom
# Content-Type with lowercase.
#
# Bypass Warning: some applications may not rely on the content-type request header in order
# to parse the request body. This could make an attacker able to send malicious URLENCODED/JSON/XML
# payloads without being detected by the WAF. Allowing request content-type that doesn't activate any
# body processor (for example: "text/plain", "application/x-amf", "application/octet-stream", etc..)
# could lead to a WAF bypass. For example, a malicious JSON payload submitted with a "text/plain"
# content type may still be interpreted as JSON by a backend application but would not trigger the
# JSON body parser at the WAF, leading to a bypass.
#
# To prevent blocking request with not allowed content-type by default, you can create an exclusion
# rule that removes rule 920420. For example:
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^text/plain" \
# "id:1234,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=920420,\
# chain"
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx ^/foo/bar" "t:none"
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900220,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json| |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|'"
# Allowed HTTP versions.
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
# we include both version strings by default.
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900230,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
# Forbidden file extensions.
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
# Note that .axd was removed due to false positives (see PR 1925).
#
# To additionally guard against configuration/install archive files from being
# accidentally exposed, common archive file extensions can be added to the
# restricted extensions list. An example list of common archive file extensions
# is presented below:
# .7z/ .br/ .bz/ .bz2/ .cab/ .cpio/ .gz/ .img/ .iso/ .jar/ .rar/ .tar/ .tbz2/ .tgz/ .txz/ .xz/ .zip/ .zst/
# (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_archive_formats)
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900240,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
# Forbidden request headers.
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
# Default: /accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/
#
# Note: Accept-Charset is a deprecated header that should not be used by clients and
# ignored by servers. It can be used for a response WAF bypass, by asking for a charset
# that the WAF cannot decode.
# Reference: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Accept-Charset
#
# Note: Content-Encoding is used to list any encodings that have been applied to the
# original payload. It is only used for compression, which isn't supported by CRS by
# default since it blocks newlines and null bytes inside the request body. Most
# compression algorithms require at least null bytes per RFC. Blocking it shouldn't
# break anything and increases security since ModSecurity is incapable of properly
# scanning compressed request bodies.
#
# Note: Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
#
# Note: Blocking the x-http-method-override,x-http-method and x-method-override headers
# prevents attacks as described here: https://www.sidechannel.blog/en/http-method-override-what-it-is-and-how-a-pentester-can-use-it
#
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900250,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/ /x-http-method-override/ /x-http-method/ /x-method-override/'"
# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
# The content-types are enclosed by |pipes| as delimiters to guarantee exact matches.
# Default: |utf-8| |iso-8859-1| |iso-8859-15| |windows-1252|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
#SecAction \
# "id:900280,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=|utf-8| |iso-8859-1| |iso-8859-15| |windows-1252|'"
#
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
#
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
#
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
#
# Block request if number of arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 255
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900300,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 100
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900310,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 400
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900320,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 64000
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900330,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900340,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
# Default: unlimited
# Example: 1048576
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
#SecAction \
# "id:900350,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
#
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
#
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
#
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
# being sent into the ruleset.
#
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
# request gets checked by the CRS. The selection of requests, which are going
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
#
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
# written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf).
#
#SecRuleUpdateActionById 901450 "nolog"
#
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
#
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900400,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
#
# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
#
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
#
#SecAction \
# "id:900950,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# t:none,\
# nolog,\
# setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
#
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
#
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
#
# This value should be greater than or equal to any block durations or timeouts
# set by plugins that make use of ModSecurity's persistent collections (e.g. the
# DoS protection and IP reputation plugins).
#
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual-(v2.x)#SecCollectionTimeout
# Please keep this directive uncommented.
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
SecCollectionTimeout 600
#
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
#
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
# the CRS rules/* files.
#
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
#
SecAction \
"id:900990,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=400"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# The purpose of this file is to hold LOCAL exceptions for your site. The
# types of rules that would go into this file are one where you want to
# short-circuit inspection and allow certain transactions to pass through
# inspection or if you want to alter rules that are applied.
#
# This file is named REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf.example for a
# very specific reason. Files affixed with the .example extension are designed
# to contain user created/modified data. The '.example'. extension should be
# renamed to end in .conf. The advantage of this is that when OWASP CRS is
# updated, the updates will not overwrite a user generated configuration file.
#
# As a result of this design paradigm users are encouraged NOT to directly
# modify rules. Instead they should use this
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS and the
# RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS file to modify OWASP rules using
# methods similar to the examples specified below.
#
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS and
# RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS serve different purposes. ModSecurity
# effectively maintains two different context: startup, and per transaction.
# As a rule, directives are processed within the startup context. While they
# can affect the per transaction context they generally remain fixed during the
# execution of ModSecurity.
#
# As a result if one wanted to disable a rule at bootup the SecRuleRemoveById
# directive or one of its siblings would have to be placed AFTER the rule is
# listed, otherwise it will not have knowledge of the rules existence (since
# these rules are read in at the same time). This means that when using
# directives that effect SecRules, these exceptions should be placed AFTER all
# the existing rules. This is why RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS is
# designed such that it loads LAST.
#
# Conversely, ModSecurity supports several actions that can change the state of
# the underlying configuration during the per transaction context, this is when
# rules are being processed. Generally, these are accomplished by using the
# 'ctl' action. As these are part of a rule, they will be evaluated in the
# order rules are applied (by physical location, considering phases). As a
# result of this ordering a 'ctl' action should be placed with consideration to
# when it will be executed. This is particularly relevant for the 'ctl' options
# that involve modifying ID's (such as ruleRemoveById). In these cases it is
# important that such rules are placed BEFORE the rule ID they will affect.
# Unlike the setup context, by the time we process rules in the per-transaction
# context, we are already aware of all the rule ID's. It is by this logic that
# we include rules such as this BEFORE all the remaining rules. As a result
# REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS is designed to load FIRST.
#
# As a general rule:
# ctl:ruleEngine -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveById -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveByMsg -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveByTag -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByMsg -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag -> place in REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS
#
# SecRuleRemoveById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleRemoveByMsg -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleRemoveByTag -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleUpdateActionById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleUpdateTargetById -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleUpdateTargetByMsg -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
# SecRuleUpdateTargetByTag -> place in RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS
#
#
# What follows are a group of examples that show you how to perform rule
# exclusions.
#
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: Disable inspection for an authorized client
#
# This ruleset allows you to control how ModSecurity will handle traffic
# originating from Authorized Vulnerability Scanning (AVS) sources. See
# related blog post -
# https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/updated-advanced-topic-of-the-week-handling-authorized-scanning-traffic/
#
# Allow List ASV network block (no blocking or logging of AVS traffic) Update
# IP network block as appropriate for your AVS traffic
#
# ModSec Rule Exclusion: Disable Rule Engine for known ASV IP
# SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.1.100" \
# "id:1000,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleEngine=Off"
#
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
# for an individual rule
#
# This rule shows how to conditionally exclude the "password"
# parameter for rule 942100 when the REQUEST_URI is /index.php
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: 942100 SQL Injection Detected via libinjection
#
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /index.php" \
# "id:1001,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetById=942100;ARGS:password"
#
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
# for only certain attacks
#
# Attack rules within the CRS are tagged, with tags such as 'attack-lfi',
# 'attack-sqli', 'attack-xss', 'attack-injection-php', et cetera.
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable inspection of ARGS:pwd
# for all rules tagged attack-sqli
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
# "id:1002,\
# phase:2,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=attack-sqli;ARGS:pwd"
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a specific ARGS parameter from inspection
# for all CRS rules
#
# This rule illustrates that we can use tagging very effectively to allow list a
# common false positive across an entire ModSecurity instance. This can be done
# because every rule in OWASP_CRS is tagged with OWASP_CRS. This will NOT
# affect custom rules.
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable inspection of ARGS:pwd
# for all CRS rules
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@endsWith /wp-login.php" \
# "id:1003,\
# phase:2,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveTargetByTag=OWASP_CRS;ARGS:pwd"
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: Removing a range of rules
#
# This rule illustrates that we can remove a rule range via a ctl action.
# This uses the fact, that rules are grouped by topic in rule files covering
# a certain id range.
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable all SQLi and XSS rules
# SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@beginsWith /admin" \
# "id:1004,\
# phase:2,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=941000-942999"
#
#
# The application-specific rule exclusion plugins
# (see: https://github.com/coreruleset/plugin-registry)
# provide additional examples which can be useful then tuning a service.
#
# Example Rule: Allow monitoring tools and scripts
#
# Uncomment this rule to allow all requests from trusted IPs and User-Agent.
# This can be useful for monitoring tools like Monit, Nagios, or other agents.
# For example, if you're using AWS Load Balancer, you may need to trust all
# requests from "10.0.0.0/8" subnet that come with the user-agent
# "ELB-HealthChecker/2.0". By doing this, all requests that match these
# conditions will not be matched against the following rules:
#
# - id: 911100 (allowed methods)
# - id: 913100,913110,913120,913101,913102 (scan detection)
# - id: 920280 (missing/empty host header)
# - id: 920350 (IP address in host header)
# - tag: attack-disclosure (all RESPONSE-*-DATA-LEAKAGES rules)
#
# SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 10.0.0.0/8" \
# "id:1005,\
# phase:1,\
# pass,\
# nolog,\
# chain"
# SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "@pm GET HEAD" "chain"
# SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pm ELB-HealthChecker" \
# "ctl:ruleRemoveById=911100,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=913100,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=913110,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=913120,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=913101,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=913102,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=920280,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveById=920350,\
# ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=attack-disclosure"

424
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# This file REQUEST-901-INITIALIZATION.conf initializes the Core Rules
# and performs preparatory actions. It also fixes errors and omissions
# of variable definitions in the file crs-setup.conf.
# The crs-setup.conf can and should be edited by the user, this file
# is part of the CRS installation and should not be altered.
#
#
# -=[ Rules Version ]=-
#
# Rule version data is added to the "Producer" line of Section H of the Audit log:
#
# - Producer: ModSecurity for Apache/2.9.1 (http://www.modsecurity.org/); OWASP_CRS/3.1.0.
#
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecComponentSignature
#
SecComponentSignature "OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1"
#
# -=[ Default setup values ]=-
#
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
# file is included at the correct time. This detects situations where
# necessary settings are not defined, for instance if the file
# inclusion order is incorrect, or if the user has forgotten to
# include the crs-setup.conf file.
#
# If you are upgrading from an earlier version of the CRS and you are
# getting this error, please make a new copy of the setup template
# crs-setup.conf.example to crs-setup.conf, and re-apply your policy
# changes. There have been many changes in settings syntax from CRS2
# to CRS3, so an old setup file may cause unwanted behavior.
#
# If you are not planning to use the crs-setup.conf template, you must
# manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
# the CRS rules/* files.
#
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
#
SecRule &TX:crs_setup_version "@eq 0" \
"id:901001,\
phase:1,\
deny,\
status:500,\
log,\
auditlog,\
msg:'ModSecurity Core Rule Set is deployed without configuration! Please copy the crs-setup.conf.example template to crs-setup.conf, and include the crs-setup.conf file in your webserver configuration before including the CRS rules. See the INSTALL file in the CRS directory for detailed instructions',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL'"
#
# -=[ Default setup values ]=-
#
# Some constructs or individual rules will fail if certain parameters
# are not set in the crs-setup.conf file. The following rules will catch
# these cases and assign sane default values.
#
# Default Inbound Anomaly Threshold Level (rule 900110 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:inbound_anomaly_score_threshold "@eq 0" \
"id:901100,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5'"
# Default Outbound Anomaly Threshold Level (rule 900110 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:outbound_anomaly_score_threshold "@eq 0" \
"id:901110,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4'"
# Default Reporting Level (rule 900115 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:reporting_level "@eq 0" \
"id:901111,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.reporting_level=4'"
# Default Early Blocking (rule 900120 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:early_blocking "@eq 0" \
"id:901115,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.early_blocking=0'"
# Default Blocking Paranoia Level (rule 900000 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:blocking_paranoia_level "@eq 0" \
"id:901120,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.blocking_paranoia_level=1'"
# Default Detection Paranoia Level (rule 900001 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:detection_paranoia_level "@eq 0" \
"id:901125,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.detection_paranoia_level=%{TX.blocking_paranoia_level}'"
# Default Sampling Percentage (rule 900400 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:sampling_percentage "@eq 0" \
"id:901130,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.sampling_percentage=100'"
# Default Anomaly Scores (rule 900100 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:critical_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
"id:901140,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.critical_anomaly_score=5'"
SecRule &TX:error_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
"id:901141,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.error_anomaly_score=4'"
SecRule &TX:warning_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
"id:901142,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.warning_anomaly_score=3'"
SecRule &TX:notice_anomaly_score "@eq 0" \
"id:901143,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.notice_anomaly_score=2'"
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_methods (rule 900200 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:allowed_methods "@eq 0" \
"id:901160,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_request_content_type (rule 900220 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:allowed_request_content_type "@eq 0" \
"id:901162,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/json| |application/cloudevents+json| |application/cloudevents-batch+json|'"
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_request_content_type_charset (rule 900280 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:allowed_request_content_type_charset "@eq 0" \
"id:901168,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=|utf-8| |iso-8859-1| |iso-8859-15| |windows-1252|'"
# Default HTTP policy: allowed_http_versions (rule 900230 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:allowed_http_versions "@eq 0" \
"id:901163,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
# Default HTTP policy: restricted_extensions (rule 900240 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:restricted_extensions "@eq 0" \
"id:901164,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
# Default HTTP policy: restricted_headers (rule 900250 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:restricted_headers "@eq 0" \
"id:901165,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/accept-charset/ /content-encoding/ /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/ /x-http-method-override/ /x-http-method/ /x-method-override/'"
# Default enforcing of body processor URLENCODED (rule 900010 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded "@eq 0" \
"id:901167,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=0'"
# Default check for UTF8 encoding validation (rule 900950 in crs-setup.conf)
SecRule &TX:crs_validate_utf8_encoding "@eq 0" \
"id:901169,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=0'"
#
# -=[ Initialize internal variables ]=-
#
# Initialize anomaly scoring variables.
# All _score variables start at 0, and are incremented by the various rules
# upon detection of a possible attack.
SecAction \
"id:901200,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=0',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=0',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=0',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=0',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.xss_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=0',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=0',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2=0',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3=0',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4=0',\
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=0'"
#
# -=[ Initialize collections ]=-
#
# Create both Global and IP collections for rules to use.
# There are some CRS rules that assume that these two collections
# have already been initiated.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@rx ^.*$" \
"id:901318,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,t:sha1,t:hexEncode,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.ua_hash=%{MATCHED_VAR}'"
SecAction \
"id:901321,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
initcol:global=global,\
initcol:ip=%{remote_addr}_%{tx.ua_hash}"
#
# -=[ Initialize Correct Body Processing ]=-
#
# Force request body variable and optionally request body processor
#
# Force body variable
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@rx (?:URLENCODED|MULTIPART|XML|JSON)" \
"id:901340,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Enabling body inspection',\
ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable=On,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"
# Force body processor URLENCODED
SecRule TX:enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded "@eq 1" \
"id:901350,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
nolog,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Enabling forced body inspection for ASCII content',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
chain"
SecRule REQBODY_PROCESSOR "!@rx (?:URLENCODED|MULTIPART|XML|JSON)" \
"ctl:requestBodyProcessor=URLENCODED"
#
# -=[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]=-
#
# This is used to send only a limited percentage of requests into the Core
# Rule Set. The selection is based on TX.sampling_percentage and a pseudo
# random number calculated below.
#
# Use this to ease into a new Core Rules installation with an existing
# productive service.
#
# See
# https://www.netnea.com/cms/2016/04/26/easing-in-conditional-modsecurity-rule-execution-based-on-pseudo-random-numbers/
#
#
# Generate the pseudo random number
#
# ATTENTION: This is no cryptographically secure random number. It's just
# a cheap way to get some random number suitable for sampling.
#
# We take the entropy contained in the UNIQUE_ID. We hash that variable and
# take the first integer numbers out of it. Theoretically, it is possible
# but highly improbable that there are no integers in a hexEncoded sha1 hash.
# In the very rare event that two integers are not matched (due to only being
# a-f in all, or all but one positions) 901450 will not be triggered.
# Leading zeros are not removed from the two-digit random number, and are
# handled gracefullly by 901450
SecRule TX:sampling_percentage "@eq 100" \
"id:901400,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
skipAfter:END-SAMPLING"
SecRule UNIQUE_ID "@rx ^[a-f]*([0-9])[a-f]*([0-9])" \
"id:901410,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
capture,\
t:sha1,t:hexEncode,\
nolog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'TX.sampling_rnd100=%{TX.1}%{TX.2}'"
#
# Sampling decision
#
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
# being written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901450 "nolog"
#
SecRule TX:sampling_rnd100 "!@lt %{tx.sampling_percentage}" \
"id:901450,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
log,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Sampling: Disable the rule engine based on sampling_percentage %{TX.sampling_percentage} and random number %{TX.sampling_rnd100}',\
ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=OWASP_CRS,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"
SecMarker "END-SAMPLING"
#
# Configuration Plausibility Checks
#
# Make sure detection paranoia level is not lower than paranoia level
SecRule TX:detection_paranoia_level "@lt %{tx.blocking_paranoia_level}" \
"id:901500,\
phase:1,\
deny,\
status:500,\
t:none,\
log,\
msg:'Detection paranoia level configured is lower than the paranoia level itself. This is illegal. Blocking request. Aborting',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# This file is used as an exception mechanism to remove common false positives
# that may be encountered.
#
# Exception for Apache SSL pinger
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "@streq GET /" \
"id:905100,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-apache',\
tag:'attack-generic',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
chain"
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 127.0.0.1,::1" \
"t:none,\
ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=OWASP_CRS,\
ctl:auditEngine=Off"
#
# Exception for Apache internal dummy connection
#
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 127.0.0.1,::1" \
"id:905110,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-apache',\
tag:'attack-generic',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@endsWith (internal dummy connection)" \
"t:none,\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_LINE "@rx ^(?:GET /|OPTIONS \*) HTTP/[12]\.[01]$" \
"t:none,\
ctl:ruleRemoveByTag=OWASP_CRS,\
ctl:auditEngine=Off"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:911011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:911012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Allowed Request Methods ]=-
#
# tx.allowed_methods is defined in the crs-setup.conf file
#
SecRule REQUEST_METHOD "!@within %{tx.allowed_methods}" \
"id:911100,\
phase:1,\
block,\
msg:'Method is not allowed by policy',\
logdata:'%{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/274',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:911013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:911014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:911015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:911016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:911017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:911018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:913011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:913012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Vulnerability Scanner Checks ]=-
#
# These rules inspect the default User-Agent and Header values sent by
# various commercial and open source vuln scanners.
#
# The following rules contain User-Agent lists:
# 913100 - security scanners (data file scanners-user-agents.data)
# 913101 - scripting/generic HTTP clients (data file scripting-user-agents.data)
# 913102 - web crawlers/bots (data file crawlers-user-agents.data)
#
# Chained rule is allow listing:
# YUM package manager of CentOS / Fedore: User-Agent: urlgrabber/3.10 yum/3.4.3
# eCairn service: User-Agent: mozilla/5.0 ecairn-grabber/1.0 (+http://ecairn.com/grabber)
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile scanners-user-agents.data" \
"id:913100,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with security scanner',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/224/541/310',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "!@rx ^(?:urlgrabber/[0-9\.]+ yum/[0-9\.]+|mozilla/[0-9\.]+ ecairn-grabber/[0-9\.]+ \(\+http://ecairn.com/grabber\))$" \
"setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@pmFromFile scanners-headers.data" \
"id:913110,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Found request header associated with security scanner',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/224/541/310',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS "@pmFromFile scanners-urls.data" \
"id:913120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Found request filename/argument associated with security scanner',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-reputation-scanner',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/224/541/310',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:913013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:913014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Scripting/Generic User-Agents ]=-
#
# This rule detects user-agents associated with various HTTP client libraries
# and scripting languages. Detection suggests attempted access by some
# automated tool.
#
# This rule is a sibling of rule 913100.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile scripting-user-agents.data" \
"id:913101,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with scripting/generic HTTP client',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-reputation-scripting',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/224/541/310',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Crawler User-Agents ]=-
#
# This rule detects user-agents associated with various crawlers, SEO tools,
# and bots, which have been reported to potentially misbehave.
# These crawlers can have legitimate uses when used with authorization.
#
# This rule is a sibling of rule 913100.
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile crawlers-user-agents.data" \
"id:913102,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Found User-Agent associated with web crawler/bot',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-reputation-crawler',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/150',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.10',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:913015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:913016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:913017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:913018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:921011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:921012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ HTTP Request Smuggling ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# This rule looks for a HTTP / WEBDAV method name in combination with the word http/\d or a CR/LF character.
# This would point to an attempt to inject a 2nd request into the request, thus bypassing
# tests carried out on the primary request.
#
# [ References ]
# http://projects.webappsec.org/HTTP-Request-Smuggling
#
SecRule ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|REQUEST_BODY|XML:/* "@rx (?:get|post|head|options|connect|put|delete|trace|track|patch|propfind|propatch|mkcol|copy|move|lock|unlock)\s+[^\s]+\s+http/\d" \
"id:921110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
msg:'HTTP Request Smuggling Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/33',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ HTTP Response Splitting ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# These rules look for Carriage Return (CR) %0d and Linefeed (LF) %0a characters.
# These characters may cause problems if the data is returned in a response header and
# may be interpreted by an intermediary proxy server and treated as two separate
# responses.
#
# [ References ]
# http://projects.webappsec.org/HTTP-Response-Splitting
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx [\r\n]\W*?(?:content-(?:type|length)|set-cookie|location):\s*\w" \
"id:921120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'HTTP Response Splitting Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/34',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:\bhttp/\d|<(?:html|meta)\b)" \
"id:921130,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
msg:'HTTP Response Splitting Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/34',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ HTTP Header Injection ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# These rules look for Carriage Return (CR) %0d and Linefeed (LF) %0a characters,
# on their own or in combination with header field names.
# These characters may cause problems if the data is returned in a response header
# and interpreted by the client.
# The rules are similar to rules defending against the HTTP Request Splitting and
# Request Smuggling rules.
#
# [ References ]
# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_header_injection
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS "@rx [\n\r]" \
"id:921140,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via headers',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/273',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Detect newlines in argument names.
# Checking for GET arguments has been moved to paranoia level 2 (921151)
# in order to mitigate possible false positives.
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx [\n\r]" \
"id:921150,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF detected)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/33',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS_GET_NAMES|ARGS_GET "@rx [\n\r]+(?:\s|location|refresh|(?:set-)?cookie|(?:x-)?(?:forwarded-(?:for|host|server)|host|via|remote-ip|remote-addr|originating-IP))\s*:" \
"id:921160,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,t:lowercase,\
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF and header-name detected)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/33',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# -=[ HTTP Splitting ]=-
#
# This rule detect \n or \r in the REQUEST FILENAME
# Reference: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_HTTP_Splitting/Smuggling_(OTG-INPVAL-016)
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx [\n\r]" \
"id:921190,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'HTTP Splitting (CR/LF in request filename detected)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/34',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ LDAP Injection ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
#
# This is a rule trying to prevent LDAP injection. It is based on a BlackHat presentation by Alonso Parada
# and regex writing by Denis Kolegov.
#
# [ References ]
# * https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-08/Alonso-Parada/Whitepaper/bh-eu-08-alonso-parada-WP.pdf
# * https://blog.ripstech.com/2017/joomla-takeover-in-20-seconds-with-ldap-injection-cve-2017-14596/
# * https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/276#issue-126581660
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx ^[^:\(\)\&\|\!\<\>\~]*\)\s*(?:\((?:[^,\(\)\=\&\|\!\<\>\~]+[><~]?=|\s*[&!|]\s*(?:\)|\()?\s*)|\)\s*\(\s*[\&\|\!]\s*|[&!|]\s*\([^\(\)\=\&\|\!\<\>\~]+[><~]?=[^:\(\)\&\|\!\<\>\~]*)" \
"id:921200,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
msg:'LDAP Injection Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-ldap',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248/136',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Body Processor Bypass ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
#
# This rule intends to detect content types in the Content-Type header outside of the actual content type declaration.
# This prevents bypasses targeting the Modsecurity recommended rules controlling which body processor is used.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/921421.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 921421
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^[^\s\v,;]+[\s\v,;].*?(?:application/(?:.+\+)?json|(?:application/(?:soap\+)?|text/)xml)" \
"id:921421,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Content-Type header: Dangerous content type outside the mime type declaration',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# Rule against CVE-2021-40438:
# A crafted request uri-path can cause mod_proxy to forward the request to an origin server choosen by the remote user.
# This issue affects Apache HTTP Server 2.4.48 and earlier.
# GET /?unix:AAAAAAAAAAAAA|http://coreruleset.org/
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx unix:[^|]*\|" \
"id:921240,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'mod_proxy attack attempt detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-apache',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/33',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:921013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:921014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
# Detect newlines in GET argument values.
# These may point to a HTTP header injection attack, but can also sometimes
# occur in benign query parameters.
#
# See also: rule 921140, 921150
#
SecRule ARGS_GET "@rx [\n\r]" \
"id:921151,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
msg:'HTTP Header Injection Attack via payload (CR/LF detected)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220/33',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Body Processor Bypass ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
#
# This rule intends to detect content types in the Content-Type header outside of the actual content type declaration.
#
# [ References ]
# * See rule 921422
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/921422.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 921422
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "@rx ^[^\s\v,;]+[\s\v,;].*?\b(?:((?:tex|multipar)t|application)|((?:audi|vide)o|image|cs[sv]|(?:vn|relate)d|p(?:df|lain)|json|(?:soa|cs)p|x(?:ml|-www-form-urlencoded)|form-data|x-amf|(?:octe|repor)t|stream)|([\+/]))\b" \
"id:921422,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Content-Type header: Dangerous content type outside the mime type declaration',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'PCI/12.1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:921015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:921016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
#
# Forbid Request Range Header
#
# It is possible abuse the HTTP Request Range Header to leak error pages
# and other information in very small snippets.
# The easiest way to fight this is to deny the use of this header.
# This is a viable option since the header is only used in rare circumstances
# anymore.
# If it is necessary to use it in a certain setup, then it is best to
# create a rule exclusion for a given URI and this rule ID as a workaround.
#
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Range "@gt 0" \
"id:921230,\
phase:1,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'HTTP Range Header detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: Header %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/210/272/220',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# -=[ HTTP Parameter Pollution ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# These rules look for multiple parameters with the same name.
# 921170 counts the occurrences of the individual parameters.
# 921180 checks if any counter is > 1.
#
# One HPP attack vector is to try evade signature filters by distributing the
# attack payload across multiple parameters with the same name.
# This works as many security devices only apply signatures to individual
# parameter payloads, however the back-end web application may (in the case
# of ASP.NET) consolidate all of the payloads into one thus making the
# attack payload active.
#
# [ References ]
# http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/05/http-parameter-pollution.html
# https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/460.html
#
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ." \
"id:921170,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
nolog,\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/15/460',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'TX.paramcounter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=+1'"
SecRule TX:/paramcounter_.*/ "@gt 1" \
"id:921180,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
msg:'HTTP Parameter Pollution (%{TX.1})',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/15/460',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VARS_NAMES "@rx TX:paramcounter_(.*)" \
"capture,\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# -=[ HTTP Parameter Pollution ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# Parameter pollution rule 921180 PL3 can by bypassed when a weak backend parameter
# parser is ignoring additional characters in a parameter array name after the
# closing of the array.
# Rule 921210 PL3 prevents this by disallowing arbitrary strings after an array has
# been closed or inbetween the square brackets in multidimensional arrays.
# Please note that rule 921120 allows for 2-dimensional, but not for higher dimensional
# arrays. If these are flagged as attacks, a rule exclusion will have to be
# deployed; ideally for the parameter(s) in question.
#
# [ References ]
# Private bug bounty in Spring 2022, findings Z05OZUCH.
#
# [ Payloads ]
# * foo[1]a=bar&foo[1]b=<evil> - parameter parsers often cut after the closing of
# the array. 921180 PL3 takes the full name, though.
# This impediance mismatch allows for bypasses.
# * foo[1]x[1]=bar&foo[1]x[2]=<evil> - extension of 1; this has the advantage that
# the parameter name does end with "]" just like a valid array notation.
#
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx (][^\]]+$|][^\]]+\[)" \
"id:921210,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
log,\
msg:'HTTP Parameter Pollution after detecting bogus char after parameter array',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/15/460',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:921017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:921018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
# -=[ HTTP Parameter Pollution ]=-
#
# [ Rule Logic ]
# Parameter pollution rule 921180 PL3 and 921210 PL3 can by bypassed if a
# weak backend parameter parser ignores parameter array alltogether at
# cuts parameter names at the first occurrence of the "[" character.
# The rule 921220 PL4 prevents this by disallowing parameter array names.
#
# If an application needs parameter array names, then this rule should be
# disabled, ideally by issueing a rule exclusion for the parameter names
# that need it.
#
# [ References ]
# Private bug bounty in Spring 2022, finding 5UXE4RK0.
#
# [ Payloads ]
# * foo[1]=bar&foo[2]=<evil>
# * foo=bar&foo[1]=<evil>
# * foo[1]=bar&foo[1]acb]=<evil> - this is an edge case that 921210 PL3 is not
# able to catch since the parameter name ends with "]".
#
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx \[" \
"id:921220,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
log,\
msg:'HTTP Parameter Pollution possible via array notation',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/15/460',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.http_violation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK"

92
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-922-MULTIPART-ATTACK.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
# This file is to address the 3UWMWA6W vulnerability.
# It requires ModSecurity version 2.9.6 or 3.0.8 (or an updated version with backports
# of the security fixes in these versions) or a compatible engine supporting these changes.
#
# If you cannot upgrade ModSecurity, this file will cause ModSecurity to fail to start.
# In that case, you can temporarily delete this file. However, you will be missing
# protection from these rules. Therefore, we recommend upgrading your engine instead.
# The rules in this file will be part of the 920 / 921 in the future.
# Only allow specific charsets when using "_charset_"
# Note: this is in phase:2 because these are headers that come in the body
SecRule &MULTIPART_PART_HEADERS:_charset_ "!@eq 0" \
"id:922100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Multipart content type global _charset_ definition is not allowed by policy',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{ARGS._charset_}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-multipart-header',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule ARGS:_charset_ "!@within |%{tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset}|" \
"t:lowercase,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Only allow specific charsets same as Rule 920600
# Note: this is in phase:2 because these are headers that come in the body
SecRule MULTIPART_PART_HEADERS "@rx ^content-type\s*:\s*(.*)$" \
"id:922110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Illegal MIME Multipart Header content-type: charset parameter',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.1} found within Content-Type multipart form',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-protocol',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/272/220',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule TX:1 "!@rx ^(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*(?:[\s\v]*,[\s\v]*(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*)*$" \
"t:lowercase,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Content-Transfer-Encoding was deprecated by rfc7578 in 2015 and should not be used (see: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7578#section-4.7)
# Note: this is in phase:2 because these are headers that come in the body
SecRule MULTIPART_PART_HEADERS "@rx content-transfer-encoding:(.*)" \
"id:922120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Content-Transfer-Encoding was deprecated by rfc7578 in 2015 and should not be used',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-deprecated-header',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/272/220',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"

203
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:930011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:930012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Directory Traversal Attacks ]=-
#
# Ref: https://github.com/wireghoul/dotdotpwn
#
# [ Encoded /../ Payloads ]
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/930100.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 930100
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI_RAW|ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|FILES|XML:/* "@rx (?i)(?:[/\x5c]|%(?:2(?:f|5(?:2f|5c|c(?:1%259c|0%25af))|%46)|5c|c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|(?:bg%q|(?:e|f(?:8%8)?0%8)0%80%a)f|u(?:221[5-6]|EFC8|F025|002f)|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|1u)|0x(?:2f|5c))(?:\.(?:%0[0-1]|\?)?|\?\.?|%(?:2(?:(?:5(?:2|c0%25a))?e|%45)|c0(?:\.|%[25-6ae-f]e)|u(?:(?:ff0|002)e|2024)|%32(?:%(?:%6|4)5|E)|(?:e|f(?:(?:8|c%80)%8)?0%8)0%80%ae)|0x2e){2,3}(?:[/\x5c]|%(?:2(?:f|5(?:2f|5c|c(?:1%259c|0%25af))|%46)|5c|c(?:0%(?:[2aq]f|5c|9v)|1%(?:[19p]c|8s|af))|(?:bg%q|(?:e|f(?:8%8)?0%8)0%80%a)f|u(?:221[5-6]|EFC8|F025|002f)|%3(?:2(?:%(?:%6|4)6|F)|5%%63)|1u)|0x(?:2f|5c))" \
"id:930100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Path Traversal Attack (/../) or (/.../)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-lfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/126',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ Decoded /../ or /..;/ Payloads ]
#
# To prevent '..' from triggering, the regexp is split into two parts:
# - ../
# - /..
# OR
# - .../
# - /...
#
# Semicolon added to prevent path traversal via reverse proxy mapping '/..;/' (Tomcat)
#
SecRule REQUEST_URI|ARGS|REQUEST_HEADERS|!REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|FILES|XML:/* "@rx (?:(?:^|[\x5c/;])\.{2,3}[\x5c/;]|[\x5c/;]\.{2,3}(?:[\x5c/;]|$))" \
"id:930110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeNulls,t:cmdLine,\
msg:'Path Traversal Attack (/../) or (/.../)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-lfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/126',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ OS File Access ]=-
#
# We check for OS file access with the help of a local file with OS files data.
#
# Ref: https://github.com/lightos/Panoptic/blob/master/cases.xml
#
# If you wonder where support for Google OAuth2 has gone, see:
# https://github.com/coreruleset/google-oauth2-plugin
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile lfi-os-files.data" \
"id:930120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,\
msg:'OS File Access Attempt',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-lfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/126',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Restricted File Access ]=-
#
# Detects attempts to retrieve application source code, metadata,
# credentials and version control history possibly reachable in a web root.
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@pmFromFile restricted-files.data" \
"id:930130,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,\
msg:'Restricted File Access Attempt',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-lfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/126',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:930013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:930014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ OS File Access ]=-
#
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 930120.
# This stricter sibling checks for OS file data in request headers referer and user-agent.
# We check for OS file access with the help of a local file with OS files data.
#
# Ref: https://github.com/lightos/Panoptic/blob/master/cases.xml
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer|REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent "@pmFromFile lfi-os-files.data" \
"id:930121,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:normalizePathWin,\
msg:'OS File Access Attempt in REQUEST_HEADERS',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-lfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/255/153/126',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.lfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:930015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:930016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:930017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:930018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# RFI Attacks
#
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:931011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:931012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
# -=[ Rule Logic ]=-
# These rules look for common types of Remote File Inclusion (RFI) attack methods.
# - URL Contains an IP Address
# - The PHP "include()" Function
# - RFI Data Ends with Question Mark(s) (?)
# - RFI Host Doesn't Match Local Host
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://projects.webappsec.org/Remote-File-Inclusion
# http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/06/generic-remote-file-inclusion-attack.html
#
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^(?i:file|ftps?|https?)://(?:\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})" \
"id:931100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: URL Parameter using IP Address',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/175/253',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule QUERY_STRING|REQUEST_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:\binclude\s*\([^)]*|mosConfig_absolute_path|_CONF\[path\]|_SERVER\[DOCUMENT_ROOT\]|GALLERY_BASEDIR|path\[docroot\]|appserv_root|config\[root_dir\])=(?:file|ftps?|https?)://" \
"id:931110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Common RFI Vulnerable Parameter Name used w/URL Payload',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/175/253',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS "@rx ^(?i:file|ftps?|https?).*?\?+$" \
"id:931120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: URL Payload Used w/Trailing Question Mark Character (?)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rfi',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/175/253',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:931013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:931014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
# url:file:// can be used by Java applications using
# org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils to access internal files, so this has been added
#
# This rule has one (stricter) sibling: 931131.
# That rule applies the same regular expression to the request filename in phase 1.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/931130.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 931130
#
SecRule ARGS "@rx (?i)(?:(?:url|jar):)?(?:a(?:cap|f[ps]|ttachment)|b(?:eshare|itcoin|lob)|c(?:a(?:llto|p)|id|vs|ompress.(?:zlib|bzip2))|d(?:a(?:v|ta)|ict|n(?:s|tp))|e(?:d2k|xpect)|f(?:(?:ee)?d|i(?:le|nger|sh)|tps?)|g(?:it|o(?:pher)?|lob)|h(?:323|ttps?)|i(?:ax|cap|(?:ma|p)ps?|rc[6s]?)|ja(?:bbe)?r|l(?:dap[is]?|ocal_file)|m(?:a(?:ilto|ven)|ms|umble)|n(?:e(?:tdoc|ws)|fs|ntps?)|ogg|p(?:aparazzi|h(?:ar|p)|op(?:2|3s?)|r(?:es|oxy)|syc)|r(?:mi|sync|tm(?:f?p)?|ar)|s(?:3|ftp|ips?|m(?:[bs]|tps?)|n(?:ews|mp)|sh(?:2(?:.(?:s(?:hell|(?:ft|c)p)|exec|tunnel))?)?|vn(?:\+ssh)?)|t(?:e(?:amspeak|lnet)|ftp|urns?)|u(?:dp|nreal|t2004)|v(?:entrilo|iew-source|nc)|w(?:ebcal|ss?)|x(?:mpp|ri)|zip)://(?:[^@]+@)?([^/]*)" \
"id:931130,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Off-Domain Reference/Link',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rfi',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/175/253',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_parameter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=.%{tx.1}',\
chain"
SecRule TX:/rfi_parameter_.*/ "!@endsWith .%{request_headers.host}" \
"setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# This is a (stricter) sibling of 931130.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/931131.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 931131
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME "@rx (?i)(?:(?:url|jar):)?(?:a(?:cap|f[ps]|ttachment)|b(?:eshare|itcoin|lob)|c(?:a(?:llto|p)|id|vs|ompress.(?:zlib|bzip2))|d(?:a(?:v|ta)|ict|n(?:s|tp))|e(?:d2k|xpect)|f(?:(?:ee)?d|i(?:le|nger|sh)|tps?)|g(?:it|o(?:pher)?|lob)|h(?:323|ttps?)|i(?:ax|cap|(?:ma|p)ps?|rc[6s]?)|ja(?:bbe)?r|l(?:dap[is]?|ocal_file)|m(?:a(?:ilto|ven)|ms|umble)|n(?:e(?:tdoc|ws)|fs|ntps?)|ogg|p(?:aparazzi|h(?:ar|p)|op(?:2|3s?)|r(?:es|oxy)|syc)|r(?:mi|sync|tm(?:f?p)?|ar)|s(?:3|ftp|ips?|m(?:[bs]|tps?)|n(?:ews|mp)|sh(?:2(?:.(?:s(?:hell|(?:ft|c)p)|exec|tunnel))?)?|vn(?:\+ssh)?)|t(?:e(?:amspeak|lnet)|ftp|urns?)|u(?:dp|nreal|t2004)|v(?:entrilo|iew-source|nc)|w(?:ebcal|ss?)|x(?:mpp|ri)|zip)://(?:[^@]+@)?([^/]*)" \
"id:931131,\
phase:1,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Possible Remote File Inclusion (RFI) Attack: Off-Domain Reference/Link',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rfi',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/175/253',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rfi_parameter_%{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}=.%{tx.1}',\
chain"
SecRule TX:/rfi_parameter_.*/ "!@endsWith .%{request_headers.host}" \
"setvar:'tx.rfi_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:931015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:931016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:931017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:931018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:933011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:933012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ PHP Injection Attacks ]=-
#
# [ References ]
# http://rips-scanner.sourceforge.net/
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Top_5#P1:_Remote_Code_Executionh
#
#
# [ PHP Open Tag Found ]
#
# Detects PHP open tags "<?" and "<?php".
# http://www.php.net/manual/en/language.basic-syntax.phptags.php
#
# Care is taken to avoid false positives in XML declarations "<?xml..."
#
# Also detects "[php]", "[/php]" and "[\php]" tags used by some applications
# to indicate PHP dynamic content.
#
# Previously, this rule also checked for the PHP close tag '?>', but
# this resulted in false positives which were difficult to prevent.
# Therefore, that pattern is now checked by rule 933190 in paranoia levels
# 3 or higher.
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:<\?(?:[^x]|x[^m]|xm[^l]|xml[^\s]|xml$|$)|<\?php|\[(?:/|\x5c)?php\])" \
"id:933100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Open Tag Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Script Uploads ]
#
# Block file uploads with filenames ending in PHP related extensions
# (.php, .phps, .phtml, .php5 etc).
#
# Many application contain Unrestricted File Upload vulnerabilities.
# https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload
#
# Attackers may use such a vulnerability to achieve remote code execution
# by uploading a .php file. If the upload storage location is predictable
# and not adequately protected, the attacker may then request the uploaded
# .php file and have the code within it executed on the server.
#
# Also block files with just dot (.) characters after the extension:
# https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2013/08/15/time-to-patch-joomla
#
# Some AJAX uploaders use the nonstandard request headers X-Filename,
# X_Filename, or X-File-Name to transmit the file name to the server;
# scan these request headers as well as multipart/form-data file names.
#
SecRule FILES|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X_Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X.Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-File-Name "@rx .*\.ph(?:p\d*|tml|ar|ps|t|pt)\.*$" \
"id:933110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Script File Upload Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Configuration Directives ]
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-config-directives.data" \
"id:933120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:normalisePath,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Configuration Directive Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.933120_TX_0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.933120_tx_0=%{tx.0}',\
chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@pm =" \
"capture,\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Variables ]
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-variables.data" \
"id:933130,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:normalisePath,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variables Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP I/O Streams ]
#
# The "php://" syntax can be used to refer to various objects, such as local files (for LFI),
# remote urls (for RFI), or standard input/request body. Its occurrence indicates a possible attempt
# to either inject PHP code or exploit a file inclusion vulnerability in a PHP web app.
#
# Examples:
# php://filter/resource=./../../../wp-config.php
# php://filter/resource=http://www.example.com
# php://stdin
# php://input
#
# http://php.net/manual/en/wrappers.php.php
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)php://(?:std(?:in|out|err)|(?:in|out)put|fd|memory|temp|filter)" \
"id:933140,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: I/O Stream Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Wrappers ]
#
# PHP comes with many built-in wrappers for various URL-style protocols for use with the filesystem
# functions such as fopen(), copy(), file_exists() and filesize(). Abusing of PHP wrappers like phar://
# could lead to RCE as describled by Sam Thomas at BlackHat USA 2018 (https://bit.ly/2yaKV5X), even
# wrappers like zlib://, glob://, rar://, zip://, etc... could lead to LFI and expect:// to RCE.
#
# Valid PHP wrappers can be found in the PHP documentation here:
# https://www.php.net/manual/en/wrappers.php
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933200.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933200
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:bzip2|expect|glob|ogg|(?:ph|r)ar|ssh2(?:.(?:s(?:hell|(?:ft|c)p)|exec|tunnel))?|z(?:ip|lib))://" \
"id:933200,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:utf8toUnicode,t:urlDecodeUni,t:removeNulls,t:cmdLine,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Wrapper scheme detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Functions ]
#
# Detecting PHP function names is useful to block PHP code injection attacks.
# There are many PHP functions. We have to strike a balance between robust detection
# of PHP code in content, and the risk of false positives.
#
# The list of PHP functions is divided into four groups of varying attack/false positive risk.
# Four separate rules are used to detect these groups of functions:
#
# - Rule 933150: ~40 words highly common to PHP injection payloads and extremely rare in
# natural language or other contexts.
# Examples: 'base64_decode', 'file_get_contents'.
# These words are detected as a match directly using @pmFromFile.
# Function names are defined in php-function-names-933150.data
#
# - Rule 933160: ~220 words which are common in PHP code, but have a higher chance to cause
# false positives in natural language or other contexts.
# Examples: 'chr', 'eval'.
# To mitigate false positives, a regexp looks for PHP function syntax, e.g. 'eval()'.
# Regexp is generated from function names in util/regexp-assemble/data/933160.data
#
# - Rule 933151: ~1300 words of lesser importance. This includes most PHP functions and keywords.
# Examples: 'addslashes', 'array_diff'.
# For performance reasons, the @pmFromFile operator is used, and many functions from lesser
# used PHP extensions are removed.
# To mitigate false positives, we only match when the '(' character is also found.
# This rule only runs in paranoia level 2 or higher.
# Function names are defined in php-function-names-933151.data
#
# - Rule 933161: ~200 words with short or trivial names, possibly leading to false positives.
# Examples: 'abs', 'cos'.
# To mitigate false positives, a regexp matches on function syntax, e.g. 'abs()'.
# This rule only runs in paranoia level 3 or higher.
# Regexp is generated from function names in util/regexp-assemble/data/933161.data
#
#
# [ PHP Functions: High-Risk PHP Function Names ]
#
# Rule 933150 contains a small list of function names which are highly indicative of a PHP
# injection attack, for example 'base64_decode'.
# We block these function names outright, without using a complex regexp or chain.
# This could make the detection a bit more robust against possible bypasses.
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-function-names-933150.data" \
"id:933150,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Name Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Functions: High-Risk PHP Function Calls ]
#
# Some PHP function names have a certain risk of false positives, due to short
# names, full or partial overlap with common natural language terms, uses in
# other contexts, et cetera. Some examples are 'eval', 'exec', 'system'.
#
# For these function names, we apply a regexp to look for PHP function syntax.
# The regexp looks for a word boundary and adjoining parentheses.
# For instance, we want to block 'eval()', but we want to allow 'medieval()'.
#
# We have to be careful of possible bypasses using comment syntax. Examples:
#
# system(...)
# system (...)
# system\t(...)
# system /*comment*/ (...)
# system /*multiline \n comment*/ (...)
# system //comment \n (...)
# system #comment \n (...)
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45260 ]
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933160.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933160
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)\b\(?[\"']*(?:a(?:rray_(?:(?:diff|intersect)_u(?:assoc|key)|filter|map|reduce|u(?:diff|intersect)(?:_u?assoc)?)|ssert(?:_options)?)|b(?:(?:ase64_en|son_(?:de|en))code|zopen)|c(?:hr|onvert_uuencode|reate_function|url_(?:exec|file_create|init))|(?:debug_backtrac|json_(?:de|en)cod|tmpfil)e|e(?:rror_reporting|scapeshell(?:arg|cmd)|val|x(?:ec|if_(?:imagetype|read_data|t(?:agname|humbnail))))|f(?:i(?:le(?:(?:_exist|perm)s|(?:[acm]tim|inod)e|group)?|nfo_open)|open|(?:pu|unction_exis)ts|tp_(?:connec|ge|nb_(?:ge|pu)|pu)t|write)|g(?:et(?:_(?:c(?:fg_va|urrent_use)r|meta_tags)|(?:cw|lastmo)d|env|imagesize|my(?:[gpu]id|inode))|lob|z(?:compress|(?:(?:defla|wri)t|encod|fil)e|open|read))|h(?:(?:ash_(?:(?:hmac|update)_)?|ighlight_)file|e(?:ader_register_callback|x2bin)|tml(?:_entity_decode|entities|specialchars(?:_decode)?))|i(?:mage(?:2?wbmp|createfrom(?:gif|(?:jpe|pn)g|wbmp|x[bp]m)|g(?:d2?|if)|(?:jpe|pn)g|xbm)|ni_(?:get(?:_all)?|set)|ptcembed|s_(?:dir|(?:(?:execut|read|write?)ab|fi)le)|terator_apply)|m(?:b_(?:ereg(?:_(?:match|replace(?:_callback)?)|i(?:_replace)?)?|parse_str)|(?:d5|ove_uploaded)_file|ethod_exists|kdir|ysql_query)|o(?:b_(?:clean|end_(?:clean|flush)|flush|get_(?:c(?:lean|ontents)|flush)|start)|dbc_(?:connect|exec(?:ute)?|result(?:_all)?)|pendir)|p(?:a(?:rse_(?:ini_file|str)|ssthru)|g_(?:connect|(?:execut|prepar)e|query)|hp(?:_(?:strip_whitespac|unam)e|info|version)|o(?:pen|six_(?:get(?:(?:e[gu]|g)id|login|pwnam)|kill|mk(?:fifo|nod)|ttyname))|r(?:eg_(?:match(?:_all)?|replace(?:_callback(?:_array)?)?|split)|int_r|oc_(?:(?:clos|nic|terminat)e|get_status|open))|utenv)|r(?:awurl(?:de|en)code|e(?:ad(?:_exif_data|dir|(?:gz)?file)|(?:gister_(?:shutdown|tick)|name)_function)|unkit_(?:constant_(?:add|redefine)|(?:function|method)_(?:add|copy|re(?:defin|nam)e)))|s(?:e(?:ssion_s(?:et_save_handler|tart)|t(?:_(?:e(?:rror|xception)_handler|include_path|magic_quotes_runtime)|defaultstub))|h(?:a1_fil|ow_sourc)e|implexml_load_(?:file|string)|ocket_c(?:onnect|reate)|pl_autoload_register|qlite_(?:(?:(?:array|single|unbuffered)_)?query|create_(?:aggregate|function)|exec|p?open)|tr(?:eam_(?:context_create|socket_client)|ipc?slashes|rev)|ystem)|u(?:[ak]?sort|n(?:pack|serialize)|rl(?:de|en)code)|var_dump)(?:/(?:\*.*\*/|/.*)|#.*[\s\v]|\")*[\"']*\)?[\s\v]*\(.*\)" \
"id:933160,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: High-Risk PHP Function Call Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Object Injection ]
#
# PHP Object Injection is an application level vulnerability that could allow
# an attacker to perform different kinds of malicious attacks, such as
# Code Injection, SQL Injection, Path Traversal and Application Denial of Service,
# depending on the context.
#
# The vulnerability occurs when user-supplied input is not properly sanitized
# before being passed to the unserialize() PHP function. Since PHP allows object
# serialization, attackers could pass ad-hoc serialized strings to a vulnerable
# unserialize() call, resulting in an arbitrary PHP object(s) injection into the
# application scope.
#
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Object_Injection
#
# In serialized form, PHP objects have the following format:
#
# O:8:"stdClass":1:{s:1:"a";i:2;}
# O:3:"Foo":0:{}
#
# Also detected are PHP objects with a custom unserializer:
# http://www.phpinternalsbook.com/classes_objects/serialization.html
# These have the following format:
#
# C:11:"ArrayObject":37:{x:i:0;a:1:{s:1:"a";s:1:"b";};m:a:0:{}}
# C:3:"Foo":23:{s:15:"My private data";}
#
# HTTP headers are inspected, since PHP object injection vulnerabilities have been
# found in applications parsing them:
# https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-8562 (User-Agent header)
# https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/39033/ (X-Forwarded-For header)
# http://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2015-10 (Host header)
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx [oOcC]:\d+:\".+?\":\d+:{.*}" \
"id:933170,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Serialized Object Injection',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Functions: Variable Function Calls ]
#
# PHP 'variable functions' provide an alternate syntax for calling PHP functions.
# http://php.net/manual/en/functions.variable-functions.php
#
# An attacker may use variable function syntax to evade detection of function
# names during exploitation of a remote code execution vulnerability.
# An example to use the 'file_get_contents' function while evading rule 933150:
#
# $fn = 'file_' . 'get_' . 'contents';
# echo $fn('wp-co' . 'nfig.php');
#
# Some examples from obfuscated malware:
#
# $OOO0000O0(...)
# @$b374k(...)
# $_[@-_]($_[@!+_] )
#
# A breakdown of the regular expression:
#
# \$+
# The variable's '$' char, or multiple '$' for 'variable variables':
# http://php.net/manual/en/language.variables.variable.php
# (?:[a-zA-Z_\x7f-\xff][a-zA-Z0-9_\x7f-\xff]*|\s*{.+})
# One of the following:
# - A variable name; regexp from http://php.net/language.variables.basics
# - A nonempty expression for variable variables: ${'fn'} or $ {'fn'}
# (?:\s|\[.+\]|{.+}|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*
# Optional whitespace, array access, or comments
# \(.*\)
# Parentheses optionally containing function parameters
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx \$+(?:[a-zA-Z_\x7f-\xff][a-zA-Z0-9_\x7f-\xff]*|\s*{.+})(?:\s|\[.+\]|{.+}|/\*.*\*/|//.*|#.*)*\(.*\)" \
"id:933180,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ PHP Functions: Variable Function Prevent Bypass ]
#
# Referring to https://www.secjuice.com/php-rce-bypass-filters-sanitization-waf/
# Regex test on https://regex101.com/r/x1tfXG/1
# the rule 933180 could be bypassed by using the following payloads:
#
# - (system)('uname');
# - (sy.(st).em)('uname');
# - (string)"system"('uname');
# - define('x', 'sys' . 'tem');(x)/* comment */('uname');
# - $y = 'sys'.'tem';($y)('uname');
# - define('z', [['sys' .'tem']]);(z)[0][0]('uname');
# - (system)(ls);
# - (/**/system)(ls/**/);
# - (['system'])[0]('uname');
# - (++[++system++][++0++])++{/*dsasd*/0}++(++ls++);
#
# This rule blocks all payloads above and avoids to block values like:
#
# - [ACME] this is a test (just a test)
# - Test (with two) rounded (brackets)
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933210.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933210
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:\((?:.+\)(?:[\"'][\-0-9A-Z_a-z]+[\"'])?\(.+|[^\)]*string[^\)]*\)[\s\v\"'\--\.0-9A-\[\]_a-\{\}]+\([^\)]*)|(?:\[[0-9]+\]|\{[0-9]+\}|\$[^\(-\),\.-/;\x5c]+|[\"'][\-0-9A-Z\x5c_a-z]+[\"'])\(.+)\);" \
"id:933210,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecode,t:replaceComments,t:removeWhitespace,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:933013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:933014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# [ PHP Functions: Medium-Risk PHP Function Names ]
#
# In paranoia level 2, we add additional checks for most PHP functions.
#
# The size of the PHP function list is considerable.
# Even after excluding the more obscure PHP extensions, 1300+ functions remain.
# For performance and maintenance reasons, this rule does not use a regexp,
# but uses a phrase file (@pmFromFile), and additionally looks for an '(' character
# in the matched variable.
#
# This approach carries some risk for false positives. Therefore, the function list
# has been curated to remove words closely matching natural language and terms often
# used in other contexts.
#
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933150.
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile php-function-names-933151.data" \
"id:933151,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Medium-Risk PHP Function Name Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.933151_TX_0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.933151_tx_0=%{tx.0}',\
chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@pm (" \
"capture,\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:933015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:933016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
#
# [ PHP Variables: Common Variable Indexes ]
#
# In paranoia level 3, we add additional checks for parameters to many PHP variables.
#
#
# One of the more common variables used within attacks on PHP is $_SERVER. Because
# of how many different ways PHP has for executing variables (variable variables,
# etc) often just looking for $_SERVER will be less effective than looking for the
# various indexes within $_SERVER. This rule checks for these indexes.
# This rule is located in PL 3 because often developers will use these names as
# parameter names or values and this will lead to false positives.
# Because this list is not expected to change and it is limited in size we use a
# regex in this case to look for these values whereas in its sibling rule we use
# @pmFromFile for flexibility and performance.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933131.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933131
#
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933130.
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx AUTH_TYPE|HTTP_(?:ACCEPT(?:_(?:CHARSET|ENCODING|LANGUAGE))?|CONNECTION|(?:HOS|USER_AGEN)T|KEEP_ALIVE|(?:REFERE|X_FORWARDED_FO)R)|ORIG_PATH_INFO|PATH_(?:INFO|TRANSLATED)|QUERY_STRING|REQUEST_URI" \
"id:933131,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:normalisePath,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variables Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Functions: Low-Value PHP Function Calls ]
#
# In paranoia level 3, we add additional checks for the remaining PHP functions.
#
# Most of these function names are likely to cause false positives in natural text
# or common parameter values, such as 'abs', 'copy', 'date', 'key', 'max', 'min'.
# Therefore, these function names are not scanned in lower paranoia levels.
#
# To mitigate the risk of false positives somewhat, a regexp is used to look for
# PHP function syntax. (See rule 933160 for a description.)
#
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933160.
#
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45262 ]
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933161.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933161
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)\b(?:a(?:bs|cosh?|r(?:ray|sort)|s(?:inh?|(?:o|se)rt)|tan[2h]?)|b(?:asename|indec)|c(?:eil|h(?:dir|eckdate|mod|o(?:p|wn)|root)|lose(?:dir|log)|o(?:(?:mpac|(?:nsta|u)n)t|py|sh?)|(?:ryp|urren)t)|d(?:ate|e(?:coct|fined?)|i(?:(?:skfreespac)?e|r(?:name)?)|(?:oubleva)?l)|e(?:a(?:ch|ster_da(?:te|ys))|cho|mpty|nd|r(?:egi?|ror_log)|x(?:(?:i|trac)t|p(?:lode)?))|f(?:close|eof|gets|ile(?:owner|pro|(?:siz|typ)e)|l(?:o(?:atval|ck|or)|ush)|(?:mo|rea)d|stat|t(?:ell|ok)|unction)|g(?:et(?:date|t(?:ext|ype))|mdate)|h(?:ash|e(?:ader(?:s_(?:lis|sen)t)?|brev)|ypot)|i(?:conv|(?:dat|mplod)e|n(?:(?:clud|vok)e|t(?:div|val))|s(?:_(?:a(?:rray)?|bool|(?:calla|dou)ble|f(?:inite|loat)|in(?:finite|t(?:eger)?)|l(?:ink|ong)|n(?:an|u(?:ll|meric))|object|re(?:al|source)|s(?:calar|tring))|set))|join|k(?:ey|sort)|l(?:(?:cfirs|sta)t|evenshtein|i(?:nk(?:info)?|st)|o(?:caltime|g(?:1[0p])?)|trim)|m(?:a(?:i[ln]|x)|b(?:ereg|split)|etaphone|hash|i(?:crotime|n)|y?sql)|n(?:atsor|ex)t|o(?:ctdec|penlog|rd)|p(?:a(?:ck|thinfo)|close|i|o[sw]|r(?:ev|intf?))|quotemeta|r(?:an(?:d|ge)|e(?:adlin[ek]|(?:cod|nam|quir)e|set|wind)|ound|sort|trim)|s(?:(?:candi|ubst)r|(?:e(?:rializ|ttyp)|huffl)e|i(?:milar_text|nh?|zeof)|leep|o(?:rt|undex)|p(?:liti?|rintf)|qrt|rand|t(?:at|r(?:coll|(?:le|sp)n))|y(?:mlink|slog))|t(?:a(?:int|nh?)|e(?:mpnam|xtdomain)|ime|ouch|rim)|u(?:cfirst|mask|n(?:iqid|link|(?:se|tain)t)|s(?:leep|ort))|virtual|wordwrap)(?:[\s\v]|/(?:\*.*\*/|/.*)|#.*)*\(.*\)" \
"id:933161,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Low-Value PHP Function Call Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ PHP Script Uploads: Superfluous extension ]
#
# Block file uploads with PHP related extensions (.php, .phps, .phtml,
# .php5 etc) anywhere in the name, followed by a dot.
#
# Example: index.php.tmp
#
# Uploading of such files can lead to remote code execution if
# Apache is configured with AddType and MultiViews, as Apache will
# automatically do a filename match when the extension is unknown.
# This configuration is fortunately not common in modern installs.
#
# Blocking these file names might lead to more false positives.
#
# Some AJAX uploaders use the nonstandard request headers X-Filename,
# X_Filename, or X-File-Name to transmit the file name to the server;
# scan these request headers as well as multipart/form-data file names.
#
# This rule is a stricter sibling of rule 933110.
#
SecRule FILES|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X_Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X.Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-File-Name "@rx .*\.(?:php\d*|phtml)\..*$" \
"id:933111,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Script File Upload Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ PHP Closing Tag Found ]
#
# http://www.php.net/manual/en/language.basic-syntax.phptags.php
#
# This check was extracted from 933100 (paranoia level 1), since the
# checked sequence '?>' commonly causes false positives.
# See issue #654 for discussion.
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pm ?>" \
"id:933190,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: PHP Closing Tag Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ PHP Functions: Variable Function Prevent Bypass ]
#
# This rule is a stricter sibling of 933210.
# Unlike 933210, this rule will also match "this is a 'dog' (not a cat)", because the semi-colon at the end of the string is optional.
# This is useful for PHP evals where the semi-colon is already hardcoded:
# <?php eval("($input);") ?>
#
# Any potential function calls not at the end of a string will require a semi-colon to form valid PHP, which is automatically covered by 933210.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/933211.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 933211
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:\((?:.+\)(?:[\"'][\-0-9A-Z_a-z]+[\"'])?\(.+|[^\)]*string[^\)]*\)[\s\v\"'\--\.0-9A-\[\]_a-\{\}]+\([^\)]*)|(?:\[[0-9]+\]|\{[0-9]+\}|\$[^\(-\),\.-/;\x5c]+|[\"'][\-0-9A-Z\x5c_a-z]+[\"'])\(.+)\)(?:;|$)?" \
"id:933211,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecode,t:replaceComments,t:removeWhitespace,\
msg:'PHP Injection Attack: Variable Function Call Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-php',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.php_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:933017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:933018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:934011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:934012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
# [ NodeJS Insecure unserialization / generic RCE signatures ]
#
# Libraries performing insecure unserialization:
# - node-serialize: _$$ND_FUNC$$_ (CVE-2017-5941)
# - funcster: __js_function
#
# See:
# https://opsecx.com/index.php/2017/02/08/exploiting-node-js-deserialization-bug-for-remote-code-execution/
# https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/
#
# Some generic snippets used:
# - function() {
# - new Function(
# - eval(
# - String.fromCharCode(
#
# Last two are used by nodejsshell.py,
# https://github.com/ajinabraham/Node.Js-Security-Course/blob/master/nodejsshell.py
#
# As base64 is sometimes (but not always) used to encode serialized values,
# use multiMatch and t:base64decode.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934100.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934100
#
# Stricter sibling: 934101
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx _(?:\$\$ND_FUNC\$\$_|_js_function)|(?:\beval|new[\s\v]+Function[\s\v]*)\(|String\.fromCharCode|function\(\)\{|this\.constructor|module\.exports=|\([\s\v]*[^0-9A-Z_a-z]child_process[^0-9A-Z_a-z][\s\v]*\)|process(?:\.(?:(?:a(?:ccess|ppendfile|rgv|vailability)|c(?:aveats|h(?:mod|own)|(?:los|opyfil)e|p|reate(?:read|write)stream)|ex(?:ec(?:file)?|ists)|f(?:ch(?:mod|own)|data(?:sync)?|s(?:tat|ync)|utimes)|inodes|l(?:chmod|ink|stat|utimes)|mkd(?:ir|temp)|open(?:dir)?|r(?:e(?:ad(?:dir|file|link|v)?|name)|m)|s(?:pawn(?:file)?|tat|ymlink)|truncate|u(?:n(?:link|watchfile)|times)|w(?:atchfile|rite(?:file|v)?))(?:sync)?(?:\.call)?\(|binding|constructor|env|global|main(?:Module)?|process|require)|\[[\"'`](?:(?:a(?:ccess|ppendfile|rgv|vailability)|c(?:aveats|h(?:mod|own)|(?:los|opyfil)e|p|reate(?:read|write)stream)|ex(?:ec(?:file)?|ists)|f(?:ch(?:mod|own)|data(?:sync)?|s(?:tat|ync)|utimes)|inodes|l(?:chmod|ink|stat|utimes)|mkd(?:ir|temp)|open(?:dir)?|r(?:e(?:ad(?:dir|file|link|v)?|name)|m)|s(?:pawn(?:file)?|tat|ymlink)|truncate|u(?:n(?:link|watchfile)|times)|w(?:atchfile|rite(?:file|v)?))(?:sync)?|binding|constructor|env|global|main(?:Module)?|process|require)[\"'`]\])|(?:binding|constructor|env|global|main(?:Module)?|process|require)\[|console(?:\.(?:debug|error|info|trace|warn)(?:\.call)?\(|\[[\"'`](?:debug|error|info|trace|warn)[\"'`]\])|require(?:\.(?:resolve(?:\.call)?\(|main|extensions|cache)|\[[\"'`](?:(?:resolv|cach)e|main|extensions)[\"'`]\])" \
"id:934100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:jsDecode,t:removeWhitespace,t:base64Decode,\
msg:'Node.js Injection Attack 1/2',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-javascript',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:close|exists|fork|(?:ope|spaw)n|re(?:ad|quire)|w(?:atch|rite))[\s\v]*\(" \
"id:934101,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:base64Decode,\
msg:'Node.js Injection Attack 2/2',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-javascript',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# -=[ SSRF Attacks ]=-
#
# We provide only partial protection to SSRF. DNS Rebinding attacks needs
# to be handled at application level, and even those might be difficult to catch.
#
# PL1 rules are based on common attacks on cloud providers, based on well-known URLs.
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# https://highon.coffee/blog/ssrf-cheat-sheet/
# https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html
# https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/664.html)
#
# Preventing: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@pmFromFile ssrf.data" \
"id:934110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Attack: Cloud provider metadata URL in Parameter',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-ssrf',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/664',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# JavaScript prototype pollution injection attempts
#
# Example from https://hackerone.com/reports/869574 critical
# vulnerability in the TypeORM library:
# {"text":"a","title":{"__proto__":{"where":{"name":"sqlinjection","where":null}}}}
#
# Test cases are based on this list of payloads:
# https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution/blob/master/README.md
#
# See also: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html
#
# Note: only server-based (not DOM-based) attacks are covered here.
# Stricter sibling: 934131
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?:__proto__|constructor\s*(?:\.|\[)\s*prototype)" \
"id:934130,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:base64Decode,\
msg:'JavaScript Prototype Pollution',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-javascript',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1/180/77',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ Ruby generic RCE signatures ]
#
# Detects Ruby-based injection attacks.
# Example: Process.spawn("id")
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934150.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934150
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx Process[\s\v]*\.[\s\v]*spawn[\s\v]*\(" \
"id:934150,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Ruby Injection Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-ruby',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ NodeJS DoS signatures ]
#
# NodeJS runs in a single thread, so any evaluated payloads that block execution can cause an easy DoS.
# This rule attempts to block e.g. while(true).
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934160.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934160
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx while[\s\v]*\([\s\v\(]*(?:!+(?:false|null|undefined|NaN|[\+\-]?0|\"{2}|'{2}|`{2})|(?:!!)*(?:(?:t(?:rue|his)|[\+\-]?(?:Infinity|[1-9][0-9]*)|new [A-Za-z][0-9A-Z_a-z]*|window|String|(?:Boolea|Functio)n|Object|Array)\b|\{.*\}|\[.*\]|\"[^\"]+\"|'[^']+'|`[^`]+`)).*\)" \
"id:934160,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:base64Decode,t:replaceComments,\
msg:'Node.js DoS attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-javascript',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ PHP data: scheme ]
#
# PHP supports the `data:` scheme without using `//` before the content-type.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934170.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934170
#
SecRule REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx ^data:(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*(?:[\s\v]*,[\s\v]*(?:(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)/(?:\*|[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+)|\*)(?:[\s\v]*;[\s\v]*(?:charset[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*\"?(?:iso-8859-15?|utf-8|windows-1252)\b\"?|(?:[^\s\v -\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]c\{\}]|c(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]h\{\}]|h(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]a\{\}]|a(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]r\{\}]|r(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]s\{\}]|s(?:[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]e\{\}]|e[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]t\{\}]))))))[^!-\"\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]*[\s\v]*=[\s\v]*[^!\(-\),/:-\?\[-\]\{\}]+);?)*)*" \
"id:934170,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'PHP data scheme attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-ssrf',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:934013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:934014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
# -=[ SSRF Attacks ]=-
#
# PL2 rules adds SSRF capture for common evasion techniques.
#
# We add captures for these evasion techniques: (see source in util/regexp-assemble/data/regexp-934120.data)
# http://425.510.425.510/ Dotted decimal with overflow (already covered by RFI rule 931100)
# http://2852039166/ Dotless decimal - \d{10}
# http://7147006462/ Dotless decimal with overflow - \d{10}
# http://0xA9.0xFE.0xA9.0xFE/ Dotted hexadecimal - (?:0x[a-f0-9]{2}\.){3}0x[a-f0-9]{2}
# http://0xA9FEA9FE/ Dotless hexadecimal - 0x[a-f0-9]{8}
# http://0x41414141A9FEA9FE/ Dotless hexadecimal with overflow - 0x[a-f0-9]{16}
# http://0251.0376.0251.0376/ Dotted octal - Covered by the same below
# http://0251.00376.000251.0000376/ Dotted octal with padding - (?:0{1,4}\d{3}\.){3}0{1,4}\d{3})
# http://169.254.43518/ - (?:\d{1,3}\.){2}\.\d{5}
# http://169.16689662/ - \d{1,3}\.\d{8}
# http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] IPV6 Compressed - IPv6 regex from https://ihateregex.io/expr/ipv6/, with [0-9] converted to \d and with non-capturing groups (below)
# http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a9fe:a9fe] IPV6 Expanded - (?:(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){7}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,7}:|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,6}:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,5}(:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,2}|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,4}(:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,3}|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,3}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,4}|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,2}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,5}|[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:(?:(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,6})|:(?:(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}){1,7}|:)|fe80:(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4}){0,4}%[0-9a-zA-Z]{1,}|::(ffff(?::0{1,4}){0,1}:){0,1}(?:(?:25[0-5]|(?:2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d)\.){3,3}(?:25[0-5]|(?:2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d)|(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){1,4}:(?:(?:25[0-5]|(2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d)\.){3,3}(?:25[0-5]|(?:2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d))
# http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254] IPV6/IPV4 - ((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}:){6}(?:(25[0-5]|(?:2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d)\.){3,3}(?:25[0-5]|(?:2[0-4]|1{0,1}\d){0,1}\d))
# http://[::]
# http://127.88.23.245:22/+&@google.com:80#+@google.com:80/ (already covered by RFI rule 931100)
# http://127.88.23.245:22/?@google.com:80/ (already covered by RFI rule 931100)
# http://127.88.23.245:22/#@www.google.com:80/ (already covered by RFI rule 931100)
# http://google.com:80\\@127.88.23.245:22/ (already covered by RFI rule 931100)
# http://google.com:80+&@127.88.23.245:22/#+@google.com:80/
# http://google.com:80+&@google.com:80#+@127.88.23.245:22/
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934120.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934120
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_FILENAME|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i)((?:a(?:cap|f[ps]|ttachment)|b(?:eshare|itcoin|lob)|c(?:a(?:llto|p)|id|vs|ompress.(?:zlib|bzip2))|d(?:a(?:v|ta)|ict|n(?:s|tp))|e(?:d2k|xpect)|f(?:(?:ee)?d|i(?:le|nger|sh)|tps?)|g(?:it|o(?:pher)?|lob)|h(?:323|ttps?)|i(?:ax|cap|(?:ma|p)ps?|rc[6s]?)|ja(?:bbe)?r|l(?:dap[is]?|ocal_file)|m(?:a(?:ilto|ven)|ms|umble)|n(?:e(?:tdoc|ws)|fs|ntps?)|ogg|p(?:aparazzi|h(?:ar|p)|op(?:2|3s?)|r(?:es|oxy)|syc)|r(?:mi|sync|tm(?:f?p)?|ar)|s(?:3|ftp|ips?|m(?:[bs]|tps?)|n(?:ews|mp)|sh(?:2(?:.(?:s(?:hell|(?:ft|c)p)|exec|tunnel))?)?|vn(?:\+ssh)?)|t(?:e(?:amspeak|lnet)|ftp|urns?)|u(?:dp|nreal|t2004)|v(?:entrilo|iew-source|nc)|w(?:ebcal|ss?)|x(?:mpp|ri)|zip)://(?:[0-9]{10}|(?:0x[0-9a-f]{2}\.){3}0x[0-9a-f]{2}|0x(?:[0-9a-f]{8}|[0-9a-f]{16})|(?:0{1,4}[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}0{1,4}[0-9]{1,3}|[0-9]{1,3}\.(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{5}|[0-9]{8})|(?:\x5c\x5c[\-0-9a-z]\.?_?)+|\[[0-:a-f]+(?:[\.0-9]+|%[0-9A-Z_a-z]+)?\]|[a-z][\--\.0-9A-Z_a-z]{1,255}:[0-9]{1,5}(?:#?[\s\v]*&?@(?:(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}|[a-z][\--\.0-9A-Z_a-z]{1,255}):[0-9]{1,5}/?)+|[\.0-9]{0,11}(?:\xe2(?:\x91[\xa0-\xbf]|\x92[\x80-\xbf]|\x93[\x80-\xa9\xab-\xbf])|\xe3\x80\x82)+))" \
"id:934120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Possible Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Attack: URL Parameter using IP Address',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-ssrf',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/664',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx \[\s*constructor\s*\]" \
"id:934131,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:base64Decode,\
msg:'JavaScript Prototype Pollution',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-javascript',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
multiMatch,\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ Perl generic RCE signatures ]
#
# Detects Perl-based injection attacks.
# Example: @{[system whoami]}
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/934140.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 934140
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx @\{.*\}" \
"id:934140,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Perl Injection Attack',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-perl',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'attack-injection-generic',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:934015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:934016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:934017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:934018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-934-APPLICATION-ATTACK-GENERIC"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:943011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:943012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# Session fixation
#
# -=[ References ]=-
# http://projects.webappsec.org/Session-Fixation
# http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246960/Session%20Fixation
# http://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/61.html
#
SecRule REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|ARGS_NAMES|ARGS|XML:/* "@rx (?i:\.cookie\b.*?;\W*?(?:expires|domain)\W*?=|\bhttp-equiv\W+set-cookie\b)" \
"id:943100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: Setting Cookie Values in HTML',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-fixation',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/21/593/61',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ^(?:jsessionid|aspsessionid|asp\.net_sessionid|phpsession|phpsessid|weblogicsession|session_id|session-id|cfid|cftoken|cfsid|jservsession|jwsession)$" \
"id:943110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: SessionID Parameter Name with Off-Domain Referer',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-fixation',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/21/593/61',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@rx ^(?:ht|f)tps?://(.*?)/" \
"capture,\
chain"
SecRule TX:1 "!@endsWith %{request_headers.host}" \
"setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS_NAMES "@rx ^(?:jsessionid|aspsessionid|asp\.net_sessionid|phpsession|phpsessid|weblogicsession|session_id|session-id|cfid|cftoken|cfsid|jservsession|jwsession)$" \
"id:943120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Possible Session Fixation Attack: SessionID Parameter Name with No Referer',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-fixation',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/21/593/61',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule &REQUEST_HEADERS:Referer "@eq 0" \
"setvar:'tx.session_fixation_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:943013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:943014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:943015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:943016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:943017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:943018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESSION-FIXATION"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
# Many rules check request bodies, use "SecRequestBodyAccess On" to enable it on main modsecurity configuration file.
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:944011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:944012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts exploit:
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
#
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts Remote Code Execution exploit:
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
#
# This rule is also triggered by an Apache Struts Remote Code Execution exploit:
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
#
# This rule is also triggered by an Oracle WebLogic Remote Command Execution exploit:
# [ Oracle WebLogic vulnerability CVE-2017-10271 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458 ]
#
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx java\.lang\.(?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
"id:944100,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Suspicious Java class detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/6',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Apache Struts (CVE-2017-9805) ]
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Oracle Weblogic (CVE-2017-10271) ]
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
# Generic rule to detect processbuilder or runtime calls, if any of those is found and the same target contains
# java. unmarshaller or base64data to trigger a potential payload execution
# tested with https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627/ and https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458/
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
"id:944110,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java process spawn (CVE-2017-9805)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* "@rx (?:unmarshaller|base64data|java\.)" \
"setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Magic bytes detected and payload included possibly RCE vulnerable classes detected and process execution methods detected
# anomaly score set to critical as all conditions indicate the request try to perform RCE.
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:clonetransformer|forclosure|instantiatefactory|instantiatetransformer|invokertransformer|prototypeclonefactory|prototypeserializationfactory|whileclosure|getproperty|filewriter|xmldecoder)" \
"id:944120,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java serialization (CVE-2015-4852)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
chain"
SecRule MATCHED_VARS "@rx (?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
"setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-5638 - Exploit tested: https://github.com/xsscx/cve-2017-5638 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9791 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42324 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-9805 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42627 ]
# [ Oracle WebLogic vulnerability CVE-2017-10271 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43458 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45262 ]
# [ Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2018-11776 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45260 ]
#
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_FILENAME|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@pmFromFile java-classes.data" \
"id:944130,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Suspicious Java class detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# [ Java Script Uploads ]
#
# Block file uploads with filenames ending in Java scripts (.jsp, .jspx)
#
# Many application contain Unrestricted File Upload vulnerabilities.
# https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload
#
# Attackers may use such a vulnerability to achieve remote code execution
# by uploading a script file. If the upload storage location is predictable
# and not adequately protected, the attacker may then request the uploaded
# file and have the code within it executed on the server.
#
# Some AJAX uploaders use the nonstandard request headers X-Filename,
# X_Filename, or X-File-Name to transmit the file name to the server;
# scan these request headers as well as multipart/form-data file names.
#
SecRule FILES|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X_Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X.Filename|REQUEST_HEADERS:X-File-Name "@rx .*\.(?:jsp|jspx)\.*$" \
"id:944140,\
phase:2,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Java Injection Attack: Java Script File Upload Found',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}: %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-injection-java',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/242',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Log4J / Log4Shell Defense
#
# This addresses exploits against the Log4J library described in several CVEs:
# * CVE-2021-44228
# * CVE-2021-44832
# * CVE-2021-45046
# * CVE-2021-45105
#
# See https://coreruleset.org/20211213/crs-and-log4j-log4shell-cve-2021-44228/
#
# This rule attempts to detect two things:
# * Nested use of ${
# * use of ${jndi:... without the closing bracket
#
# Rule 932130 is also essential for defense since there are certain
# bypasses of the log4j rules that can be caught by 932130.
#
# The payload is not displayed in the alert message since log4j could
# potentially be executed on the logviewer.
#
# This rule has stricter siblings: 944151 (PL2), 944152 (PL4)
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/944150.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 944150
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* "@rx (?i)(?:\$|&dollar;?)(?:\{|&l(?:brace|cub);?)(?:[^\}]{0,15}(?:\$|&dollar;?)(?:\{|&l(?:brace|cub);?)|jndi|ctx)" \
"id:944150,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:jsDecode,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
log,\
msg:'Potential Remote Command Execution: Log4j / Log4shell',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/6',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:944013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:944014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
# This is a stricter sibling of 944150.
# It is a re-iteration of said rule without the curly bracket distance limiter
# between the nested "${". This is prone to backtracking and therefore a potential
# DoS problem for backtracking regular expression engines (e.g. PCRE2), but it also avoids evasions that fill the space between the nested
# elements with arbitrary data.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/944151.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 944151
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* "@rx (?i)(?:\$|&dollar;?)(?:\{|&l(?:brace|cub);?)(?:[^\}]*(?:\$|&dollar;?)(?:\{|&l(?:brace|cub);?)|jndi|ctx)" \
"id:944151,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:jsDecode,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
log,\
msg:'Potential Remote Command Execution: Log4j / Log4shell',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/6',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# [ Java deserialization vulnerability/Apache Commons (CVE-2015-4852) ]
#
# Detect exploitation of "Java deserialization" Apache Commons.
#
# Based on rules by @spartantri.
# https://spartantri.com/ModSecurity/?p=44
#
# Interesting references about the vulnerability
# https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/
# https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet
#
# Potential false positives with random fields, the anomaly level is set low to avoid blocking request
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx \xac\xed\x00\x05" \
"id:944200,\
phase:2,\
block,\
msg:'Magic bytes Detected, probable java serialization in use',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Detecting possible base64 text to match encoded magic bytes \xac\xed\x00\x05 with padding encoded in base64 strings are rO0ABQ KztAAU Cs7QAF
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:rO0ABQ|KztAAU|Cs7QAF)" \
"id:944210,\
phase:2,\
block,\
msg:'Magic bytes Detected Base64 Encoded, probable java serialization in use',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:clonetransformer|forclosure|instantiatefactory|instantiatetransformer|invokertransformer|prototypeclonefactory|prototypeserializationfactory|whileclosure|getproperty|filewriter|xmldecoder)" \
"id:944240,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Java serialization (CVE-2015-4852)',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# [ SAP CRM Java vulnerability CVE-2018-2380 - Exploit tested: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292 ]
#
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx java\b.+(?:runtime|processbuilder)" \
"id:944250,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:lowercase,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Suspicious Java method detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# This rule is also triggered by the following exploit(s):
# - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/03/30/spring4shell-zero-day-vulnerability-in-spring-framework/
# - https://www.ironcastle.net/possible-new-java-spring-framework-vulnerability-wed-mar-30th/
#
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:class\.module\.classLoader\.resources\.context\.parent\.pipeline|springframework\.context\.support\.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext)" \
"id:944260,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:urlDecodeUni,\
msg:'Remote Command Execution: Malicious class-loading payload',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:944015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:944016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
# Interesting keywords for possibly RCE on vulnerable classes and methods base64 encoded
# Keywords = ['runtime', 'processbuilder', 'clonetransformer', 'forclosure', 'instantiatefactory', 'instantiatetransformer', 'invokertransformer', 'prototypeclonefactory', 'prototypeserializationfactory', 'whileclosure']
#for item in keywords:
# pad='\x00'
# for padding in xrange(3):
# print base64.b64encode(''.join([pad*padding,item])).replace('=','')[padding:],
#cnVudGltZQ HJ1bnRpbWU BydW50aW1l cHJvY2Vzc2J1aWxkZXI HByb2Nlc3NidWlsZGVy Bwcm9jZXNzYnVpbGRlcg Y2xvbmV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg GNsb25ldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI BjbG9uZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy Zm9yY2xvc3VyZQ GZvcmNsb3N1cmU Bmb3JjbG9zdXJl aW5zdGFudGlhdGVmYWN0b3J5 Gluc3RhbnRpYXRlZmFjdG9yeQ BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZWZhY3Rvcnk aW5zdGFudGlhdGV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg Gluc3RhbnRpYXRldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy aW52b2tlcnRyYW5zZm9ybWVy Gludm9rZXJ0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg BpbnZva2VydHJhbnNmb3JtZXI cHJvdG90eXBlY2xvbmVmYWN0b3J5 HByb3RvdHlwZWNsb25lZmFjdG9yeQ Bwcm90b3R5cGVjbG9uZWZhY3Rvcnk cHJvdG90eXBlc2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbmZhY3Rvcnk HByb3RvdHlwZXNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25mYWN0b3J5 Bwcm90b3R5cGVzZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uZmFjdG9yeQ d2hpbGVjbG9zdXJl HdoaWxlY2xvc3VyZQ B3aGlsZWNsb3N1cmU
SecRule ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|!REQUEST_COOKIES:/__utm/|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* \
"@rx (?:cnVudGltZQ|HJ1bnRpbWU|BydW50aW1l|cHJvY2Vzc2J1aWxkZXI|HByb2Nlc3NidWlsZGVy|Bwcm9jZXNzYnVpbGRlcg|Y2xvbmV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|GNsb25ldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|BjbG9uZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|Zm9yY2xvc3VyZQ|GZvcmNsb3N1cmU|Bmb3JjbG9zdXJl|aW5zdGFudGlhdGVmYWN0b3J5|Gluc3RhbnRpYXRlZmFjdG9yeQ|BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZWZhY3Rvcnk|aW5zdGFudGlhdGV0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|Gluc3RhbnRpYXRldHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|BpbnN0YW50aWF0ZXRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|aW52b2tlcnRyYW5zZm9ybWVy|Gludm9rZXJ0cmFuc2Zvcm1lcg|BpbnZva2VydHJhbnNmb3JtZXI|cHJvdG90eXBlY2xvbmVmYWN0b3J5|HByb3RvdHlwZWNsb25lZmFjdG9yeQ|Bwcm90b3R5cGVjbG9uZWZhY3Rvcnk|cHJvdG90eXBlc2VyaWFsaXphdGlvbmZhY3Rvcnk|HByb3RvdHlwZXNlcmlhbGl6YXRpb25mYWN0b3J5|Bwcm90b3R5cGVzZXJpYWxpemF0aW9uZmFjdG9yeQ|d2hpbGVjbG9zdXJl|HdoaWxlY2xvc3VyZQ|B3aGlsZWNsb3N1cmU)" \
"id:944300,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,\
msg:'Base64 encoded string matched suspicious keyword',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{MATCHED_VAR} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/248',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/3',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:944017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:944018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
# This is a stricter sibling of 944150.
# It simply checks for the existence of `${`, taking into account the same encoding evasions
# as 944150.
#
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/944152.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 944152
#
SecRule REQUEST_LINE|ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|REQUEST_COOKIES|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES|REQUEST_HEADERS|XML:/*|XML://@* "@rx (?i)(?:\$|&dollar;?)(?:\{|&l(?:brace|cub);?)" \
"id:944152,\
phase:2,\
block,\
t:none,t:urlDecodeUni,t:jsDecode,t:htmlEntityDecode,\
log,\
msg:'Potential Remote Command Execution: Log4j / Log4shell',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152/137/6',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.2',\
tag:'paranoia-level/4',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.rce_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA"

221
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
# Summing up the blocking and detection anomaly scores in phase 1
# even when early blocking is disabled, we need to sum up the scores in phase 1
# this prevents bugs in phase 5 if Apache skips phases because of error handling
# See: https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/issues/2319#issuecomment-1047503932
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:949052,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:949152,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:949053,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:949153,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:949054,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:949154,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:949055,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:949155,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
# at start of phase 2, we reset the aggregate scores to 0 to prevent duplicate counting of per-PL scores
# this is necessary because the per-PL scores are counted across phases
SecAction "id:949059,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=0'"
SecAction "id:949159,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=0'"
# Summing up the blocking and detection anomaly scores in phase 2
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:949060,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:949160,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:949061,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:949161,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:949062,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:949162,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:949063,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:949163,\
phase:2,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
SecMarker "BEGIN-REQUEST-BLOCKING-EVAL"
#
# -=[ Anomaly Mode: Overall Transaction Anomaly Score ]=-
#
# if early blocking is active, check threshold in phase 1
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
"id:949111,\
phase:1,\
deny,\
t:none,\
msg:'Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded in phase 1 (Total Score: %{TX.BLOCKING_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE})',\
tag:'anomaly-evaluation',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
chain"
SecRule TX:EARLY_BLOCKING "@eq 1"
# always check threshold in phase 2
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
"id:949110,\
phase:2,\
deny,\
t:none,\
msg:'Inbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: %{TX.BLOCKING_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE})',\
tag:'anomaly-evaluation',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:949011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:949012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:949013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:949014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:949015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:949016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:949017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:949018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"

134
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The paranoia level skip rules 950020, 950021 and 950022 have odd
# numbers not in sync with other paranoia level skip rules in other
# files. This is done to avoid rule id collisions with CRSv2.
# This is also true for rule 950130.
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:950020,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:950021,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Directory Listing ]=-
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?:<(?:TITLE>Index of.*?<H|title>Index of.*?<h)1>Index of|>\[To Parent Directory\]</[Aa]><br>)" \
"id:950130,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Directory Listing',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54/127',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ CGI Source Code Leakage ]=-
#
# A CGI script begins normally with #! and the interpreter,
# for example:
#
# #!/usr/bin/perl
# #!/usr/bin/python
# #!/usr/bin/ruby
#
# If the CGI script processors or MIME type handlers are misconfigured,
# the script's source code could be erroneously returned to the client.
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^#\!\s?/" \
"id:950140,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'CGI source code leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:950013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:950014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ The application is not available - 5xx level status code ]=-
#
SecRule RESPONSE_STATUS "@rx ^5\d{2}$" \
"id:950100,\
phase:3,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'The Application Returned a 500-Level Status Code',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/152',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:950015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:950016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:950017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:950022,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:951011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:951012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ SQL Error Leakages ]=-
#
# Ref: https://raw.github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap/master/xml/errors.xml
# Ref: https://github.com/Arachni/arachni/tree/master/components/checks/active/sql_injection/regexps
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "!@pmFromFile sql-errors.data" \
"id:951100,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
skipAfter:END-SQL-ERROR-MATCH-PL1"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:JET Database Engine|Access Database Engine|\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC Microsoft Access Driver\])" \
"id:951110,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Microsoft Access SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-msaccess',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:ORA-[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]|java\.sql\.SQLException|Oracle error|Oracle.*Driver|Warning.*oci_.*|Warning.*ora_.*)" \
"id:951120,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Oracle SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-oracle',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:DB2 SQL error:|\[IBM\]\[CLI Driver\]\[DB2/6000\]|CLI Driver.*DB2|DB2 SQL error|db2_\w+\()" \
"id:951130,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'DB2 SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-db2',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:\[DM_QUERY_E_SYNTAX\]|has occurred in the vicinity of:)" \
"id:951140,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'EMC SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-emc',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)Dynamic SQL Error" \
"id:951150,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'firebird SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-firebird',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)Exception (?:condition )?\d+\. Transaction rollback\." \
"id:951160,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Frontbase SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-frontbase',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)org\.hsqldb\.jdbc" \
"id:951170,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'hsqldb SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-hsqldb',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:An illegal character has been found in the statement|com\.informix\.jdbc|Exception.*Informix)" \
"id:951180,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'informix SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-informix',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:Warning.*ingres_|Ingres SQLSTATE|Ingres\W.*Driver)" \
"id:951190,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'ingres SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-ingres',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:<b>Warning</b>: ibase_|Unexpected end of command in statement)" \
"id:951200,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'interbase SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-interbase',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i:SQL error.*POS[0-9]+.*|Warning.*maxdb.*)" \
"id:951210,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'maxDB SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-maxdb',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:System\.Data\.OleDb\.OleDbException|\[Microsoft\]\[ODBC SQL Server Driver\]|\[Macromedia\]\[SQLServer JDBC Driver\]|\[SqlException|System\.Data\.SqlClient\.SqlException|Unclosed quotation mark after the character string|'80040e14'|mssql_query\(\)|Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers|Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server|Incorrect syntax near|Sintaxis incorrecta cerca de|Syntax error in string in query expression|Procedure or function .* expects parameter|Unclosed quotation mark before the character string|Syntax error .* in query expression|Data type mismatch in criteria expression\.|ADODB\.Field \(0x800A0BCD\)|the used select statements have different number of columns|OLE DB.*SQL Server|Warning.*mssql_.*|Driver.*SQL[ _-]*Server|SQL Server.*Driver|SQL Server.*[0-9a-fA-F]{8}|Exception.*\WSystem\.Data\.SqlClient\.)" \
"id:951220,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'mssql SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-mssql',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/951230.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 951230
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:supplied argument is not a valid |SQL syntax.*)MySQL|Column count doesn't match(?: value count at row)?|mysql_fetch_array\(\)|on MySQL result index|You have an error in your SQL syntax(?:;| near)|MyS(?:QL server version for the right syntax to use|qlClient\.)|\[MySQL\]\[ODBC|(?:Table '[^']+' doesn't exis|valid MySQL resul)t|Warning.{1,10}mysql_(?:[\(-\)_a-z]{1,26})?|ERROR [0-9]{4} \([0-9a-z]{5}\):" \
"id:951230,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'mysql SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-mysql',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Regular expression generated from regex-assembly/951240.ra.
# To update the regular expression run the following shell script
# (consult https://coreruleset.org/docs/development/regex_assembly/ for details):
# crs-toolchain regex update 951240
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)P(?:ostgreSQL(?: query failed:|.{1,20}ERROR)|G::[a-z]*Error)|pg_(?:query|exec)\(\) \[:|Warning.{1,20}\bpg_.*|valid PostgreSQL result|Npgsql\.|Supplied argument is not a valid PostgreSQL .*? resource|Unable to connect to PostgreSQL server" \
"id:951240,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'postgres SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-pgsql',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:Warning.*sqlite_.*|Warning.*SQLite3::|SQLite/JDBCDriver|SQLite\.Exception|System\.Data\.SQLite\.SQLiteException)" \
"id:951250,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'sqlite SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-sqlite',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)(?:Sybase message:|Warning.{2,20}sybase|Sybase.*Server message.*)" \
"id:951260,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Sybase SQL Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-sybase',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116/54',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.sql_injection_score=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecMarker "END-SQL-ERROR-MATCH-PL1"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:951013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:951014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:951015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:951016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:951017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:951018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:952011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:952012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ Java Source Code Leakages ]=-
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile java-code-leakages.data" \
"id:952100,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Java Source Code Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Java Errors ]=-
#
# Ref: https://github.com/andresriancho/w3af/blob/master/w3af/plugins/grep/error_pages.py
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile java-errors.data" \
"id:952110,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Java Errors',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-java',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:952013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:952014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:952015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:952016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:952017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:952018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:953011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:953012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ PHP Error Message Leakage ]=-
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile php-errors.data" \
"id:953100,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ PHP source code leakage ]=-
#
# Detect some common PHP keywords in output.
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?:\b(?:f(?:tp_(?:nb_)?f?(?:ge|pu)t|get(?:s?s|c)|scanf|write|open|read)|gz(?:(?:encod|writ)e|compress|open|read)|s(?:ession_start|candir)|read(?:(?:gz)?file|dir)|move_uploaded_file|(?:proc_|bz)open|call_user_func)|\$_(?:(?:pos|ge)t|session))\b" \
"id:953110,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP source code leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
# Detect the presence of the PHP open tag "<? ", "<?= " or "<?php " in output.
#
# To prevent false positives (due to the short "<?" sequences), we also include,
# the space after it in an attempt to stop alerts in binary output.
# And we make it case insensitive.
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?i)<\?(?:=|php)?\s+" \
"id:953120,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP source code leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:953013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:953014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
#
# -=[ PHP Error Message Leakage ]=-
#
# This is a stricter sibling of rule 953100.
# This stricter sibling checks for additional error messages which has a higher chance to appear in common language.
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile php-errors-pl2.data" \
"id:953101,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PHP Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:953015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:953016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:953017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:953018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP"

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.conf Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:954011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:954012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
# IIS default location
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx [a-z]:\x5cinetpub\b" \
"id:954100,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:lowercase,\
msg:'Disclosure of IIS install location',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-iis',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (?:Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server(?:</font>.{1,20}?error '800(?:04005|40e31)'.{1,40}?Timeout expired| \(0x80040e31\)<br>Timeout expired<br>)|<h1>internal server error</h1>.*?<h2>part of the server has crashed or it has a configuration error\.</h2>|cannot connect to the server: timed out)" \
"id:954110,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Application Availability Error',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-iis',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
#
# IIS Errors leakage
#
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile iis-errors.data" \
"id:954120,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'IIS Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-iis',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule RESPONSE_STATUS "!@rx ^404$" \
"id:954130,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'IIS Information Leakage',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'application-multi',\
tag:'language-multi',\
tag:'platform-iis',\
tag:'platform-windows',\
tag:'attack-disclosure',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/118/116',\
tag:'PCI/6.5.6',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'ERROR',\
chain"
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx \bServer Error in.{0,50}?\bApplication\b" \
"capture,\
t:none,\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.error_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:954013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:954014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:954015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:954016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:954017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:954018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. (not) All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:955011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:955012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
# For performance reasons, most of the shells are matched using this rule.
# This rule is intended for PHP web shells.
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@pmFromFile web-shells-php.data" \
"id:955100,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Web shell detected',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# r57 web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx (<title>r57 Shell Version [0-9.]+</title>|<title>r57 shell</title>)" \
"id:955110,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'r57 web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# WSO web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html><head><meta http-equiv='Content-Type' content='text/html; charset=Windows-1251'><title>.*? - WSO [0-9.]+</title>" \
"id:955120,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'WSO web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# b4tm4n web shell (https://github.com/k4mpr3t/b4tm4n)
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx B4TM4N SH3LL</title>.*<meta name='author' content='k4mpr3t'/>" \
"id:955130,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'b4tm4n web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Mini Shell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>Mini Shell</title>.*Developed By LameHacker" \
"id:955140,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Mini Shell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Ashiyane web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>\.:: .* ~ Ashiyane V [0-9.]+ ::\.</title>" \
"id:955150,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Ashiyane web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Symlink_Sa web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>Symlink_Sa [0-9.]+</title>" \
"id:955160,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Symlink_Sa web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# CasuS web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>CasuS [0-9.]+ by MafiABoY</title>" \
"id:955170,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'CasuS web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# GRP WebShell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\r\n<head>\r\n<title>GRP WebShell [0-9.]+ " \
"id:955180,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'GRP WebShell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# NGHshell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <small>NGHshell [0-9.]+ by Cr4sh</body></html>\n$" \
"id:955190,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'NGHshell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# SimAttacker web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>SimAttacker - (?:Version|Vrsion) : [0-9.]+ - " \
"id:955200,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'SimAttacker web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Unknown web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<!-- By Artyum .*<title>Web Shell</title>" \
"id:955210,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Unknown web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# lama's'hell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>lama's'hell v. [0-9.]+</title>" \
"id:955220,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'lama\'s\'hell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# lostDC web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^ *<html>\n[ ]+<head>\n[ ]+<title>lostDC - " \
"id:955230,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'lostDC web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Unknown web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<title>PHP Web Shell</title>\r\n<html>\r\n<body>\r\n <!-- Replaces command with Base64-encoded Data -->" \
"id:955240,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Unknown web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Unknown web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\n<head>\n<div align=\"left\"><font size=\"1\">Input command :</font></div>\n<form name=\"cmd\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\">" \
"id:955250,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Unknown web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Ru24PostWebShell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\n<head>\n<title>Ru24PostWebShell - " \
"id:955260,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Ru24PostWebShell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# s72 Shell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx <title>s72 Shell v[0-9.]+ Codinf by Cr@zy_King</title>" \
"id:955270,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'s72 Shell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# PhpSpy web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\r\n<head>\r\n<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=gb2312\">\r\n<title>PhpSpy Ver [0-9]+</title>" \
"id:955280,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'PhpSpy web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# g00nshell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^ <html>\n\n<head>\n\n<title>g00nshell v[0-9.]+ " \
"id:955290,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'g00nshell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# PuNkHoLic shell web shell
# Various versions has this text written little differently so we need to do
# t:removeWhitespace and t:lowercase.
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@contains <title>punkholicshell</title>" \
"id:955300,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,t:removeWhitespace,t:lowercase,\
msg:'PuNkHoLic shell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# azrail web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\n <head>\n <title>azrail [0-9.]+ by C-W-M</title>" \
"id:955310,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'azrail web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# SmEvK_PaThAn Shell web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx >SmEvK_PaThAn Shell v[0-9]+ coded by <a href=" \
"id:955320,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'SmEvK_PaThAn Shell web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# Shell I web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^<html>\n<title>.*? ~ Shell I</title>\n<head>\n<style>" \
"id:955330,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'Shell I web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
# b374k m1n1 web shell
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@rx ^ <html><head><title>:: b374k m1n1 [0-9.]+ ::</title>" \
"id:955340,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'b374k m1n1 web shell',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/1',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:955013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:955014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
# webadmin.php file manager
# This is placed in PL2 because of too generic pattern.
SecRule RESPONSE_BODY "@contains <h1 style=\"margin-bottom: 0\">webadmin.php</h1>" \
"id:955350,\
phase:4,\
block,\
capture,\
t:none,\
msg:'webadmin.php file manager',\
logdata:'Matched Data: %{TX.0} found within %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}',\
tag:'language-php',\
tag:'platform-multi',\
tag:'attack-rce',\
tag:'paranoia-level/2',\
tag:'OWASP_CRS',\
tag:'capec/1000/225/122/17/650',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
severity:'CRITICAL',\
setvar:'tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2=+%{tx.critical_anomaly_score}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:955015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:955016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:955017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:955018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-955-WEB-SHELLS"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# You should set the score to the proper threshold you would prefer. If kept at "@gt 0"
# it will work similarly to previous Mod CRS rules and will create an event in the error_log
# file if there are any rules that match. If you would like to lessen the number of events
# generated in the error_log file, you should increase the anomaly score threshold to
# something like "@gt 20". This would only generate an event in the error_log file if
# there are multiple lower severity rule matches or if any 1 higher severity item matches.
#
# You should also set the desired disruptive action (deny, redirect, etc...).
#
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
# Summing up the blocking and detection anomaly scores in phase 3
# even when early blocking is disabled, we need to sum up the scores in phase 3
# this prevents bugs in phase 5 if Apache skips phases because of error handling
# See: https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/issues/2319#issuecomment-1047503932
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:959052,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:959152,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:959053,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:959153,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:959054,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:959154,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:959055,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:959155,\
phase:3,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
# at start of phase 4, we reset the aggregate scores to 0 to prevent duplicate counting of per-PL scores
# this is necessary because the per-PL scores are counted across phases
SecAction "id:959059,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=0'"
SecAction "id:959159,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=0'"
SecMarker "EARLY_BLOCKING_ANOMALY_SCORING"
# Summing up the blocking and detection anomaly scores in phase 4
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:959060,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 1" \
"id:959160,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:959061,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 2" \
"id:959161,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:959062,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 3" \
"id:959162,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3}'"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:959063,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@ge 4" \
"id:959163,\
phase:4,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
setvar:'tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score=+%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4}'"
#
# -=[ Anomaly Mode: Overall Transaction Anomaly Score ]=-
#
# if early blocking is active, check threshold in phase 3
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_OUTBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
"id:959101,\
phase:3,\
deny,\
t:none,\
msg:'Outbound Anomaly Score Exceeded in phase 3 (Total Score: %{tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score})',\
tag:'anomaly-evaluation',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
chain"
SecRule TX:EARLY_BLOCKING "@eq 1"
# always check threshold in phase 4
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_OUTBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" \
"id:959100,\
phase:4,\
deny,\
t:none,\
msg:'Outbound Anomaly Score Exceeded (Total Score: %{tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score})',\
tag:'anomaly-evaluation',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:959011,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:959012,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:959013,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:959014,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:959015,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:959016,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:959017,phase:3,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:959018,phase:4,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION"

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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# This file is used in post processing after the response has been sent to
# the client (in the logging phase). Its purpose is to provide inbound+outbound
# correlation of events to provide a more intelligent designation as to the outcome
# or result of the transaction - meaning, was this a successful attack?
#
#
# -= Paranoia Level 0 (empty) =- (apply unconditionally)
#
# Combine inbound and outbound scores
SecAction \
"id:980099,\
phase:5,\
pass,\
t:none,\
nolog,\
noauditlog,\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1',\
setvar:'tx.blocking_anomaly_score=%{tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.blocking_anomaly_score=+%{tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.detection_anomaly_score=%{tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.detection_anomaly_score=+%{tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=%{tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score}',\
setvar:'tx.anomaly_score=+%{tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score}'"
#
# -=[ Anomaly Score Reporting ]=-
#
# -= Reporting Level 0 =- (Skip over reporting when tx.reporting_level is 0)
SecRule TX:REPORTING_LEVEL "@eq 0" "id:980041,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REPORTING"
# -= Reporting Level 5 =- (Jump to reporting rule immediately when tx.reporting_level is 5 or greater)
SecRule TX:REPORTING_LEVEL "@ge 5" "id:980042,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
# -= Zero detection score =- (Skip over reporting when sum of inbound and outbound detection score is equal to 0)
SecRule TX:DETECTION_ANOMALY_SCORE "@eq 0" "id:980043,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REPORTING"
# -= Blocking score exceeds threshold =- (Jump to reporting rule immediately if a blocking score exceeds a threshold)
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" "id:980044,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_OUTBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" "id:980045,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
# -= Reporting Level 2 =- (Skip over reporting when tx.reporting_level is less than 2)
SecRule TX:REPORTING_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:980046,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REPORTING"
# -= Detection score exceeds threshold =- (Jump to reporting rule immediately if a detection score exceeds a threshold)
SecRule TX:DETECTION_INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" "id:980047,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_OUTBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE "@ge %{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold}" "id:980048,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
# -= Reporting Level 3 =- (Skip over reporting when tx.reporting_level is less than 3)
SecRule TX:REPORTING_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:980049,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REPORTING"
# -= Blocking score greater than zero =- (Jump to reporting rule immediately when sum of inbound and outbound blocking score is greater than zero)
SecRule TX:BLOCKING_ANOMALY_SCORE "@gt 0" "id:980050,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:LOG-REPORTING"
# -= Reporting Level 4 =- (Skip over reporting when tx.reporting_level is less than 4)
SecRule TX:REPORTING_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:980051,phase:5,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-REPORTING"
# At this point, the reporting level is 4 and there's a non-zero detection
# score (already established by rule 980043) so fall through to the reporting
# rule.
# Requests that land on the following SecMarker:
# - At reporting level 5 (unconditional reporting)
# - At reporting levels 1-4 when a blocking score exceeds a threshold
# - At reporting levels 2-4 when a detection score exceeds a threshold
# - At reporting levels 3-4 when the total blocking score is greater than zero
# - At reporting level 4 when the total detection score is greater than zero
SecMarker "LOG-REPORTING"
# Inbound and outbound - all requests
SecAction \
"id:980170,\
phase:5,\
pass,\
t:none,\
noauditlog,\
msg:'Anomaly Scores: \
(Inbound Scores: blocking=%{tx.blocking_inbound_anomaly_score}, detection=%{tx.detection_inbound_anomaly_score}, per_pl=%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl1}-%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl2}-%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl3}-%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_pl4}, threshold=%{tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold}) - \
(Outbound Scores: blocking=%{tx.blocking_outbound_anomaly_score}, detection=%{tx.detection_outbound_anomaly_score}, per_pl=%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl1}-%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl2}-%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl3}-%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_pl4}, threshold=%{tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold}) - \
(SQLI=%{tx.sql_injection_score}, XSS=%{tx.xss_score}, RFI=%{tx.rfi_score}, LFI=%{tx.lfi_score}, RCE=%{tx.rce_score}, PHPI=%{tx.php_injection_score}, HTTP=%{tx.http_violation_score}, SESS=%{tx.session_fixation_score}, COMBINED_SCORE=%{tx.anomaly_score})',\
tag:'reporting',\
ver:'OWASP_CRS/4.0.0-rc1'"
SecMarker "END-REPORTING"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:980011,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 1" "id:980012,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 1 (default) =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 1 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:980013,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 2" "id:980014,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 2 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 2 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:980015,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 3" "id:980016,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 3 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 3 or higher)
#
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:980017,phase:1,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
SecRule TX:DETECTION_PARANOIA_LEVEL "@lt 4" "id:980018,phase:2,pass,nolog,skipAfter:END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"
#
# -= Paranoia Level 4 =- (apply only when tx.detection_paranoia_level is sufficiently high: 4 or higher)
#
#
# -= Paranoia Levels Finished =-
#
SecMarker "END-RESPONSE-980-CORRELATION"

76
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf.example Normal file
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.4.0.0-rc1
# Copyright (c) 2006-2020 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
# Copyright (c) 2021-2022 Core Rule Set project. All rights reserved.
#
# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# The purpose of this file is to hold LOCAL exceptions for your site.
# The types of rules that would go into this file are one where you want
# to unconditionally disable rules or modify their actions during startup.
#
# Please see the file REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS.conf.example
# for a description of the rule exclusions mechanism and the correct
# use of this file.
#
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: To unconditionally disable a rule ID
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: 942100 SQL Injection Detected via libinjection
# SecRuleRemoveById 942100
# Example Exclusion Rule: Remove a group of rules
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: Disable PHP injection rules
# SecRuleRemoveByTag "attack-injection-php"
#
# Example Exclusion Rule: To unconditionally remove parameter "foo" from
# inspection for SQLi rules
#
# ModSecurity Rule Exclusion: disable sqli rules for parameter foo.
# SecRuleUpdateTargetByTag "attack-sqli" "!ARGS:foo"
# -- [[ Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode ]] --
#
# In Anomaly Mode (default in CRS3), the rules in REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
# and RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf check the accumulated attack scores
# against your policy. To apply a disruptive action, they overwrite the default
# actions specified in SecDefaultAction (setup.conf) with a 'deny' action.
# This 'deny' is by default paired with a 'status:403' action.
#
# In order to change the disruptive action from 'deny' to something else,
# you must use SecRuleUpdateActionByID directives AFTER the CRS rules
# are configured, for instance in the RESPONSE-999-EXCLUSION-RULES-AFTER-CRS.conf file.
#
# These actions only apply when using Anomaly Mode.
#
# Default action: block with error 403
# (No configuration needed in this file if you want the default behavior.)
#
# Example: redirect back to the homepage on blocking
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 949110 "t:none,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/'"
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 959100 "t:none,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/'"
# Example: redirect to another URL on blocking
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 949110 "t:none,redirect:'http://example.com/report_problem'"
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 959100 "t:none,redirect:'http://example.com/report_problem'"
# Example: send an error 404
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 949110 "t:none,deny,status:404"
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 959100 "t:none,deny,status:404"
# Example: drop the connection (best for DoS attacks)
#
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 949110 "t:none,drop"
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 959100 "t:none,drop"

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# Search engine crawlers and other bots
# crawler
# https://80legs.com/
80legs
# scraping framework
# https://ache.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
# User-Agent: (Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ACME/VERSION; +OPERATOR_CONTACT_URL; +OPERATOR_CONTACT_EMAIL)
ACHE/
# SEO
# https://ahrefs.com/robot
AhrefsBot
# site ripper
# http://www.softbytelabs.com/en/BlackWidow/
black widow
blackwidow
# security crawler
# User-Agent: Censys: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/)
CensysInspect
# scraping framework
# http://go-colly.org/
# User-Agent: colly - https://github.com/gocolly/colly/v2
colly -
# scraping framework
# https://github.com/yasserg/crawler4j
# User-Agent: crawler4j (https://github.com/yasserg/crawler4j/)
crawler4j
# SEO
# advertising targeting
# https://www.grapeshot.com/crawler/
grapeFX
GrapeshotCrawler/2.0
# scraping framework
# https://github.com/internetarchive/heritrix3
# User-Agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; heritrix/VERSION +OPERATOR_CONTACT_URL)
heritrix/
# User-Agent: Krzana bot
# https://krzana.com/
Krzana bot
# misbehaving spider
Lingewoud-550-Spyder
# scraping framework
# http://docs.seattlerb.org/mechanize/Mechanize.html
Mechanize
# SEO
# http://www.majestic12.co.uk/projects/dsearch/mj12bot.php
MJ12bot
# scraping framework
# https://nutch.apache.org/
# User-Agent: NutchCVS/VERSION (Nutch; http://lucene.apache.org/nutch/bot.html; nutch-agent@lucene.apache.org)
NutchCVS/
# news service
Owlin bot
# people database
# https://pipl.com/bot/
PiplBot
# crawler
# 2006
prowebwalker
# generic crawler
pymills-spider/
# scraping framework
# https://docs.pyspider.org/en/latest/
# User-Agent: pyspider/VERSION (+http://pyspider.org/)
pyspider/
# SEO
# https://moz.com/help/guides/moz-procedures/what-is-rogerbot
rogerbot
# SEO
# http://www.searchmetrics.com/searchmetricsbot/
SearchmetricsBot
# SEO
# https://www.semrush.com/bot/
SemrushBot
# SEO
# User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; seoscanners.net/1; +spider@seoscanners.net)
seoscanners.net
# scraping framework
# https://scrapy.org/
# User-Agent: Scrapy/VERSION (+https://scrapy.org)
Scrapy/
# https://www.wappalyzer.com/
Wappalyzer

59
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# This list comes from the default IIS error pages
# To renerate get the files from a default installation and use:
# grep -h '<title' *.htm
<title>401.1 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to invalid credentials.</title>
<title>401.2 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to server configuration.</title>
<title>401.3 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to an ACL set on the requested resource.</title>
<title>401.4 - Unauthorized: Authorization failed by filter installed on the Web server.</title>
<title>401.5 - Unauthorized: Authorization failed by an ISAPI/CGI application.</title>
<title>401 - Unauthorized: Access is denied due to invalid credentials.</title>
<title>403.1 - Forbidden: Execute access is denied.</title>
<title>403.10 - Forbidden: Web server is configured to deny Execute access.</title>
<title>403.11 - Forbidden: Password has been changed.</title>
<title>403.12 - Forbidden: Client certificate is denied access by the server certificate mapper.</title>
<title>403.13 - Forbidden: Client certificate has been revoked on the Web server.</title>
<title>403.14 - Forbidden: Directory listing denied.</title>
<title>403.15 - Forbidden: Client access licenses have exceeded limits on the Web server.</title>
<title>403.16 - Forbidden: Client certificate is ill-formed or is not trusted by the Web server.</title>
<title>403.17 - Forbidden: Client certificate has expired or is not yet valid.</title>
<title>403.18 - Forbidden: Cannot execute requested URL in the current application pool.</title>
<title>403.19 - Forbidden: Cannot execute CGIs for the client in this application pool.</title>
<title>403.2 - Forbidden: Read access is denied.</title>
<title>403.3 - Forbidden: Write access is denied.</title>
<title>403.4 - Forbidden: SSL is required to view this resource.</title>
<title>403.5 - Forbidden: SSL 128 is required to view this resource.</title>
<title>403.6 - Forbidden: IP address of the client has been rejected.</title>
<title>403.7 - Forbidden: SSL client certificate is required.</title>
<title>403.8 - Forbidden: DNS name of the client is rejected.</title>
<title>403.9 - Forbidden: Too many clients are trying to connect to the Web server.</title>
<title>403 - Forbidden: Access is denied.</title>
<title>404.1 - File or directory not found: Web site not accessible on the requested port.</title>
<title>404.11 - URL is double-escaped.</title>
<title>404.12 - URL has high bit characters.</title>
<title>404.14 - URL too long.</title>
<title>404.15 - Query-String too long.</title>
<title>404.2 - File or directory not found: Lockdown policy prevents this request.</title>
<title>404.3 - File or directory not found: MIME map policy prevents this request.</title>
<title>404.4 - File or directory not found: No module handler is registered to handle the request.</title>
<title>404.5 - URL sequence denied.</title>
<title>404.6 - HTTP verb denied.</title>
<title>404.7 - File extension denied.</title>
<title>404.8 - URL namespace hidden.</title>
<title>404.9 - File attribute hidden.</title>
<title>404 - File or directory not found.</title>
<title>405 - HTTP verb used to access this page is not allowed.</title>
<title>406 - Client browser does not accept the MIME type of the requested page.</title>
<title>412 - Precondition set by the client failed when evaluated on the Web server.</title>
<title>413.1 - Content-Length too large.</title>
<title>431 - Request header too long.</title>
<title>500.13 - Server error: Web server is too busy.</title>
<title>500.14 - Server error: Invalid application configuration on the server.</title>
<title>500.15 - Server error: Direct requests for GLOBAL.ASA are not allowed.</title>
<title>500.16 - Server error: UNC authorization credentials incorrect.</title>
<title>500.17 - Server error: URL authorization store cannot be found.</title>
<title>500.18 - Server error: URL authorization store cannot be opened.</title>
<title>500.19 - Server error: Data for this file is configured improperly.</title>
<title>500 - Internal server error.</title>
<title>501 - Header values specify a method that is not implemented.</title>
<title>502 - Web server received an invalid response while acting as a gateway or proxy server.</title>

61
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# Java Classes for use with Java RCEs
#
# Used With Rule 944130 in Apache Struts and Oracle Weblogic RCEs Detection:
#
# CVE-2017-5638 (2017.01.29) https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5638
# CVE-2017-9791 (2017.06.21) https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-9791
# CVE-2017-9805 (2017.06.21) https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-9805
# CVE-2017-10271 (2017.06.21) https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10271
# CVE-2018-11776 (2018.06.05) https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-11776
#
# Additional Resources
# Apache S2-057 (2019.01.20) https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-057
com.opensymphony.xwork2
com.sun.org.apache
freemarker.core
freemarker.template
freemarker.ext.rhino
java.io.BufferedInputStream
java.io.BufferedReader
java.io.ByteArrayInputStream
java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream
java.io.CharArrayReader
java.io.DataInputStream
java.io.File
java.io.FileOutputStream
java.io.FilePermission
java.io.FileWriter
java.io.FilterInputStream
java.io.FilterOutputStream
java.io.FilterReader
java.io.InputStream
java.io.InputStreamReader
java.io.LineNumberReader
java.io.ObjectOutputStream
java.io.OutputStream
java.io.PipedOutputStream
java.io.PipedReader
java.io.PrintStream
java.io.PushbackInputStream
java.io.Reader
java.io.StringReader
java.lang.Class
java.lang.Integer
java.lang.Number
java.lang.Object
java.lang.Process
java.lang.ProcessBuilder
java.lang.reflect
java.lang.Runtime
java.lang.String
java.lang.StringBuilder
java.lang.System
javassist
javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
org.apache.commons
org.apache.struts
org.apache.struts2
org.omg.CORBA
java.beans.XMLDecode
sun.reflect

17
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<jsp:
javax.servlet
.addheader
.createtextfile
.getfile
.loadfromfile
response.binarywrite
response.write
scripting.filesystemobject
server.createobject
server.execute
server.htmlencode
server.mappath
server.urlencode
vbscript.encode
wscript.network
wscript.shell

10
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[java.lang.
class java.lang.
java.lang.NullPointerException
java.rmi.ServerException
at java.lang.
onclick="toggle('full exception chain stacktrace')"
at org.apache.catalina
at org.apache.coyote.
at org.apache.tomcat.
at org.apache.jasper.

720
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# This list comes from:
# - https://github.com/lightos/Panoptic
# - https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists
# /proc and /sys entries should be kept in sync with restricted-files.data
# Entries in this list generally use the shortest path that suffices for identifying them as dangerous.
# .ssh/id_rsa and .ssh/id_dsa for example, are both dangerous paths but are represented in this list as .ssh.
# The same applies to different log files below /var/log/mysql: var/log/mysql is enough to tell us that the request is suspicious.
# Additionally, similar paths with different roots are represented as a single entry.
# For example, the two entries usr/local/mysql/data/mysql.err and xampp/mysql/data/mysql.err are
# represented as mysal/data, as that is enough to identify the paths as being suspicious.
# Most of the dotfile entries can be generated from the following three commands.
# Unfortunately, the output contains many more entries, including some file
# extensions. There are also some entries that probably added by hand.
# curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lightos/Panoptic/master/home.txt | grep -E "^\." | awk '{ print tolower($0) }' | sort | uniq
# curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lightos/Panoptic/master/cases.xml | grep "file value" | cut -d'"' -f2 | grep -E "^\." | awk '{ print tolower($0) }' | sort | uniq
# curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/master/Fuzzing/fuzz-Bo0oM.txt | grep -Ev '\\|\.\.|=\b|%' | grep -E "^\." | awk '{ print tolower($0) }' | sort | uniq
.addressbook
.anydesk/
.aptitude/config
.atom/
.aws/
.azure/
.bash_
.bashrc
.boto
.cache/notify-osd.log
.config/
.cshrc
.cups/
.dbus/
.docker
.drush/
.env
.eslintignore
.fbcindex
.forward
.gem/
.gitattributes
.gitconfig
.gnonme/
.gnupg/
.gsutil/
.hplip/hplip.conf
.htaccess
.htdigest
.htpasswd
.java/
.ksh_history
.kube/
.lesshst
.lftp/
.lhistory
.lighttpdpassword
.lldb-history
.local/share/mc/
.lynx_cookies
.minikube/
.my.cnf
.mysql_history
.nano_history
.netrc
.node_repl_history
.npm/
.nsconfig
.nsr
.nvm/
.oh-my-
.password-store
.pearrc
.pgpass
.php_history
.pinerc
.pki/
.proclog
.procmailrc
.profile
.psql_history
.python_history
.rediscli_history
.rhistory
.rhosts
.sh_history
.sqlite_history
.ssh/
.subversion/
.tconn/
.tcshrc
.thunderbird/
.tor/
.vidalia/
.vim/
.viminfo
.vimrc
.vmware/
.www_acl
.wwwacl
.xauthority
.zhistory
.zsh_history
.zshrc
/php.ini
/tmp/
# Apache httpd entries can be generated with the following command:
# curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lightos/Panoptic/master/cases.xml | grep "file value" | cut -d'"' -f2 | awk -F/ '{ { if (length($NF) > 0) {v1 = NF-1; v2 = NF} else {v1 = NF-2; v2 = NF-1} print tolower($v1"/"$v2) }) }' | grep apache | sort | uniq
apache/access.conf
apache/apache.conf
apache/apache2.conf
apache/audit_log
apache/conf
apache/default-server.conf
apache/error_log
apache/error.log
apache/httpd.conf
apache/log
apache2/apache.conf
apache2/apache2.conf
apache2/conf
apache2/default-server.conf
apache2/envvars
apache2/httpd.conf
apache2/httpd2.conf
apache2/logs
apache2/mods
apache2/ports.conf
apache2/sites
apache2/ssl-global.conf
apache2/vhosts.d
apache22/conf
apache22/httpd.conf
apache22/logs
apache24/conf
apache24/httpd.conf
apache24/logs
app/etc/local.xml
boot.ini
boot/grub/grub.cfg
boot/grub/menu.lst
config_dev.yml
config_prod.yml
config_test.yml
config.inc.php
config.php
config.yml
config/app.php
config/custom.php
config/database.php
configuration.php
cpanel/logs
data/elasticsearch
data/kafka
etc/.java
etc/acpi
etc/adduser.conf
etc/alias
etc/alsa
etc/alternatives
etc/anacrontab
etc/ansible
etc/apache/access.conf
etc/apache/apache.conf
etc/apache/default-server.conf
etc/apache/httpd.conf
etc/apache/vhosts.conf
etc/apache2
etc/apm
etc/apparmor
etc/apport
etc/apt
etc/asciidoc
etc/at.allow
etc/at.deny
etc/avahi
etc/bash_completion.d
etc/bash.bashrc
etc/bashrc
etc/bind
etc/binfmt.d
etc/bluetooth
etc/bonobo-activation
etc/bootptab
etc/brltty
etc/ca-certificates
etc/calendar
etc/casper.conf
etc/centos-release
etc/chatscripts
etc/chkrootkit.conf
etc/chromium-browser
etc/chrootusers
etc/chttp.conf
etc/clam.d
etc/clamav
etc/cni
etc/console-setup
etc/coraza-waf
etc/cracklib
etc/cron.allow
etc/cron.d
etc/cron.hourly
etc/cron.monthly
etc/cron.weekly
etc/crontab
etc/crypttab
etc/cups
etc/cvs-cron.conf
etc/cvs-pserver.conf
etc/dbus-1
etc/dconf
etc/debconf.conf
etc/debian_version
etc/default
etc/deluser.conf
etc/depmod.d
etc/dhcp
etc/dictionaries-common
etc/dkms
etc/dns2tcpd.conf
etc/dnsmasq.d
etc/dockeretc/dpkg
etc/e2fsck.conf
etc/elasticsearch
etc/emacs
etc/environment.d
etc/esound/esd.conf
etc/etter.conf
etc/exports
etc/fail2ban
etc/fedora-release
etc/firebird
etc/firefox
etc/firewall
etc/fonts
etc/foremost.conf
etc/freshclam.conf
etc/fstab
etc/ftpaccess
etc/ftpchroot
etc/ftphosts
etc/ftpusers
etc/fuse.conf
etc/fwupd
etc/gconf
etc/gdb
etc/gdm3
etc/geoclue
etc/ghostscript
etc/gimp
etc/glvnd
etc/gnome
etc/gnucash
etc/gnustep
etc/groff
etc/group
etc/grub.conf
etc/grub.d
etc/gshadow
etc/gss
etc/gtk-2.0
etc/gtk-3.0
etc/hdparm.conf
etc/host.conf
etc/hostname
etc/hosts
etc/hp
etc/http/conf
etc/http/httpd.conf
etc/httpd
etc/ifplugd
etc/imagemagick-6
etc/inetd.conf
etc/init
etc/insserv.conf.d
etc/ipfw
etc/iproute2
etc/iptables
etc/issue
etc/java
etc/kafka
etc/kbd/config
etc/kernel
etc/kibana
etc/ld.so.conf
etc/ldap
etc/libblockdev
etc/libibverbs.d
etc/libnl-3
etc/libpaper.d
etc/libreoffice
etc/lighttpd
etc/lilo.conf
etc/logcheck
etc/login.defs
etc/logrotate.conf
etc/logrotate.d
etc/logstash
etc/lsb-release
etc/ltrace.conf
etc/lvm
etc/lynx
etc/mail
etc/mandrake-release
etc/manpath.config
etc/mc
etc/menu
etc/miredo-server.conf
etc/miredo.conf
etc/miredo/miredo-server.conf
etc/miredo/miredo.conf
etc/modprobe.d
etc/modsecurity
etc/modulesf
etc/mongod.conf
etc/monit
etc/mono
etc/motd
etc/mplayer
etc/mpv
etc/mtab
etc/mtools.conf
etc/muddleftpd
etc/muddleftpd.com
etc/muttrc.d
etc/my.cnf
etc/my.conf
etc/mysql
etc/netplan
etc/network
etc/networkmanager
etc/newsyslog.conf
etc/newt
etc/nghttpx
etc/nginx/
etc/nikto
etc/npasswd
etc/nuxeo.conf
etc/odbcdatasources
etc/openal
etc/openldap/ldap.conf
etc/openmpi
etc/opt
etc/os-release
etc/osxhttpd
etc/osync
etc/packagekit
etc/pam.conf
etc/pam.d
etc/pam.d/proftpd
etc/passwd
etc/password
etc/pcmcia
etc/perl
etc/php
etc/pki
etc/pm
etc/polkit-1
etc/postfix
etc/postgresql
etc/ppp
etc/printcap
etc/profile
etc/proftp.conf
etc/proftpd
etc/pulse
etc/pure-ftpd
etc/pureftpd
etc/python
etc/rc.conf
etc/rc.d/rc.httpd
etc/rc0.d
etc/rc1.d
etc/rc2.d
etc/rc3.d
etc/rc4.d
etc/rc5.d
etc/rc6.d
etc/rcs.d
etc/redhat-release
etc/redis-sentinel.conf
etc/redis.conf
etc/resolv.conf
etc/resolvconf
etc/rsyslog.d
etc/samba
etc/sane.d
etc/scw-release
etc/security
etc/selinux
etc/sensors.conf
etc/sensors.d
etc/sensors3.conf
etc/sgml
etc/shadow
etc/signon-ui
etc/skel
etc/slackware-release
etc/smb.conf
etc/smbpasswd
etc/smi.conf
etc/snmp
etc/sound
etc/spamassassin
etc/speech-dispatcher
etc/squid
etc/squirrelmail
etc/ssh
etc/ssl
etc/sso
etc/stunnel
etc/subgid
etc/subuid
etc/subversion
etc/sudoers
etc/suse-release
etc/sw-cp-server/applications.d
etc/sysconfig
etc/sysctl.conf
etc/sysctl.d
etc/syslog.conf
etc/sysstat
etc/system-release-cpe
etc/systemd
etc/termcap
etc/terminfo
etc/texmf
etc/thermald
etc/thnuclnt
etc/thunderbird
etc/timezone
etc/timidity
etc/tinyproxy
etc/tmpfiles.d
etc/tor/tor-tsocks.conf
etc/tsocks.conf
etc/ubuntu-advantage
etc/udev
etc/udisks2
etc/ufw
etc/update-manager
etc/update-motd.d
etc/update-notifier
etc/updatedb.conf
etc/upower
etc/urlview
etc/usb_modeswitch.d
etc/utmp
etc/vhcs2/proftpd/proftpd.conf
etc/vim
etc/vmware
etc/vsftpd.chroot_list
etc/vsftpd.conf
etc/vsftpd/vsftpd.conf
etc/vulkan
etc/w3m
etc/webmin
etc/wicd
etc/wireshark
etc/wpa_supplicant
etc/wu-ftpd
etc/x11
etc/xdg
etc/xml
gruntfile.js
home/postgres
http/httpd.conf
httpd/conf/httpd.conf
inc/config.php
includes/config.php
includes/configure.php
inetpub/wwwroot/global.asa
jakarta/dist/tomcat
jakarta/tomcat/conf
jakarta/tomcat/logs
library/webserver/documents
lighttpd/conf
lighttpd/lighttpd.conf
lighttpd/log
localsettings.php
logs/access_log
logs/access.log
logs/error_log
logs/error.log
logs/pure-ftpd.log
logs/samba.log
logs/security_debug_log
logs/security_log
lsws/conf
lsws/logs
mysql/bin/my.ini
mysql/data
mysql/my.cnf
mysql/my.ini
nginx/conf/nginx.conf
npm-debug.log
opt/apache
opt/apache2
opt/httpd/apache.conf
opt/httpd/apache2.conf
opt/httpd/conf/
opt/jboss
opt/lampp
opt/nuxeo
opt/tomcat
opt/xampp
ormconfig.json
package-lock.json
package.json
parameters.yml
pgsql/bin/pg_passwd
pgsql/data
php/apache.conf
php/apache2.conf
php/httpd.conf
php5/apache.conf
php5/apache2.conf
php5/httpd.conf
postgresql/log/
proc/0
proc/1
proc/2
proc/3
proc/4
proc/5
proc/6
proc/7
proc/8
proc/9
proc/acpi
proc/asound
proc/bootconfig
proc/buddyinfo
proc/bus
proc/cgroups
proc/cmdline
proc/config.gz
proc/consoles
proc/cpuinfo
proc/crypto
proc/devices
proc/diskstats
proc/dma
proc/docker
proc/driver
proc/dynamic_debug
proc/execdomains
proc/fb
proc/filesystems
proc/fs
proc/interrupts
proc/iomem
proc/ioports
proc/ipmi
proc/irq
proc/kallsyms
proc/kcore
proc/key-users
proc/keys
proc/kmsg
proc/kpagecgroup
proc/kpagecount
proc/kpageflags
proc/latency_stats
proc/loadavg
proc/locks
proc/mdstat
proc/meminfo
proc/misc
proc/modules
proc/mounts
proc/mpt
proc/mtd
proc/mtrr
proc/net
proc/pagetypeinfo
proc/partitions
proc/pressure
proc/sched_debug
proc/schedstat
proc/scsi
proc/self
proc/slabinfo
proc/softirqs
proc/stat
proc/swaps
proc/sys
proc/sysrq-trigger
proc/sysvipc
proc/thread-self
proc/timer_list
proc/timer_stats
proc/tty
proc/uptime
proc/version
proc/version_signature
proc/vmallocinfo
proc/vmstat
proc/zoneinfo
program files
psa/admin
pureftpd/etc
root/anaconda-ks.cfg
routing.yml
samba/lib
sb/config
security.yml
server/default/conf
server/default/deploy
server/default/log
services.yml
sftp-config.json
sites/default/default.settings.php
sites/default/settings.local.php
sites/default/settings.php
squirrelmail/config/config.php
squirrelmail/www
sys/block
sys/bus
sys/class
sys/dev
sys/devices
sys/firmware
sys/fs
sys/hypervisor
sys/kernel
sys/module
sys/power
system/library/webobjects/adaptors
system32/config
system32/inetsrv/config
tmp/access.log
tmp/kafka-logs
tsconfig.json
typo3conf/localconf.php
usr/etc/pure-ftpd.conf
usr/home/user/lighttpd
usr/lib/cron/log
usr/lib/php
usr/lib/rpm/rpm.log
usr/lib/security
usr/local/zeus/web
usr/pkg/etc/httpd
usr/pkgsrc/net/pureftpd
usr/ports/contrib/pure-ftpd
usr/ports/ftp/pure-ftpd
usr/sbin/mudlogd
usr/sbin/mudpasswd
usr/sbin/pure-config.pl
usr/share/adduser
usr/share/logs
usr/share/squirrelmail
usr/share/tomcat
usr/spool/lp
usr/spool/mqueue
var/adm
var/apache/logs
var/apache2/config.inc
var/cpanel
var/cron/log
var/data/elasticsearch
var/data/mysql-bin
var/htmp
var/lib/elasticsearch
var/lib/mysql
var/lib/pgsql
var/lib/squirrelmail
var/lighttpd
var/local/www/conf
var/log
var/lp/logs
var/mail
var/mysql-bin
var/mysql.log
var/nm2/postgresql.conf
var/postgresql
var/run/utmp
var/saf/_log
var/saf/port/log
var/spool
var/webmin
var/www/conf
var/www/html/squirrelmail
var/www/log
volumes/macintosh_hd
volumes/webbackup
wamp/bin/apache
wamp/bin/mysql
wamp/bin/php
wamp/logs
web.config
webpack.config.js
windows/comsetup.log
windows/debug/netsetup.log
windows/odbc.ini
windows/repair/setup.log
windows/setupact.log
windows/setupapi.log
windows/setuperr.log
windows/system32
windows/updspapi.log
windows/windowsupdate.log
windows/wmsetup.log
winnt/repair
winnt/system32/logfiles
wp-config.
www/conf/httpd.conf
www/logs
xampp/apache/logs
xampp/filezillaftp
xampp/htdocs
xampp/mercurymail
xampp/mysql/data
xampp/php
xampp/sendmail
xampp/webalizer/webalizer.conf
yarn.lock

571
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/php-config-directives.data Normal file
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# This list comes mainly from:
# - https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.core.php
# - https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.list.php
#
# There are additional directives defined in some of the modules, that can be parsed from each modules's configuration page:
# - https://www.php.net/manual/en/$book.configuration.php (book comes from funcref.php)
#
# As the source code is in docbook format with many dependencies, the easiest
# way to get it is using an xpath parser on the ini list and getting all
# using '//table/tbody/tr/td[1]'. A simple helper tool you can use is https://www.videlibri.de/xidel.html
#
# Small post-processing is needed to remove numbers coming from a column,
# and `*` chars (e.g. `pdo.dsn.*`).
# Also removed single words like `engine`, `extension`, `from` and `precision`, to prevent FP.
#
# Example usage:
# `xidel https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.core.php https://www.php.net/manual/en/ini.list.php --xpath '//table/tbody/tr/td[1]' | sort | uniq`
#
# And for configuration in submodules:
#
# for book in $(xidel https://www.php.net/manual/en/funcref.php -e '//a/extract(@href, "book\.(.+)\.php", 1)[. != ""]') ─╯
# do
# xidel https://www.php.net/manual/en/$book.configuration.php --xpath '//table/tbody/tr/td[1]' >> php-config-directives.txt
# done
#
# ** Remember to always `sort` the output so its easy to spot the changes, and remove duplicates if any.
allow_url_fopen
allow_url_include
apc.coredump_unmap
apc.enable_cli
apc.enabled
apc.entries_hint
apc.gc_ttl
apc.mmap_file_mask
apc.preload_path
apc.serializer
apc.shm_segments
apc.shm_size
apc.slam_defense
apc.ttl
apc.use_request_time
arg_separator.input
arg_separator.output
assert.active
assert.bail
assert.callback
assert.exception
assert.quiet_eval
assert.warning
auto_append_file
auto_detect_line_endings
auto_globals_jit
auto_prepend_file
bcmath.scale
browscap
cgi.check_shebang_line
cgi.discard_path
cgi.fix_pathinfo
cgi.force_redirect
cgi.nph
cgi.redirect_status_env
cgi.rfc2616_headers
child_terminate
cli_server.color
cli.pager
cli.prompt
com.allow_dcom
com.autoregister_casesensitive
com.autoregister_typelib
com.autoregister_verbose
com.code_page
com.dotnet_version
com.typelib_file
curl.cainfo
date.default_latitude
date.default_longitude
date.sunrise_zenith
date.sunset_zenith
date.timezone
dba.default_handler
default_charset
default_mimetype
default_socket_timeout
disable_classes
disable_functions
display_errors
display_startup_errors
doc_root
docref_ext
docref_root
enable_dl
enable_post_data_reading
engine
error_append_string
error_log
error_prepend_string
error_reporting
exif.decode_jis_intel
exif.decode_jis_motorola
exif.decode_unicode_intel
exif.decode_unicode_motorola
exif.encode_jis
exif.encode_unicode
exit_on_timeout
extension
expect.logfile
expect.loguser
expect.match_max
expect.timeout
expose_php
extension_dir
fastcgi.impersonate
fastcgi.logging
ffi.enable
ffi.preload
file_uploads
filter.default
filter.default_flags
gd.jpeg_ignore_warning
geoip.custom_directory
hard_timeout
highlight.comment
highlight.default
highlight.html
highlight.keyword
highlight.string
html_errors
ibase.allow_persistent
ibase.dateformat
ibase.default_charset
ibase.default_db
ibase.default_password
ibase.default_user
ibase.max_links
ibase.max_persistent
ibase.timeformat
ibase.timestampformat
ibm_db2.binmode
ibm_db2.i5_all_pconnect
ibm_db2.i5_allow_commit
ibm_db2.i5_dbcs_alloc
ibm_db2.i5_ignore_userid
ibm_db2.instance_name
iconv.input_encoding
iconv.internal_encoding
iconv.output_encoding
igbinary.compact_strings
ignore_repeated_errors
ignore_repeated_source
ignore_user_abort
imagick.locale_fix
imagick.progress_monitor
imagick.skip_version_check
imap.enable_insecure_rsh
implicit_flush
include_path
input_encoding
internal_encoding
intl.default_locale
intl.error_level
intl.use_exceptions
ldap.max_links
log_errors
log_errors_max_len
magic_quotes_gpc
magic_quotes_runtime
mail.add_x_header
mail.force_extra_parameters
mail.log
mailparse.def_charset
max_execution_time
max_file_uploads
max_input_nesting_level
max_input_time
max_input_vars
mbstring.detect_order
mbstring.encoding_translation
mbstring.func_overload
mbstring.http_input
mbstring.http_output
mbstring.http_output_conv_mimetypes
mbstring.internal_encoding
mbstring.language
mbstring.regex_retry_limit
mbstring.regex_stack_limit
mbstring.strict_detection
mbstring.substitute_character
mcrypt.algorithms_dir
mcrypt.modes_dir
memcache.allow_failover
memcache.chunk_size
memcache.compress_threshold
memcache.default_port
memcache.hash_function
memcache.hash_strategy
memcache.lock_timeout
memcache.max_failover_attempts
memcache.protocol
memcache.redundancy
memcache.session_redundancy
memcached.compression_factor
memcached.compression_threshold
memcached.compression_type
memcached.default_binary_protocol
memcached.default_connect_timeout
memcached.default_consistent_hash
memcached.serializer
memcached.sess_binary
memcached.sess_binary_protocol
memcached.sess_connect_timeout
memcached.sess_consistent_hash
memcached.sess_consistent_hash_type
memcached.sess_lock_expire
memcached.sess_lock_retries
memcached.sess_lock_wait
memcached.sess_lock_wait_max
memcached.sess_lock_wait_min
memcached.sess_locking
memcached.sess_number_of_replicas
memcached.sess_persistent
memcached.sess_prefix
memcached.sess_randomize_replica_read
memcached.sess_remove_failed
memcached.sess_remove_failed_servers
memcached.sess_sasl_password
memcached.sess_sasl_username
memcached.sess_server_failure_limit
memcached.store_retry_count
memcached.use_sasl
memory_limit
mysql.allow_local_infile
mysql.allow_persistent
mysql.connect_timeout
mysql.default_host
mysql.default_password
mysql.default_port
mysql.default_socket
mysql.default_user
mysql.max_links
mysql.max_persistent
mysql.trace_mode
mysqli.allow_local_infile
mysqli.allow_persistent
mysqli.default_host
mysqli.default_port
mysqli.default_pw
mysqli.default_socket
mysqli.default_user
mysqli.local_infile_directory
mysqli.max_links
mysqli.max_persistent
mysqli.reconnect
mysqli.rollback_on_cached_plink
mysqlnd.collect_memory_statistics
mysqlnd.collect_statistics
mysqlnd.debug
mysqlnd.fetch_data_copy
mysqlnd.log_mask
mysqlnd.mempool_default_size
mysqlnd.net_cmd_buffer_size
mysqlnd.net_read_buffer_size
mysqlnd.net_read_timeout
mysqlnd.sha256_server_public_key
mysqlnd.trace_alloc
oci8.connection_class
oci8.default_prefetch
oci8.events
oci8.max_persistent
oci8.old_oci_close_semantics
oci8.persistent_timeout
oci8.ping_interval
oci8.prefetch_lob_size
oci8.privileged_connect
oci8.statement_cache_size
odbc.allow_persistent
odbc.check_persistent
odbc.default_cursortype
odbc.default_db
odbc.default_pw
odbc.default_user
odbc.defaultbinmode
odbc.defaultlrl
odbc.max_links
odbc.max_persistent
opcache.blacklist_filename
opcache.cache_id
opcache.consistency_checks
opcache.dups_fix
opcache.enable
opcache.enable_cli
opcache.enable_file_override
opcache.error_log
opcache.fast_shutdown
opcache.file_cache
opcache.file_cache_consistency_checks
opcache.file_cache_fallback
opcache.file_cache_only
opcache.file_update_protection
opcache.force_restart_timeout
opcache.huge_code_pages
opcache.inherited_hack
opcache.interned_strings_buffer
opcache.jit
opcache.jit_bisect_limit
opcache.jit_blacklist_root_trace
opcache.jit_blacklist_side_trace
opcache.jit_buffer_size
opcache.jit_debug
opcache.jit_hot_func
opcache.jit_hot_loop
opcache.jit_hot_return
opcache.jit_hot_side_exit
opcache.jit_max_exit_counters
opcache.jit_max_loop_unrolls
opcache.jit_max_polymorphic_calls
opcache.jit_max_recursive_calls
opcache.jit_max_recursive_returns
opcache.jit_max_root_traces
opcache.jit_max_side_traces
opcache.jit_prof_threshold
opcache.lockfile_path
opcache.log_verbosity_level
opcache.max_accelerated_files
opcache.max_file_size
opcache.max_wasted_percentage
opcache.memory_consumption
opcache.mmap_base
opcache.opt_debug_level
opcache.optimization_level
opcache.preferred_memory_model
opcache.preload
opcache.preload_user
opcache.protect_memory
opcache.record_warnings
opcache.restrict_api
opcache.revalidate_freq
opcache.revalidate_path
opcache.save_comments
opcache.use_cwd
opcache.validate_permission
opcache.validate_root
opcache.validate_timestamps
open_basedir
openssl.cafile
openssl.capath
output_buffering
output_encoding
output_handler
pcre.backtrack_limit
pcre.jit
pcre.recursion_limit
pdo_odbc.connection_pooling
pdo_odbc.db2_instance_name
pdo.dsn
pgsql.allow_persistent
pgsql.auto_reset_persistent
pgsql.ignore_notice
pgsql.log_notice
pgsql.max_links
pgsql.max_persistent
phar.cache_list
phar.readonly
phar.require_hash
phpdbg.eol
phpdbg.path
precision
post_max_size
realpath_cache_size
realpath_cache_ttl
register_argc_argv
report_memleaks
report_zend_debug
request_order
runkit.internal_override
runkit.superglobal
seaslog.appender
seaslog.appender_retry
seaslog.buffer_disabled_in_cli
seaslog.buffer_size
seaslog.default_basepath
seaslog.default_datetime_format
seaslog.default_logger
seaslog.default_template
seaslog.disting_by_hour
seaslog.disting_folder
seaslog.disting_type
seaslog.ignore_warning
seaslog.level
seaslog.recall_depth
seaslog.remote_host
seaslog.remote_port
seaslog.remote_timeout
seaslog.throw_exception
seaslog.trace_error
seaslog.trace_exception
seaslog.trace_notice
seaslog.trace_warning
seaslog.trim_wrap
seaslog.use_buffer
sendmail_from
sendmail_path
serialize_precision
session.auto_start
session.cache_expire
session.cache_limiter
session.cookie_domain
session.cookie_httponly
session.cookie_lifetime
session.cookie_path
session.cookie_samesite
session.cookie_secure
session.entropy_file
session.entropy_length
session.gc_divisor
session.gc_maxlifetime
session.gc_probability
session.hash_bits_per_character
session.hash_function
session.lazy_write
session.name
session.referer_check
session.save_handler
session.save_path
session.serialize_handler
session.sid_bits_per_character
session.sid_length
session.trans_sid_hosts
session.trans_sid_tags
session.upload_progress.cleanup
session.upload_progress.enabled
session.upload_progress.freq
session.upload_progress.min_freq
session.upload_progress.name
session.upload_progress.prefix
session.use_cookies
session.use_only_cookies
session.use_strict_mode
session.use_trans_sid
short_open_tag
smtp
smtp_port
soap.wsdl_cache
soap.wsdl_cache_dir
soap.wsdl_cache_enabled
soap.wsdl_cache_limit
soap.wsdl_cache_ttl
sql.safe_mode
sqlite3.defensive
sqlite3.extension_dir
stomp.default_broker
stomp.default_connection_timeout_sec
stomp.default_connection_timeout_usec
stomp.default_read_timeout_sec
stomp.default_read_timeout_usec
swoole.aio_thread_num
swoole.display_errors
swoole.enable_coroutine
swoole.enable_library
swoole.enable_preemptive_scheduler
swoole.fast_serialize
swoole.unixsock_buffer_size
swoole.use_namespace
swoole.use_shortname
sys_temp_dir
syslog.facility
syslog.filter
syslog.ident
sysvshm.init_mem
taint.enable
taint.error_level
tidy.clean_output
tidy.default_config
track_errors
trader.real_precision
trader.real_round_mode
unserialize_callback_func
unserialize_max_depth
uopz.disable
uopz.exit
uopz.overloads
upload_max_filesize
upload_tmp_dir
uploadprogress.file.filename_template
url_rewriter.hosts
url_rewriter.tags
user_agent
user_dir
user_ini.cache_ttl
user_ini.filename
v8js.flags
v8js.max_disposed_contexts
variables_order
vld.active
vld.execute
vld.skip_append
vld.skip_prepend
wincache.chkinterval
wincache.enablecli
wincache.fcachesize
wincache.fcenabled
wincache.fcenabledfilter
wincache.fcndetect
wincache.filecount
wincache.filemapdir
wincache.ignorelist
wincache.maxfilesize
wincache.namesalt
wincache.ocachesize
wincache.ocenabled
wincache.ocenabledfilter
wincache.reroute_enabled
wincache.rerouteini
wincache.scachesize
wincache.srwlocks
wincache.ttlmax
wincache.ucachesize
wincache.ucenabled
windows.show_crt_warning
wkhtmltox.graphics
xbithack
xhprof.output_dir
xmlrpc_error_number
xmlrpc_errors
yac.compress_threshold
yac.debug
yac.enable
yac.enable_cli
yac.keys_memory_size
yac.serializer
yac.values_memory_size
yaconf.check_delay
yaconf.directory
yaf.action_prefer
yaf.cache_config
yaf.environ
yaf.forward_limit
yaf.library
yaf.lowcase_path
yaf.name_separator
yaf.name_suffix
yaf.use_namespace
yaf.use_spl_autoload
yaml.decode_binary
yaml.decode_php
yaml.decode_timestamp
yaml.output_canonical
yaml.output_indent
yaml.output_width
yar.connect_timeout
yar.debug
yar.expose_info
yar.packager
yar.timeout
yaz.keepalive
yaz.log_mask
zend_extension
zend.assertions
zend.detect_unicode
zend.enable_gc
zend.exception_ignore_args
zend.exception_string_param_max_len
zend.multibyte
zend.script_encoding
zend.signal_check
zlib.output_compression
zlib.output_compression_level
zlib.output_handler
zookeeper.recv_timeout
zookeeper.sess_lock_wait
zookeeper.session_lock

5
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/php-errors-pl2.data Normal file
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# For more information, see comments at the beginning of the php-errors.data file.
Invalid date
Static function
The function

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/php-function-names-933150.data Normal file
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__halt_compiler
apache_child_terminate
base64_decode
bzdecompress
call_user_func
call_user_func_array
call_user_method
call_user_method_array
convert_uudecode
file_get_contents
file_put_contents
fsockopen
get_class_methods
get_class_vars
get_defined_constants
get_defined_functions
get_defined_vars
gzdecode
gzinflate
gzuncompress
include_once
invokeargs
pcntl_exec
pcntl_fork
pfsockopen
posix_getcwd
posix_getpwuid
posix_getuid
posix_uname
ReflectionFunction
require_once
shell_exec
str_rot13
sys_get_temp_dir
wp_remote_fopen
wp_remote_get
wp_remote_head
wp_remote_post
wp_remote_request
wp_safe_remote_get
wp_safe_remote_head
wp_safe_remote_post
wp_safe_remote_request
zlib_decode

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/php-variables.data Normal file
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# The data in this list comes from
# https://www.php.net/manual/en/reserved.variables.php
# https://www.php.net/manual/en/language.variables.superglobals.php
# https://www.php.net/manual/en/language.constants.predefined.php
# These superglobal variables are:
$GLOBALS
$_COOKIE
$_ENV
$_FILES
$_GET
$_POST
$_REQUEST
$_SERVER
$_SESSION
$argc
$argv
$http_​response_​header
# Deprecated
$php_​errormsg
# This is really old, completely deprecated vars (PHP >= 4 < 5.3)
$HTTP_COOKIE_VARS
$HTTP_ENV_VARS
$HTTP_GET_VARS
$HTTP_POST_FILES
$HTTP_POST_VARS
$HTTP_RAW_POST_DATA
$HTTP_REQUEST_VARS
$HTTP_SERVER_VARS

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plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/crs/restricted-files.data Normal file
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# Apache
# (no slash; also guards against old.htaccess, old.htpasswd, etc.)
.htaccess
.htdigest
.htpasswd
# home level dotfiles (keep in sync with lfi-os-files.data)
# grep -E '^\.' lfi-os-files.data
.addressbook
.aptitude/config
.aws/
.azure/
.bash_
.bashrc
.cache/notify-osd.log
.config/
.cshrc
.docker
.drush/
.env
.eslintignore
.fbcindex
.forward
.gitattributes
.gitconfig
.gnupg/
.hplip/hplip.conf
.htaccess
.htdigest
.htpasswd
.ksh_history
.lesshst
.lftp/
.lhistory
.lighttpdpassword
.lldb-history
.local/share/mc/
.lynx_cookies
.my.cnf
.mysql_history
.nano_history
.node_repl_history
.nsconfig
.nsr
.oh-my-
.password-store
.pearrc
.pgpass
.php_history
.pinerc
.pki/
.proclog
.procmailrc
.profile
.psql_history
.python_history
.rediscli_history
.rhistory
.rhosts
.sh_history
.sqlite_history
.ssh/
.subversion/
.tconn/
.tcshrc
.tor/
.vidalia/
.vim/
.viminfo
.vimrc
.www_acl
.wwwacl
.xauthority
.zhistory
.zsh_history
.zshrc
# Version control
/.git/
/.gitignore
/.hg/
/.hgignore
/.svn/
# Wordpress
wp-config.php
wp-config.bak
wp-config.old
wp-config.temp
wp-config.tmp
wp-config.txt
# Symfony
/config/config.yml
/config/config_dev.yml
/config/config_prod.yml
/config/config_test.yml
/config/parameters.yml
/config/routing.yml
/config/security.yml
/config/services.yml
# Drupal
/sites/default/default.settings.php
/sites/default/settings.php
/sites/default/settings.local.php
# Prestashop configuration file
/config/settings.inc.php
# Magento
/app/etc/local.xml
# Sublime Text
/sftp-config.json
# ASP.NET
/Web.config
# Node
/package.json
/package-lock.json
/npm-shrinkwrap.json
/gruntfile.js
/npm-debug.log
/ormconfig.json
/tsconfig.json
/webpack.config.js
/yarn.lock
# Composer
/composer.json
/composer.lock
/packages.json
# dotenv
/.env
# OSX
/.DS_Store
# WS FTP
/.ws_ftp.ini
# New Per-Project Files
.idea
nbproject/
bower.json
.bowerrc
.eslintrc
.jshintrc
.gitlab-ci.yml
.travis.yml
database.yml
Dockerfile
# PHP_CodeSniffer configuration files
.php_cs.dist
.phpcs.xml
phpcs.xml
.phpcs.xml.dist
phpcs.xml.dist
# Windows desktop configuration file
Desktop.ini
# Windows Explorer cache of thumbnail images
Thumbs.db
# PHP configuration files
.user.ini
php.ini
# Oracle WebLogic Server configuration file
weblogic.xml
# Oracle SOAP Request Handler configuration file
soapConfig.xml
# Common names for local PHP error logs
php_error.log
php_errors.log
# Java directory for non-pubic application data
WEB-INF/
# Fortinet SSL VPN session file
sslvpn_websession
# /proc entries (keep in sync with lfi-os-files.data)
# grep -E "^proc/" lfi-os-files.data
proc/0
proc/1
proc/2
proc/3
proc/4
proc/5
proc/6
proc/7
proc/8
proc/9
proc/acpi
proc/asound
proc/bootconfig
proc/buddyinfo
proc/bus
proc/cgroups
proc/cmdline
proc/config.gz
proc/consoles
proc/cpuinfo
proc/crypto
proc/devices
proc/diskstats
proc/dma
proc/docker
proc/driver
proc/dynamic_debug
proc/execdomains
proc/fb
proc/filesystems
proc/fs
proc/interrupts
proc/iomem
proc/ioports
proc/ipmi
proc/irq
proc/kallsyms
proc/kcore
proc/key-users
proc/keys
proc/kmsg
proc/kpagecgroup
proc/kpagecount
proc/kpageflags
proc/latency_stats
proc/loadavg
proc/locks
proc/mdstat
proc/meminfo
proc/misc
proc/modules
proc/mounts
proc/mpt
proc/mtd
proc/mtrr
proc/net
proc/pagetypeinfo
proc/partitions
proc/pressure
proc/sched_debug
proc/schedstat
proc/scsi
proc/self
proc/slabinfo
proc/softirqs
proc/stat
proc/swaps
proc/sys
proc/sysrq-trigger
proc/sysvipc
proc/thread-self
proc/timer_list
proc/timer_stats
proc/tty
proc/uptime
proc/version
proc/version_signature
proc/vmallocinfo
proc/vmstat
proc/zoneinfo
# /sys entries (keep in sync with lfi-os-files.data)
# grep -E "^sys/" lfi-os-files.data
sys/block
sys/bus
sys/class
sys/dev
sys/devices
sys/firmware
sys/fs
sys/hypervisor
sys/kernel
sys/module
sys/power

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# Apache webserver
.htaccess
.htdigest
.htpasswd
# WordPress configuration file
wp-config.php
# Symfony configuration files
config.yml
config_dev.yml
config_prod.yml
config_test.yml
parameters.yml
routing.yml
security.yml
services.yml
# Drupal configuration files
default.settings.php
settings.php
settings.local.php
# Magento configuration files
local.xml
# dotenv configuration file
.env

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acunetix-product
(acunetix web vulnerability scanner
acunetix-scanning-agreement
acunetix-user-agreement
myvar=1234
x-ratproxy-loop
bytes=0-,5-0,5-1,5-2,5-3,5-4,5-5,5-6,5-7,5-8,5-9,5-10,5-11,5-12,5-13,5-14
x-scanner

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/.adSensepostnottherenonobook
/<invalid>hello.html
/actSensepostnottherenonotive
/acunetix-wvs-test-for-some-inexistent-file
/antidisestablishmentarianism
/appscan_fingerprint/mac_address
/arachni-
/cybercop
/nessus_is_probing_you_
/nessustest
/netsparker-
/rfiinc.txt
/thereisnowaythat-you-canbethere
/w3af/remotefileinclude.html
appscan_fingerprint
w00tw00t.at.ISC.SANS.DFind
w00tw00t.at.blackhats.romanian.anti-sec

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# Vulnerability scanners, bruteforce password crackers and exploitation tools
# password cracker
# http://sectools.org/tool/hydra/
(hydra)
# vuln scanner
# http://virtualblueness.net/nasl.html
.nasl
# sql injection
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/absinthe/
absinthe
# email harvesting
# dead? 2004
advanced email extractor
# vuln scanner
# http://www.arachni-scanner.com/
arachni/
autogetcontent
# nessus frontend
# http://www.crossley-nilsen.com/Linux/Bilbo_-_Nessus_WEB/bilbo_-_nessus_web.html
# dead? 2003
bilbo
# Backup File Artifacts Checker
# https://github.com/mazen160/bfac
BFAC
# password cracker
# http://sectools.org/tool/brutus/
brutus
brutus/aet
# sql injection
# https://www.notsosecure.com/bsqlbf-v2-blind-sql-injection-brute-forcer/
bsqlbf
# vuln scanner assistance
# example:
# Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like \
# Gecko) Chrome/55.0.2883.87 Safari/537.36 root@foo.burpcollaborator.net
# https://portswigger.net/burp/documentation/collaborator
burpcollaborator
# vuln scanner
# http://freecode.com/projects/cgichk dead? 2001
cgichk
# vuln scanner
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/cisco-torch/
cisco-torch
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/stasinopoulos/commix
commix
# MS FrontPage vuln scanner?
core-project/1.0
# vuln scanner?
crimscanner/
# vuln scanner
datacha0s
# Detectify website vulnerability scanner
# https://detectify.com/
Detectify
# hidden page scanner
# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_DirBuster_Project
dirbuster
# vuln scanner
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/dominohunter/
domino hunter
# vuln scanner - directory traversal fuzzer
# https://github.com/wireghoul/dotdotpwn
dotdotpwn
# User-Agent: mozilla/5.0 ecairn-grabber/1.0 (+http://ecairn.com/grabber)
ecairn-grabber
email extractor
# vuln scanner
fhscan core 1.
floodgate
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/ffuf/ffuf
Fuzz Faster U Fool
# "F-Secure Radar is a turnkey vulnerability scanning and management platform."
F-Secure Radar
get-minimal
# Scanner that looks for existing or hidden web objects
# https://github.com/OJ/gobuster
gobuster
# vuln scanner
gootkit auto-rooter scanner
grabber
# vuln scanner
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/grendel/
grendel-scan
# sql injection
havij
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/projectdiscovery/httpx
httpx - Open-source project
# vuln scanner - path disclosure finder
# http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Sep/375
inspath
internet ninja
# vuln scanner
jaascois
# "Mozilla/5.0 Jorgee", vuln scanner
Jorgee
# port scanner
# https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
masscan
# vuln scanner
# http://www.severus.org/sacha/metis/
metis
# vuln scanner
morfeus fucking scanner
# sql injection
# https://github.com/dtrip/mysqloit
mysqloit
# vuln scanner
# http://www.nstalker.com/
n-stealth
# vuln scanner
# http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus-vulnerability-scanner
nessus
# vuln scanner
# https://www.netsparker.com/web-vulnerability-scanner/
netsparker
# vuln scanner
# https://cirt.net/Nikto2
nikto
# vuln scanner
nmap nse
nmap scripting engine
nmap-nse
# vuln scanner
# http://www.nsauditor.com/
nsauditor
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei
Nuclei
# vuln scanner
# http://www.openvas.org/
openvas
# sql injection
# http://www.vealtel.com/software/nosec/pangolin/
pangolin
# web proxy & vuln scanner
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/paros/
paros
# phpmyadmin vuln scanner
# dead 2005?
pmafind
prog.customcrawler
# QQGameHall DoS/Virus/Malware/Adware
# https://twitter.com/bagder/status/1244982556958826496?s=20
QQGameHall
# vuln scanner
# https://www.qualys.com/suite/web-application-scanning/
qualys was
s.t.a.l.k.e.r.
security scan
# vuln scanner
# https://sourceforge.net/projects/springenwerk/
springenwerk
# sql injection
# http://www.sqlpowerinjector.com/
sql power injector
# sql injection
# http://sqlmap.org/
sqlmap
# sql injection
# http://sqlninja.sourceforge.net/
sqlninja
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/mazen160/struts-pwn
struts-pwn
# https://www.cyber.nj.gov/threat-profiles/trojan-variants/sysscan
sysscan
# LeakIX web scanner (User-Agent: TBI-WebScanner/0.0.1 (+https://leakix.net/))
# https://leakix.net/
TBI-WebScanner
# password cracker
# http://foofus.net/goons/jmk/medusa/medusa.html
teh forest lobster
this is an exploit
# vuln scanner?
toata dragostea
toata dragostea mea pentru diavola
# SQL bot
# http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=22142&signatureSubId=0
uil2pn
# badly scripted UAs (e.g. User-Agent: User-Agent: foo)
user-agent:
# vuln scannr
# https://subgraph.com/vega/
vega/
# vuln scanner
# dead?
voideye
# vuln scanner
# http://w3af.org/
w3af.sf.net
w3af.sourceforge.net
w3af.org
# site scanner (legacy)
# http://www.robotstxt.org/db/webbandit.html
webbandit
# vuln scanner
# http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/webinspect-dynamic-analysis-dast/
webinspect
# site scanner
# http://www.scrt.ch/en/attack/downloads/webshag
webshag
# vuln scanner
# dead?
webtrends security analyzer
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/hhucn/webvulnscan
webvulnscan
# vuln scanner
# https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz
Wfuzz
# web technology scanner
# https://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb
whatweb
# vuln scanner
whcc/
# exploit poc
wordpress hash grabber
# wordpress vuln scanner
# https://wpscan.org/
WPScan
# exploit
xmlrpc exploit
# ZGrab scanner (Mozilla/5.0 zgrab/0.x)
# https://zmap.io
zgrab
# vuln scanner
zmeu

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# Generic HTTP clients (popular libraries)
# http library
# https://docs.aiohttp.org/en/stable/
# User-Agent: Python/VERSION aiohttp/VERSION
aiohttp/
# http library
# http://search.cpan.org/~opera/HTTP-DAV/DAV.pm
dav.pm/v
# http library
# https://pkg.go.dev/net/http
# User-Agent: Go http package
# User-Agent: Go 1.1 package http
# User-Agent: Go-http-client/VERSION
Go http package
Go 1.1 package http
Go-http-client/
# http library
# http://search.cpan.org/dist/libwww-perl/lib/LWP.pm
libwww-perl
# generic
mozilla/4.0 (compatible)
mozilla/4.0 (compatible; msie 6.0; win32)
mozilla/5.0 sf/
mozilla/5.0 sf//
# http library
# https://pypi.python.org/pypi/httplib2
python-httplib2
# http library
# https://www.python-httpx.org/
# User-Agent: python-httpx/VERSION
python-httpx/
# http library
# http://docs.python-requests.org/en/master/
python-requests
# http library
# https://docs.python.org/2/library/urllib.html
Python-urllib
# http library
# https://github.com/typhoeus/typhoeus
typhoeus
# http library
# https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa382925%28v=vs.85%29.aspx
winhttp.winhttprequest
# http library
# https://kong.github.io/unirest-java/
# User-Agent: unirest-java/VERSION
unirest-java/
# http library (deprecated since 2022)
# https://index.scala-lang.org/scalaj/scalaj-http
# User-Agent: scalaj-http/VERSION
scalaj-http/
# http library
# https://http4s.org/
# User-Agent: http4s-ember
http4s-ember

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MySqlClient.
Server message
SQL error
Oracle error
JET Database Engine
Procedure or function
SQLite.Exception
[IBM][CLI Driver][DB2/6000]
the used select statements have different number of columns
org.postgresql.util.PSQLException
Access Database Engine
Incorrect syntax near
Syntax error in string in query expression
SQLiteException
' doesn't exist
CLI Driver
on MySQL result index
sybase
com.informix.jdbc
[MySQL][ODBC
Error
has occurred in the vicinity of:
Sintaxis incorrecta cerca de
MySQL server version for the right syntax to use
com.mysql.jdbc.exceptions
You have an error in your SQL syntax near
You have an error in your SQL syntax;
An illegal character has been found in the statement
pg_query() [:
supplied argument is not a valid MySQL
mssql_query()
mysql_fetch_array()
Exception
java.sql.SQLException
Column count doesn't match value count at row
Sybase message
SQL Server
PostgreSQL query failed:
Dynamic SQL Error
System.Data.SQLite.SQLiteException
SQLite/JDBCDriver
Unclosed quotation mark before the character string
System.Data.SqlClient.
Unclosed quotation mark after the character string
System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException
[DM_QUERY_E_SYNTAX]
[SqlException
Unexpected end of command in statement
valid PostgreSQL result
pg_exec() [:
SQL Server
[SQLITE_ERROR]
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers
PostgreSQL
org.hsqldb.jdbc
ADODB.Field (0x800A0BCD)
SQL syntax
Exception
System.Data.SqlClient.SqlException
Data type mismatch in criteria expression.
Driver
DB2 SQL error
Sybase message:
ORA-
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver]
'80040e14'
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server
in query expression
Npgsql.
valid MySQL result
supplied argument is not a valid PostgreSQL result
db2_
Ingres SQLSTATE
Column count doesn't match
Warning
[Microsoft][ODBC Microsoft Access Driver]
[Macromedia][SQLServer JDBC Driver]
<b>Warning</b>: ibase_
Roadhouse.Cms.
DB2 SQL error:
SQLSTATE[

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# Sources:
# - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/jhaddix/78cece26c91c6263653f31ba453e273b/raw/a4869d58a5ce337d1465c2d1b29777b9eecd371f/cloud_metadata.txt
# - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf
# - https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Server%20Side%20Request%20Forgery
# - https://github.com/assetnote/blind-ssrf-chains
## AWS
# from http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ec2-instance-metadata.html#instancedata-data-categories
#
# To fully protect, use IMDSv2 (see https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/defense-in-depth-open-firewalls-reverse-proxies-ssrf-vulnerabilities-ec2-instance-metadata-service/)
http://instance-data/latest/
http://169.254.169.254/latest/
# Common evasion techniques:
http://2852039166/latest/
http://025177524776/latest/
http://0251.0376.0251.0376/latest/
http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/latest/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/latest/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/
http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/
http://nicob.net/redir-http-169.254.169.254:80-
# http://127.0.0.1
http://2130706433/
# http://192.168.0.1
http://3232235521/
# http://192.168.1.1
http://3232235777/
# http://169.254.169.254
http://2852039166/
# IPv6 base
http://[::]:
# AWS ECS
http://169.254.170.2/v2
## Google Cloud
# https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/metadata
# - Requires the header "Metadata-Flavor: Google" or "X-Google-Metadata-Request: True"
http://169.254.169.254/computeMetadata/v1/
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/
http://metadata/computeMetadata/v1/
# Common evasion techniques:
http://2852039166/computeMetadata/v1/
http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/computeMetadata/v1/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/computeMetadata/v1/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254]/computeMetadata/v1/
http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/computeMetadata/v1/
# Google allows recursive pulls
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/disks/?recursive=true
## Google
# Beta does NOT require a header atm
http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1beta1/
## Digital Ocean
# https://developers.digitalocean.com/documentation/metadata/
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
# This other prefix will be used from Azure: http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
## Packetcloud
https://metadata.packet.net/userdata
## Azure
#
# To be effective, these also have to:
#
# - contain the header Metadata: true
# - not contain an X-Forwarded-For header
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2017-04-02
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance/network/interface/0/ipv4/ipAddress/0/publicIpAddress?api-version=2017-04-02&format=text
# Common evasion techniques:
http://2852039166/metadata/v1/
http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/metadata/v1/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/metadata/v1/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:169.254.169.254]/metadata/v1/
http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/metadata/v1/
## OpenStack/RackSpace
http://169.254.169.254/openstack
## HP Helion
# (header required? unknown)
http://169.254.169.254/2009-04-04/meta-data/
## Oracle Cloud
http://192.0.0.192/latest/
## Alibaba
http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/
# Rancher metadata
http://rancher-metadata/
# Local Docker
http://127.0.0.1:2375
http://2130706433:2375/
http://[::]:2375/
http://[0000::1]:2375/
http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:127.0.0.1]:2375/
http://2130706433:2375/
http://017700000001:2375/
http://0x7f000001:2375/
http://0xc0a80014:2375/
# Kubernetes etcd
http://127.0.0.1:2379
# Enclosed alphanumerics
http://169。254。169。254
http://169｡254｡169｡254
http://⑯⑨。②⑤④。⑯⑨｡②⑤④
http://⓪ⓧⓐ⑨｡⓪ⓧⓕⓔ｡⓪ⓧⓐ⑨｡⓪ⓧⓕⓔ
http://⓪ⓧⓐ⑨ⓕⓔⓐ⑨ⓕⓔ
http://②⑧⑤②⓪③⑨①⑥⑥
http://④②⑤｡⑤①⓪｡④②⑤｡⑤①⓪
http://⓪②⑤①。⓪③⑦⑥。⓪②⑤①。⓪③⑦⑥
http://⓪⓪②⑤①｡⓪⓪⓪③⑦⑥｡⓪⓪⓪⓪②⑤①｡⓪⓪⓪⓪⓪③⑦⑥
http://[::①⑥⑨｡②⑤④｡⑯⑨｡②⑤④]
http://[::ⓕⓕⓕⓕ:①⑥⑨。②⑤④。⑯⑨。②⑤④]
http://⓪ⓧⓐ⑨。⓪③⑦⑥。④③⑤①⑧
http://⓪ⓧⓐ⑨｡⑯⑥⑧⑨⑥⑥②
http://⓪⓪②⑤①。⑯⑥⑧⑨⑥⑥②
http://⓪⓪②⑤①｡⓪ⓧⓕⓔ｡④③⑤①⑧
# Java only blind ssrf
jar:http://127.0.0.1!/
jar:https://127.0.0.1!/
jar:ftp://127.0.0.1!/
# Other PL1 protocols
gopher://127.0.0.1
gopher://localhost
# AWS Lambda
http://localhost:9001/2018-06-01/runtime/

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# This list has generic unix shell variables, shells and commands that affect Unix systems.
# To generate the list, we get the data from all places first. Strip or add the path to commands so it begins with `bin`.
# Sort the file content ascending, and remove duplicate lines.
#
# Data comes from multiple places, listed below.
# - Binaries:
# - GTFOBins. Update list using `curl -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" https://api.github.com/repos/GTFOBins/GTFOBins.github.io/contents/_gtfobins | jq '.[].name' | grep '.md' | tr -d '"' | cut -f1 -d.`
# - Shell lists:
# - https://tldp.org/LDP/Linux-Filesystem-Hierarchy/html/etc.html
# - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_shell
# - https://hyperpolyglot.org/unix-shells
# - Generic shell variables (Ad-Hoc for now, needs references)
# - Generic /etc and /dev files (Ad-Hoc, needs references)
# - Compression and decompression utilities present on Arch Linux (as of 2022-08-02) and Debian 11
${CDPATH}
${DIRSTACK}
${HOME}
${HOSTNAME}
${IFS}
${OLDPWD}
${OSTYPE}
${PATH}
${PWD}
$CDPATH
$DIRSTACK
$HOME
$HOSTNAME
$IFS
$OLDPWD
$OSTYPE
$PATH
$PWD
bin/7z
bin/7za
bin/7zr
bin/7zx
bin/ab
bin/adduser
bin/agetty
bin/alias
bin/alpine
bin/ansible-playbook
bin/apt
bin/apt-get
bin/ar
bin/arch
bin/aria2c
bin/arj
bin/arp
bin/as
bin/ascii-xfr
bin/ascii85
bin/ash
bin/aspell
bin/at
bin/atobm
bin/awk
bin/aws
bin/base32
bin/base64
bin/basenc
bin/bash
bin/batch
bin/bpftrace
bin/breaksw
bin/bridge
bin/bsdcat
bin/bsdiff
bin/bsdtar
bin/builtin
bin/bundler
bin/bunzip2
bin/busctl
bin/busybox
bin/byebug
bin/bzcat
bin/bzcmp
bin/bzdiff
bin/bzegrep
bin/bzexe
bin/bzfgrep
bin/bzgrep
bin/bzip2
bin/bzip2recover
bin/bzless
bin/bzmore
bin/bzz
bin/c89
bin/c99
bin/cancel
bin/capsh
bin/cat
bin/cc
bin/certbot
bin/chattr
bin/chdir
bin/check_by_ssh
bin/check_cups
bin/check_log
bin/check_memory
bin/check_raid
bin/check_ssl_cert
bin/check_statusfile
bin/chflags
bin/chmod
bin/choom
bin/chown
bin/chroot
bin/clang
bin/clang++
bin/cmp
bin/cobc
bin/column
bin/comm
bin/command
bin/composer
bin/compress
bin/coproc
bin/core_perl/zipdetails
bin/cowsay
bin/cowthink
bin/cp
bin/cpan
bin/cpio
bin/cpulimit
bin/crash
bin/crontab
bin/csh
bin/csplit
bin/csvtool
bin/cupsfilter
bin/curl
bin/cut
bin/dash
bin/date
bin/dd
bin/dhclient
bin/dialog
bin/diff
bin/dig
bin/dmesg
bin/dmidecode
bin/dmsetup
bin/dnf
bin/doas
bin/docker
bin/done
bin/dosbox
bin/dpkg
bin/du
bin/dvips
bin/easy_install
bin/eb
bin/echo
bin/ed
bin/efax
bin/egrep
bin/emacs
bin/endif
bin/endsw
bin/env
bin/env-update
bin/eqn
bin/es
bin/esac
bin/esh
bin/eval
bin/ex
bin/exec
bin/exiftool
bin/expand
bin/expect
bin/export
bin/expr
bin/facter
bin/fc
bin/fetch
bin/fgrep
bin/fi
bin/file
bin/filetest
bin/find
bin/finger
bin/fish
bin/flock
bin/fmt
bin/fold
bin/foreach
bin/fping
bin/ftp
bin/ftpstats
bin/ftpwho
bin/function
bin/gawk
bin/gcc
bin/gcore
bin/gdb
bin/gem
bin/genie
bin/genisoimage
bin/GET
bin/getfacl
bin/ghc
bin/ghci
bin/gimp
bin/ginsh
bin/git
bin/go
bin/grc
bin/grep
bin/gtester
bin/gunzip
bin/gzcat
bin/gzexe
bin/gzip
bin/hd
bin/head
bin/hexdump
bin/highlight
bin/history
bin/hostid
bin/hostname
bin/hping3
bin/htdigest
bin/htpasswd
bin/hup
bin/iconv
bin/id
bin/ifconfig
bin/iftop
bin/install
bin/ionice
bin/ip
bin/ip6tables
bin/ipconfig
bin/iptables
bin/irb
bin/ispell
bin/java
bin/jexec
bin/jjs
bin/jobs
bin/join
bin/journalctl
bin/jq
bin/jrunscript
bin/kill
bin/killall
bin/knife
bin/ksh
bin/ksshell
bin/last
bin/lastcomm
bin/lastlog
bin/lastlogin
bin/latex
bin/ld
bin/ldconfig
bin/ldd
bin/less
bin/lessecho
bin/lessfile
bin/lesspipe
bin/lftp
bin/lftpget
bin/links
bin/ln
bin/local
bin/locate
bin/loginctl
bin/logname
bin/logsave
bin/look
bin/lp
bin/ls
bin/ls-F
bin/lsb_release
bin/lscpu
bin/lshw
bin/lsmod
bin/lsof
bin/lspci
bin/lsusb
bin/ltrace
bin/lua
bin/lualatex
bin/luatex
bin/lwp-download
bin/lwp-dump
bin/lwp-mirror
bin/lwp-request
bin/lynx
bin/lz
bin/lz4
bin/lz4c
bin/lz4cat
bin/lzcat
bin/lzcmp
bin/lzdiff
bin/lzegrep
bin/lzfgrep
bin/lzgrep
bin/lzless
bin/lzma
bin/lzmadec
bin/lzmainfo
bin/lzmore
bin/mail
bin/mailq
bin/mailx
bin/make
bin/man
bin/mawk
bin/mkdir
bin/mkfifo
bin/mknod
bin/mlocate
bin/more
bin/mosquitto
bin/mount
bin/msgattrib
bin/msgcat
bin/msgconv
bin/msgfilter
bin/msgmerge
bin/msguniq
bin/mtr
bin/mutt
bin/mv
bin/mysql
bin/mysqladmin
bin/mysqldump
bin/mysqldumpslow
bin/mysqlhotcopy
bin/mysqlshow
bin/nano
bin/nasm
bin/nawk
bin/nc
bin/nc.openbsd
bin/nc.traditional
bin/ncat
bin/neofetch
bin/net
bin/netcat
bin/netkit-ftp
bin/netstat
bin/nice
bin/nl
bin/nm
bin/nmap
bin/node
bin/nohup
bin/nping
bin/npm
bin/nroff
bin/nsenter
bin/nslookup
bin/nstat
bin/octave
bin/od
bin/onintr
bin/openssl
bin/openvpn
bin/openvt
bin/opkg
bin/passwd
bin/paste
bin/patch
bin/pax
bin/pdb
bin/pdflatex
bin/pdftex
bin/pdksh
bin/perf
bin/perl
bin/perl5
bin/perlsh
bin/perms
bin/pf
bin/pftp
bin/pg
bin/pgrep
bin/php
bin/php-cgi
bin/php5
bin/php7
bin/pic
bin/pico
bin/pidstat
bin/pigz
bin/ping
bin/pip
bin/pkexec
bin/pkg
bin/pkg_info
bin/pkginfo
bin/pkill
bin/popd
bin/pr
bin/printenv
bin/printf
bin/pry
bin/ps
bin/psed
bin/psftp
bin/psql
bin/ptar
bin/ptardiff
bin/ptargrep
bin/ptx
bin/puppet
bin/pushd
bin/pxz
bin/python
bin/python2
bin/python3
bin/rake
bin/raku
bin/rar
bin/rbash
bin/rc
bin/rcp
bin/readelf
bin/realpath
bin/red
bin/redcarpet
bin/rename
bin/repeat
bin/replace
bin/restic
bin/rev
bin/rlogin
bin/rlwrap
bin/rm
bin/rmdir
bin/rmuser
bin/rnano
bin/route
bin/rpm
bin/rpmdb
bin/rpmquery
bin/rpmverify
bin/rsync
bin/ruby
bin/run-mailcap
bin/run-parts
bin/rview
bin/rvim
bin/sash
bin/sched
bin/scp
bin/screen
bin/script
bin/sdiff
bin/sed
bin/sendmail
bin/service
bin/set
bin/setarch
bin/setenv
bin/setfacl
bin/setsid
bin/sftp
bin/sg
bin/sh
bin/sh.distrib
bin/shuf
bin/shutdown
bin/sleep
bin/slsh
bin/smbclient
bin/snap
bin/socat
bin/soelim
bin/sort
bin/source
bin/split
bin/sqlite3
bin/ss
bin/ssh
bin/ssh-keygen
bin/ssh-keyscan
bin/sshpass
bin/start-stop-daemon
bin/stdbuf
bin/strace
bin/strings
bin/su
bin/sudo
bin/svn
bin/sysctl
bin/systemctl
bin/systemd-resolve
bin/tac
bin/tail
bin/tailf
bin/tar
bin/task
bin/taskset
bin/tbl
bin/tclsh
bin/tcpdump
bin/tcping
bin/tcptraceroute
bin/tcsh
bin/tee
bin/telnet
bin/tex
bin/tftp
bin/tic
bin/time
bin/timedatectl
bin/timeout
bin/tmux
bin/top
bin/touch
bin/traceroute
bin/traceroute6
bin/troff
bin/tshark
bin/ul
bin/ulimit
bin/uname
bin/uncompress
bin/unexpand
bin/uniq
bin/unlink
bin/unlz4
bin/unlzma
bin/unpigz
bin/unrar
bin/unset
bin/unshare
bin/unxz
bin/unzip
bin/unzstd
bin/update-alternatives
bin/useradd
bin/userdel
bin/usermod
bin/uudecode
bin/uuencode
bin/valgrind
bin/vi
bin/view
bin/vigr
bin/vim
bin/vimdiff
bin/vipw
bin/virsh
bin/volatility
bin/w3m
bin/wall
bin/watch
bin/wc
bin/wget
bin/whiptail
bin/who
bin/whoami
bin/whois
bin/wireshark
bin/wish
bin/xargs
bin/xelatex
bin/xetex
bin/xmodmap
bin/xmore
bin/xpad
bin/xterm
bin/xxd
bin/xz
bin/xzcat
bin/xzcmp
bin/xzdec
bin/xzdiff
bin/xzegrep
bin/xzfgrep
bin/xzgrep
bin/xzless
bin/xzmore
bin/yarn
bin/yelp
bin/yes
bin/yum
bin/zathura
bin/zcat
bin/zcmp
bin/zdiff
bin/zegrep
bin/zfgrep
bin/zgrep
bin/zip
bin/zipcloak
bin/zipcmp
bin/zipdetails
bin/zipgrep
bin/zipinfo
bin/zipmerge
bin/zipnote
bin/zipsplit
bin/ziptool
bin/zless
bin/zmore
bin/zrun
bin/zsh
bin/zsoelim
bin/zstd
bin/zstdcat
bin/zstdgrep
bin/zstdless
bin/zstdmt
bin/zypper
dev/fd
dev/null
dev/stderr
dev/stdin
dev/stdout
dev/tcp
dev/udp
dev/zero
etc/group
etc/master.passwd
etc/passwd
etc/pwd.db
etc/shadow
etc/shells
etc/spwd.db
proc/self
sbin/capsh
sbin/logsave
sbin/service
sbin/start-stop-daemon

148
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# This list contains patterns of various web shells, backdoors and similar
# software written in PHP language. There is no way how to automatically update
# this list, so it must be done by hand. Here is a recommended way how to add
# new malicious software:
# 1.) As patterns are matched against RESPONSE_BODY, you need to run a malicious
# software (ideally in an isolated environment) and catch the output.
# 2.) In the output, search for static pattern unique enough to match only
# the software in question and to not do any FPs. The best pick is usually
# a part of HTML code with software name.
# 3.) Include software name and URL (if available) in the comment above
# the pattern.
#
# Data comes from multiple places of which some doesn't work anymore. Few are
# listed below:
# - https://github.com/JohnTroony/php-webshells/tree/master/Collection
# - https://www.localroot.net/shell/
# - Google search (keywords like webshells, php backdoor and similar)
# 1n73ction web shell
<title>=[ 1n73ct10n privat shell ]=</title>
# Ajax/PHP Command Shell web shell
>Ajax/PHP Command Shell<
# AK-74 Security Team Web-shell
.:: :[ AK-74 Security Team Web-shell ]: ::.
# ALFA-SHELL web shell (https://github.com/solevisible)
~ ALFA TEaM Shell -
# Andela Yuwono Priv8 Shell web shell
<title>--==[[ Andela Yuwono Priv8 Shell ]]==--</title>
# Ani-Shell web shell (http://ani-shell.sourceforge.net/)
<title>Ani-Shell | India</title>
# AnonymousFox PHP web shell
<input type='submit' value='file' /></form>AnonymousFox
# Antichat Shell web shell
- Antichat Shell</title>
# AYT web shell
Ayyildiz Tim | AYT
# b374k web shell (https://github.com/b374k/b374k)
<link rel='SHORTCUT ICON' href=''>
# BloodSecurity Hackers Shell web shell
<title>BloodSecurity Hackers Shell</title>
# Bypass Attack Shell web shell
<font color='red' size='6px' face='Fredericka the Great'> Bypass Attack Shell </font>
# c0derz shell web shell
title='.::[c0derz shell]::.'>
# C99Shell + N3tShell web shell
<font face=Webdings size=6><b>!</b></font>
# Con7ext Shell V.2 web shell
<title>Con7ext Shell V.2</title>
# Crystal shell web shell
<font face="Wingdings 3" size="5">y</font><b>Crystal shell v.
# CWShell web shell
~ CWShell ~</font></a>
# dC3 Security Crew web shell
&dir&pic=o.b height= width=>
# Defacing Tool Pro web shell
<b>[ Defacing Tool Pro v
# Dive Shell web shell
<title>Dive Shell - Emperor Hacking Team</title>
# easy simple php web shell
<script>document.getElementById("cmd").focus();</script>
# ex0 shell web shell
color=DeepSkyBlue size=6> ## ex0 shell
# FaTaLSheLL web shell
<p align="center" class="style4">FaTaLSheLL v
# G-Security Webshell
<title>G-Security Webshell</title>
# h4ntu shell web shell
<title>h4ntu shell [powered by tsoi]</title>
# IDBTEAM SHELLS file manager
<H1><center>-=[+] IDBTEAM SHELLS
# IndoXploit web shell
<title>IndoXploit</title>
# KA_uShell web shell
<KAdot Universal Shell> |
# Lifka Shell web shell
>LIFKA SHELL</span></big></big></big></a>
# Loader'z web shell
<title>Loader'z WEB shell</title>
# Locus7Shell web shell
b>--[ x2300 Locus7Shell v.
# Lolipop web shell
<title>Lolipop.php - Edited By KingDefacer -
# MARIJUANA web shell (https://0x5a455553.github.io/MARIJUANA/)
<link rel="icon" href="//0x5a455553.github.io/MARIJUANA/icon.png" />
# Matamu Mat web shell
<title> Matamu Mat </title>
# MyShell web shell
<b>MyShell</b> &copy;2001 Digitart Producciones</a>
# NCC Shell web shell
<h1>.:NCC:. Shell v
# PHPShell by Macker web shell
<font size=3>PHPShell by Macker - Version
# PHPShell by MAX666 web shell
PHPShell by MAX666, Private Exploit, For Server Hacking
# qsd web shell
<form action="" METHOD="GET" >Execute Shell Command (safe mode is off): <input type="text" name="c"><input type="submit" value="Go"></form>
# Rootshell web shell
<p align="center"><font face="Verdana" size="2">Rootshell v
# rusuh web shell
<font color=lime>./rusuh</font>
# Safe0ver web shell
<font color="navy"><strong>##Safe0ver##</strong></font>
# Shany's web shell
<center><h1>Watch Your system Shany was here.</h1></center><center><h1>Linux Shells</h1></center><hr><hr>
# Simple PHP backdoor web shell
<!-- Simple PHP backdoor by DK
# SimShell web shell
<title>SimShell - Simorgh Security MGZ</title>
# Sincap web shell
<title>:: AventGrup ::.. - Sincap
# Small Shell file manager
<title>Small Shell - Edited By KingDefacer</title>
# Small Web Shell
<title>small web shell by zaco
# SoldiersofAllah Private Shell web shell
<title>SoldiersofAllah Private Shell |
# Sosyete web shell
<title>Sosyete Safe Mode Bypass Shell -
# STNC WebShell
&nbsp;&nbsp;STNC&nbsp;WebShell&nbsp;
# StresBypass shell web shell
<font face="Wingdings 3" size="5">y</font><b>StresBypass<span lang="en-us">v
# SyRiAn Sh3ll web shell
<title>SyRiAn Sh3ll ~
# Turk Shell web shell
<head><title>Wardom | Ne Mutlu T
# Unknown web shell
<hr>to browse go to http://?d=[directory here]
# Ustadcage48 Filemanager
<font color="red">USTADCAGE_48</font> <font color="dodgerblue">FILE MANAGER</font>
# WebRoot Hack Tools shell
<title>WebRoot Hack Tools</title>
# web shell by BLaSTER
<div align="center"><span class="style6">By BLaSTER</span><br />
# WinX Shell web shell
<title>-:[GreenwooD]:- WinX Shell</title>
# wwwolf web shell
<sup><a href="#" onclick="cmd.value=''; cmd.focus(); return false;">Clear cmd</a></sup>
# Yourman.sh Mini Shell web shell
<title>Yourman.sh Mini Shell</title>
# Zerion Mini Shell web shell
</div><center><br />Zerion Mini Shell <font color=
# Zero Byte Mini Shell V2 web shell
<title>0byt3m1n1-V2</title>
# Zerostore web shell
<title>ZEROSHELL | ZEROSTORE</title>
# Unknown web shell
<input type=submit name=find value='find writeable'>

425
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# Sources:
# Microsoft PowerShell Docs: https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/PowerShell-Docs
# - curl -H "Accept: application/vnd.github.v3+json" https://api.github.com/repos/MicrosoftDocs/PowerShell-Docs/git/trees/main\?recursive\=1 | jq -r '.tree[] .path | capture("reference/\\d.\\d/(.*)/(?<fn>[A-Z]\\w+-\\w+).md") | .fn' | sort | uniq
powershell
Add-Computer
Add-Content
Add-History
Add-JobTrigger
Add-LocalGroupMember
Add-Member
Add-PSSnapin
Add-Type
Checkpoint-Computer
Clear-Content
Clear-EventLog
Clear-History
Clear-Host
Clear-Item
Clear-ItemProperty
Clear-RecycleBin
Clear-Variable
Compare-Object
Complete-Transaction
Compress-Archive
Connect-PSSession
Connect-WSMan
Convert-Path
Convert-String
ConvertFrom-Csv
ConvertFrom-Json
ConvertFrom-Markdown
ConvertFrom-SddlString
ConvertFrom-SecureString
ConvertFrom-String
ConvertFrom-StringData
ConvertTo-Csv
ConvertTo-Html
ConvertTo-Json
ConvertTo-SecureString
ConvertTo-Xml
Copy-Item
Copy-ItemProperty
Debug-Job
Debug-Process
Debug-Runspace
Disable-ComputerRestore
Disable-ExperimentalFeature
Disable-JobTrigger
Disable-LocalUser
Disable-PSBreakpoint
Disable-PSRemoting
Disable-PSSessionConfiguration
Disable-PSTrace
Disable-PSWSManCombinedTrace
Disable-RunspaceDebug
Disable-ScheduledJob
Disable-WSManCredSSP
Disable-WSManTrace
Disconnect-PSSession
Disconnect-WSMan
Enable-ComputerRestore
Enable-ExperimentalFeature
Enable-JobTrigger
Enable-LocalUser
Enable-PSBreakpoint
Enable-PSRemoting
Enable-PSSessionConfiguration
Enable-PSTrace
Enable-PSWSManCombinedTrace
Enable-RunspaceDebug
Enable-ScheduledJob
Enable-WSManCredSSP
Enable-WSManTrace
Enter-PSHostProcess
Enter-PSSession
Exit-PSHostProcess
Exit-PSSession
Expand-Archive
Export-Alias
Export-BinaryMiLog
Export-Clixml
Export-Console
Export-Counter
Export-Csv
Export-FormatData
Export-ModuleMember
Export-ODataEndpointProxy
Export-PSSession
Find-Command
Find-DscResource
Find-Module
Find-Package
Find-PackageProvider
Find-RoleCapability
Find-Script
ForEach-Object
Format-Custom
Format-Hex
Format-List
Format-Table
Format-Wide
Get-Acl
Get-Alias
Get-AuthenticodeSignature
Get-ChildItem
Get-CimAssociatedInstance
Get-CimClass
Get-CimInstance
Get-CimSession
Get-Clipboard
Get-CmsMessage
Get-Command
Get-ComputerInfo
Get-ComputerRestorePoint
Get-Content
Get-ControlPanelItem
Get-Counter
Get-Credential
Get-Culture
Get-Date
Get-Error
Get-Event
Get-EventLog
Get-EventSubscriber
Get-ExecutionPolicy
Get-ExperimentalFeature
Get-FileHash
Get-FormatData
Get-Help
Get-History
Get-Host
Get-HotFix
Get-InstalledModule
Get-InstalledScript
Get-IseSnippet
Get-Item
Get-ItemProperty
Get-ItemPropertyValue
Get-Job
Get-JobTrigger
Get-LocalGroup
Get-LocalGroupMember
Get-LocalUser
Get-Location
Get-LogProperties
Get-MarkdownOption
Get-Member
Get-Module
Get-OperationValidation
Get-PSBreakpoint
Get-PSCallStack
Get-PSDrive
Get-PSHostProcessInfo
Get-PSProvider
Get-PSReadLineKeyHandler
Get-PSReadLineOption
Get-PSRepository
Get-PSSession
Get-PSSessionCapability
Get-PSSessionConfiguration
Get-PSSnapin
Get-PSSubsystem
Get-Package
Get-PackageProvider
Get-PackageSource
Get-PfxCertificate
Get-Process
Get-Random
Get-Runspace
Get-RunspaceDebug
Get-ScheduledJob
Get-ScheduledJobOption
Get-Service
Get-TimeZone
Get-TraceSource
Get-Transaction
Get-TypeData
Get-UICulture
Get-Unique
Get-Uptime
Get-Variable
Get-Verb
Get-WSManCredSSP
Get-WSManInstance
Get-WinEvent
Get-WmiObject
Group-Object
Import-Alias
Import-BinaryMiLog
Import-Clixml
Import-Counter
Import-Csv
Import-IseSnippet
Import-LocalizedData
Import-Module
Import-PSSession
Import-PackageProvider
Import-PowerShellDataFile
Install-Module
Install-Package
Install-PackageProvider
Install-Script
Invoke-AsWorkflow
Invoke-CimMethod
Invoke-Command
Invoke-Expression
Invoke-History
Invoke-Item
Invoke-OperationValidation
Invoke-RestMethod
Invoke-WSManAction
Invoke-WebRequest
Invoke-WmiMethod
Join-Path
Join-String
Limit-EventLog
Measure-Command
Measure-Object
Move-Item
Move-ItemProperty
New-Alias
New-CimInstance
New-CimSession
New-CimSessionOption
New-Event
New-EventLog
New-FileCatalog
New-Guid
New-IseSnippet
New-Item
New-ItemProperty
New-JobTrigger
New-LocalGroup
New-LocalUser
New-Module
New-ModuleManifest
New-Object
New-PSDrive
New-PSRoleCapabilityFile
New-PSSession
New-PSSessionConfigurationFile
New-PSSessionOption
New-PSTransportOption
New-PSWorkflowExecutionOption
New-PSWorkflowSession
New-ScheduledJobOption
New-ScriptFileInfo
New-Service
New-TemporaryFile
New-TimeSpan
New-Variable
New-WSManInstance
New-WSManSessionOption
New-WebServiceProxy
New-WinEvent
Out-Default
Out-File
Out-GridView
Out-Host
Out-Null
Out-Printer
Out-String
Pop-Location
Protect-CmsMessage
Publish-Module
Publish-Script
Push-Location
Read-Host
Receive-Job
Receive-PSSession
Register-ArgumentCompleter
Register-CimIndicationEvent
Register-EngineEvent
Register-ObjectEvent
Register-PSRepository
Register-PSSessionConfiguration
Register-PackageSource
Register-ScheduledJob
Register-WmiEvent
Remove-Alias
Remove-CimInstance
Remove-CimSession
Remove-Computer
Remove-Event
Remove-EventLog
Remove-Item
Remove-ItemProperty
Remove-Job
Remove-JobTrigger
Remove-LocalGroup
Remove-LocalGroupMember
Remove-LocalUser
Remove-Module
Remove-PSBreakpoint
Remove-PSDrive
Remove-PSReadLineKeyHandler
Remove-PSSession
Remove-PSSnapin
Remove-Service
Remove-TypeData
Remove-Variable
Remove-WSManInstance
Remove-WmiObject
Rename-Computer
Rename-Item
Rename-ItemProperty
Rename-LocalGroup
Rename-LocalUser
Reset-ComputerMachinePassword
Resolve-Path
Restart-Computer
Restart-Service
Restore-Computer
Resume-Job
Resume-Service
Save-Help
Save-Module
Save-Package
Save-Script
Select-Object
Select-String
Select-Xml
Send-MailMessage
Set-Acl
Set-Alias
Set-AuthenticodeSignature
Set-CimInstance
Set-Clipboard
Set-Content
Set-Date
Set-ExecutionPolicy
Set-Item
Set-ItemProperty
Set-JobTrigger
Set-LocalGroup
Set-LocalUser
Set-Location
Set-LogProperties
Set-MarkdownOption
Set-PSBreakpoint
Set-PSDebug
Set-PSReadLineKeyHandler
Set-PSReadLineOption
Set-PSRepository
Set-PSSessionConfiguration
Set-PackageSource
Set-ScheduledJob
Set-ScheduledJobOption
Set-Service
Set-StrictMode
Set-TimeZone
Set-TraceSource
Set-Variable
Set-WSManInstance
Set-WSManQuickConfig
Set-WmiInstance
Show-Command
Show-ControlPanelItem
Show-EventLog
Show-Markdown
Sort-Object
Split-Path
Start-Job
Start-Process
Start-Service
Start-Sleep
Start-ThreadJob
Start-Trace
Start-Transaction
Start-Transcript
Stop-Computer
Stop-Job
Stop-Process
Stop-Service
Stop-Trace
Stop-Transcript
Suspend-Job
Suspend-Service
Switch-Process
Tee-Object
Test-ComputerSecureChannel
Test-Connection
Test-FileCatalog
Test-Json
Test-ModuleManifest
Test-PSSessionConfigurationFile
Test-Path
Test-ScriptFileInfo
Test-WSMan
Trace-Command
Unblock-File
Undo-Transaction
Uninstall-Module
Uninstall-Package
Uninstall-Script
Unprotect-CmsMessage
Unregister-Event
Unregister-PSRepository
Unregister-PSSessionConfiguration
Unregister-PackageSource
Unregister-ScheduledJob
Update-FormatData
Update-Help
Update-List
Update-Module
Update-ModuleManifest
Update-Script
Update-ScriptFileInfo
Update-TypeData
Use-Transaction
Wait-Debugger
Wait-Event
Wait-Job
Wait-Process
Where-Object
Write-Debug
Write-Error
Write-EventLog
Write-Host
Write-Information
Write-Output
Write-Progress
Write-Verbose
Write-Warning

36
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/rules/ftw-config.conf Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Overrides default SecResponseBodyMimeType in order to add application/json (httpbin response Content-Type)
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml application/json
# crs-setup.conf.example defaults SecAction only for phase 1 and 2.
# Adding logs for phase 3, 4 and 5 otherwise go-ftw is not able to detected the triggered rules
SecDefaultAction "phase:3,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDefaultAction "phase:4,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDefaultAction "phase:5,log,auditlog,pass"
SecDebugLogLevel 3
# Rule 900005 from https://github.com/coreruleset/coreruleset/blob/v4.0/dev/tests/regression/README.md#requirements
# By default rule 900340 is commented, therefore max_file_size is added to 900005 in order to test 920400-* rules
SecAction "id:900005,\
phase:1,\
nolog,\
pass,\
ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly,\
ctl:ruleRemoveById=910000,\
setvar:tx.blocking_paranoia_level=4,\
setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1,\
setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100,\
setvar:tx.arg_length=400,\
setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000,\
setvar:tx.max_num_args=255,\
setvar:tx.max_file_size=64100,\
setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=65535"
# Write the value from the X-CRS-Test header as a marker to the log
# Requests with X-CRS-Test header will not be matched by any rule. See https://github.com/coreruleset/go-ftw/pull/133
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:X-CRS-Test "@rx ^.*$" \
"id:999999,\
phase:1,\
pass,\
t:none,\
log,\
msg:'X-CRS-Test %{MATCHED_VAR}',\
ctl:ruleRemoveById=1-999999"

119
plugins/wasm-go/extensions/waf/wasmplugin/utils.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
package wasmplugin
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/alibaba/higress/plugins/wasm-go/pkg/wrapper"
ctypes "github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/types"
"github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk/proxywasm"
"github.com/tetratelabs/proxy-wasm-go-sdk/proxywasm/types"
"math"
"net"
"strconv"
)
const noGRPCStream int32 = -1
const replaceResponseBody int = 10
// retrieveAddressInfo retrieves address properties from the proxy
// Expected targets are "source" or "destination"
// Envoy ref: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/intro/arch_overview/advanced/attributes#connection-attributes
func retrieveAddressInfo(logger wrapper.Log, target string) (string, int) {
var targetIP, targetPortStr string
var targetPort int
targetAddressRaw, err := proxywasm.GetProperty([]string{target, "address"})
if err != nil {
logger.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get %s address", target))
} else {
targetIP, targetPortStr, err = net.SplitHostPort(string(targetAddressRaw))
if err != nil {
logger.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse %s address", target))
}
}
targetPortRaw, err := proxywasm.GetProperty([]string{target, "port"})
if err == nil {
targetPort, err = parsePort(targetPortRaw)
if err != nil {
logger.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to parse %s port", target))
}
} else if targetPortStr != "" {
// If GetProperty fails we rely on the port inside the Address property
// Mostly useful for proxies other than Envoy
targetPort, err = strconv.Atoi(targetPortStr)
if err != nil {
logger.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("Failed to get %s port", target))
}
}
return targetIP, targetPort
}
// parsePort converts port, retrieved as little-endian bytes, into int
func parsePort(b []byte) (int, error) {
// Port attribute ({"source", "port"}) is populated as uint64 (8 byte)
// Ref: https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/1b3da361279a54956f01abba830fc5d3a5421828/source/common/network/utility.cc#L201
if len(b) < 8 {
return 0, errors.New("port bytes not found")
}
// 0 < Port number <= 65535, therefore the retrieved value should never exceed 16 bits
// and correctly fit int (at least 32 bits in size)
unsignedInt := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(b)
if unsignedInt > math.MaxInt32 {
return 0, errors.New("port conversion error")
}
return int(unsignedInt), nil
}
// parseServerName parses :authority pseudo-header in order to retrieve the
// virtual host.
func parseServerName(logger wrapper.Log, authority string) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(authority)
if err != nil {
// missing port or bad format
logger.Debug("Failed to parse server name from authority")
host = authority
}
return host
}
func handleInterruption(ctx wrapper.HttpContext, phase string, interruption *ctypes.Interruption, log wrapper.Log) types.Action {
if ctx.GetContext("interruptionHandled").(bool) {
// handleInterruption should never be called more than once
panic("Interruption already handled")
}
log.Infof("Transaction interrupted at %s", phase)
ctx.SetContext("interruptionHandled", true)
if phase == "http_response_body" {
return replaceResponseBodyWhenInterrupted(log, replaceResponseBody)
}
statusCode := interruption.Status
//log.Infof("Status code is %d", statusCode)
if statusCode == 0 {
statusCode = 403
}
if err := proxywasm.SendHttpResponse(uint32(statusCode), nil, nil, noGRPCStream); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
// SendHttpResponse must be followed by ActionPause in order to stop malicious content
return types.ActionPause
}
// replaceResponseBodyWhenInterrupted address an interruption raised during phase 4.
// At this phase, response headers are already sent downstream, therefore an interruption
// can not change anymore the status code, but only tweak the response body
func replaceResponseBodyWhenInterrupted(logger wrapper.Log, bodySize int) types.Action {
// TODO(M4tteoP): Update response body interruption logic after https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-proxy-wasm/issues/26
// Currently returns a body filled with null bytes that replaces the sensitive data potentially leaked
err := proxywasm.ReplaceHttpResponseBody(bytes.Repeat([]byte("\x00"), bodySize))
if err != nil {
logger.Error("Failed to replace response body")
return types.ActionContinue
}
logger.Warn("Response body intervention occurred: body replaced")
return types.ActionContinue
}

4
tools/hack/build-wasm-plugins.sh
View File

@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ if [ ! -n "$INNER_PLUGIN_NAME" ]; then
echo "build all wasmplugins under folder of $EXTENSIONS_DIR"
for file in `ls $EXTENSIONS_DIR`
do
# TODO: adjust waf build
if [ $file == "waf" ]; then
continue
fi
if [ -d $EXTENSIONS_DIR$file ]; then
name=${file##*/}
echo "build wasmplugin name of $name"